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Winter 1980–81

Richard K. Betts — Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed

I. M. Destler — National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought

Lewis J. Edinger — The German-American Connection in the 1980s

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# Political Science Quarterly

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## *From the Editor:*

*In this issue . . .*

RICHARD K. BETTS attempts to account for why surprise attacks succeed even when the victim has ample intelligence warnings in advance. He explores the role in this process of communication delays, deception, false alarms, and doctrinal innovations.

I.M. DESTLER, after analyzing the evolution of the NSC staff, argues that responding to immediate presidential demands has undercut the U.S. government's capacity for continuity and coherence in foreign policy. He contends that major improvement will depend on future presidents deemphasizing personal decision making in favor of other leadership instruments and on delegating to strong subordinates.

LEWIS J. EDINGER examines West German interests in world affairs. He concludes that for the forseeable future, the German Federal Republic is bound to remain a close and essentially subordinate ally of the United States.

DAVID VOGEL critically examines the political perspectives of the contemporary public-interest movement's effort to challenge business's influence over the regulatory process. He argues that the strategies the movement has developed reflect both the strengths and limitations of the American reform tradition.

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN analyzes the United States intervention in Guatemala that took place in 1954. He argues that misperceptions led to that intervention and that those misperceptions later contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI and THOMAS J. KNOCK present a major reinterpretation of the role of Woodrow Wilson in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote. They demonstrate how Wilson, originally opposed to the amendment, was converted through the efforts of women suffragists and became an advocate of critical importance.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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# Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed

RICHARD K. BETTS

Most major wars since 1939 have begun with surprise attacks. Hindsight reveals that the element of surprise in most of these attacks was unwarranted; substantial evidence of an impending strike was available to the victims before the fact. The high incidence of surprise is itself surprising. The voluminous literature on strategic surprise, however, suffers from three fixations. One is a focus on the problem of warning, and how to improve intelligence collection, rather than on the more difficult problem of how to improve political response to ample warning indicators. Another is a common view of surprise as an absolute or dichotomous problem rather than as a matter of degree. Third is the prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies. This article puts these fixations in perspective.[1]

## Intelligence and Warning: The Relativity of Surprise

Warning without response is useless. "Warning" is evidence filtered through perception; "response" is action designed to counter an attack (alert, mobilization, and redeployments to enhance readiness). The linkage between the two is accurate evaluation and sound judgment, the lack of which is the source of most victims' failures to avoid the avoidable. Just as analysts of arms-control agree-

[1] For eight case studies on which this article is based see, Richard K. Betts, *Surprise and Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming), chaps. 2 and 3.

RICHARD K. BETTS, research associate at The Brookings Institution, has taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins Universities, has served on the staffs of the National Security Council and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and is author of *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*.



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ments distinguish between monitoring and verification (the former detects possibly discrepant indicators, the latter is political determination of what evidence constitutes satisfactory compliance), analysts of surprise attack need to distinguish more carefully between intelligence, warning, and response. The issue in most cases is not a yes-or-no question of whether there is warning or response; rather the issue is *how much* warning there is and *how soon* response begins.

For most Americans, the shock of Pearl Harbor made surprise attack seem something that comes without warning; therefore obtaining warning should avert the threat. Only if communication were instantaneous and uninhibited and judgment did not intervene between information and action would this be true, and these conditions never exist. Warning derived from intelligence gathering is a continuum in several dimensions: the amount or weight of threatening indicators detected; the ratio between these and contradictory nonthreatening indicators; and the timing of receipt, evaluation, and reaction to indicators. This is also true of the response by authorities—the intensity and duration of debate about whether and how to react, and the degree of response eventually chosen: none; some; or complete (full military readiness).

Consider five phases: data acquisition; correlation, and intelligence professionals' decision to warn; communication to decision makers; discussion, assessment, and decision to respond, by these authorities; and military commanders' implementation of the authorization to respond. These phases are logically sequential but in practice often overlap and regress. Communications between intelligence officers and policymakers produce doubt and fluctuations of certainty; officials may have second thoughts and order more search, or they may declare alerts and then cancel them. Information processing may be slower than decision time or may be unsynchronized with the deliberations. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, a human source in Cuba reported sighting a missile on 12 September, but the report did not arrive at CIA until 21 September, two days after the meeting of the United States Intelligence Board. The time required to process such reports could have been shortened, but previously there had been no reason to invest the resources and take the necessary risks (endangering agents and communication networks) because the value of these sources had usually been minimal. Problems can be reduced by redundancy in intelligence collection, such as use of reconnaissance to complement espionage, to shrink the potential lacunae in coverage. But in this case, U-2 flights were suspended around the same time for political reasons (China had just shot down a U-2, and the State Department feared aggravation of the crisis by a similar incident over Cuba).[2]

Even if the process were orderly, the clock is ticking, and at each of the first four phases different views about whether attack is imminent (no, maybe, or yes) may prevail. Thus at each stage reactions can go wrong. Even if it takes

[2] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 120-22.

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only a reasonable time to form a consensus that war is coming, this is insufficient if it is less than the time the enemy needs to complete preparations.[3] The final tactical warnings that may congeal the consensus, as well as authorizations from the victim's leaders to their troops to move into wartime positions, can also be held up in the communication chain. This keeps the rates of speed in attack preparation and defense reaction in a ratio unfavorable to the victim. On the night of 21 June 1941, for example, Red Army commanders picked up numerous indicators that the Wehrmacht was going into motion, but reported through routine channels that delayed Moscow's receipt of the information.[4] The same night, Marshal Timoshenko delayed the alerting process by putting everything in writing rather than just telephoning his commanders—which was necessary for survival in Stalin's regime, where subordinates always knew they might need evidence that they had obeyed the dictator's orders perfectly. Transmission and decoding time further delayed military units' receipt of instructions; some did not receive them before they came under fire.[5]

Depending on his strategy, efficiency, and speed of preparation, the attacker can strike at many points along this continuum of reaction by the victim. The point determines the *degree* of surprise that prevents the defender from using his capabilities fully or effectively. Response necessarily lags behind warning. Even if recognition crystallizes perfectly before the moment of attack, the victim may still suffer the costs of surprise if alert, mobilization, and deployment to defensive positions are still getting under way. The victim may not be surprised that war breaks out, but he is still surprised in military *effect*. There is always some warning; there is usually some response; yet surprise seldom fails. For example, the night before the German assault in the West in 1940 Wehrmacht concentrations were detected. The Belgian military attaché in Berlin said the Germans would attack the next day, and Belgian military headquarters issued warning orders and recalled men on leave.[6] But many front-line French units were standing down for training. Important staffers of the Second Army, which was in the crucial position by Sedan, had gone to see a play and were asleep when they got news the Germans were rolling through Luxembourg.[7]

Stalin also hedged against the evidence of war (by declaring a national state of emergency on 10 April 1941); in addition he increased troop readiness, assumed full power as head of the government on 1 May, and recognized the day before Operation Barbarossa that attack might be imminent. The navy was well

[3] See Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (July 1965): 696, 698.

[4] Amnon Sella, " 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13 (July 1978): 557.

[5] Ibid., p. 563; Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 537.

[6] Guy Chapman, *Why France Fell* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 94.

[7] William L. Shirer, *The Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 607.

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alerted, and the army made last-minute preparations in a few places.[8] But "the abysmal lack of contingent preparations and the cumbrous inefficiency of his bureaucracy meant that even with a few hours' advance warning at the top, the system as a whole remained unwarned."[9] German tactics also extended the surprise into the early phases of the war. Initial strikes interdicted lines of command, control, and communication, preventing leaders in Moscow from discovering the scope and character of the assault during the first days and disrupting recovery by preventing the flow of instructions back to military units. As a result the cohesion of Soviet formations broke down and authority was paralyzed.[10]

By 6 December 1941 a full alert was declared for U.S. air units in the Philippines and troops took up defense positions along beaches. But the attack on Clark Field, despite the fact that it lagged behind the strike on Hawaii by nine hours, was as devastating as if it had come with no warning. The problem in the Philippines was not lack of intelligence, but deployments that lacked enough flexibility to respond to short warning. MacArthur had ordered his air commander to move B-17s further south, to Del Monte, but by 7 December only half of the bombers had been transferred because the new base was not ready. B-17s and fighter planes at Clark were caught on the ground while refueling.[11]

Other notable examples of the military effect of surprise include MacArthur's testimony that even if he had received three days of warning before the North Koreans invaded in 1950, it would have made little difference since he needed three weeks to get a large body of U.S. troops from Japan to Korea;[12] General Westmoreland's miscalculations of the scope and intensity of the Tet Offensive of 1968, despite intelligence warnings three weeks prior to the attacks and despite the repositioning of U.S. forces closer to Saigon;[13] and, in October 1973, the Israelis' decision half a day before the Arabs struck that war was inevitable,

[8] Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Men of Intelligence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 93; John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 96, 107, 110-12; Harrison Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 30-32.

[9] Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), p. 7.

[10] Sella, "Surprise Attack and Communication," pp. 558, 564, 566-68, 578-79; and Georgi Zhukov, *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), p. 236. Earlier, in the Battle of France, similar but self-inflicted problems occurred. Processing blockages, staff shortages, and transmission times between allied headquarters and formations in the field prevented intelligence from catching up with the pace of German operations. See F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 131, 137-38, 144, 147.

[11] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 83, 361-62, 366-67.

[12] H.A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," *Orbis* 6 (Fall 1962): 441.

[13] "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam (Interim Report)," 11 April 1968, declassified 3 December 1975, p. 5, reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Hearings, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities, Part 5: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 1997.

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which, though correct, did not allow enough time to complete mobilization; movement of ready forces into blocking positions was also incomplete by the time the Arabs struck.

Surprise is seldom absolute. Militarily, though, warning just before the fact is hardly better than no warning at all.

### *Obstacles to Warning*

To detect evidence of a threat—through reconnaissance, interception of radio transmissions, or espionage—is only the prerequisite for warning. Collected information must pass through numerous bottlenecks. It must be screened at low levels to raise initial suspicion; it must be transmitted to higher levels of the intelligence bureaucracy to be compared with data from other sources; it then has to be passed to policymakers who must judge whether the evidence warrants action. The amount and sequence of the presentation of data do much to determine how information is appreciated. But warning indicators "are usually scattered across individuals and bureaucratic units. They are also introduced incrementally over a long period."[14] Before Pearl Harbor the accumulation of signals was disjointed. Not all intercepts were decoded. Of those that were, some were transmitted quickly upward, others were held up at low levels, and some never got to a level where decisions could be made; "no single person or agency ever had at any given moment all the signals existing in this vast information network."[15] Some indicators are dismissed as false or meaningless at low levels and are never passed to decision makers.

The process of relaying intelligence can distort its meaning. Content can be altered unconsciously in transmission. Garbled data are made to appear more coherent when relayed in conversation, allowing actual disjunctions between facts to be replaced by false connections; lengthy information can be made shorter; details are suppressed subconsciously if they are not consistent with the rest of the relayer's message; and transmission errors tend to make the message sound like what the person transmitting it had been expecting to hear. Subordinates also tend to bias messages so as to minimize distress to their superiors; transmitting individuals tend toward "closure" of incomplete images and "confabulating detail where gaps are conspicuous"; long time periods are reported as shorter, and short ones as longer.[16] Early on the morning the Yom Kippur War began, a trusted source warned Israel that the Arabs would attack that day. Somewhere in the communication chain the time of six o'clock was added erroneously to the warning.[17] The Arabs struck over four hours sooner.

[14] Steve Chan, "The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning," *American Political Science Review* 73 (March 1979): 175.

[15] Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 385.

[16] Donald T. Campbell, "Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communication Systems," *Information and Control* 1 (1958): 341–47, 349–51.

[17] Confidential source.

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Strategic warning has come a long way since the days when one of the prime indicators was the enemy's decision to forbid the export of horses. Hundreds of bits of information pour in from technical sensors and must be digested and summarized as they are passed up to officials with progressively wider responsibilities. If done well, this may clarify the danger, but the process creates the possibility that the whole picture may be less compelling to a high-level policymaker than it might be to a specialist spending all his time on the matter, seeing crucial connections between disparate shreds of data. George Marshall testified after Pearl Harbor, "If I am supposed to have (had) final responsibility of the reading of all MAGIC [intercepts of Japanese diplomatic communications], I would have ceased to be Chief of Staff in practically every other respect."[18]

Lower-level specialists, on the other hand, do not see all the collected indicators. Security mandates "compartmentation," and "need-to-know" as a criterion for access to classes of data. Secrecy also complicates judgment of the credibility of information. Early in World War II the ability to decipher German communications with the "Enigma" machine was so sensitive that decrypts sent to British intelligence staffs were disguised as espionage reports from human sources (HUMINT), which are normally much less reliable than signals intelligence (SIGINT). Analysts therefore were very skeptical about this information, which was really pure gold. Sensitivity also limited circulation of this data at field headquarters, and staffs there could not coordinate it with other, less sensitive SIGINT and field intelligence.[19] Distrust of HUMINT illustrates how possession of information does not guarantee better warning. Frequently wild, incorrect, or contradictory reports from agents in Cuba in 1961–62 led U.S. estimators to discount them in the period before missiles were discovered by aerial reconnaissance. Since protection of sources requires that the identity of agents be concealed from middle-level analysts, the analysts have no idea of how to verify the reliability of the sources. U.S. analysts of OPEC relied much more on embassy reporting than CIA clandestine service reports prior to the 1973 oil embargo and price rise, and this contributed to the failure to predict the events.[20]

The lower the level of authority, the more limited is the access; the higher the level, the more coordinated is the evaluation, but also the less time available to ponder one particular problem to the exclusion of others. Only *nine* U.S. officials were on the regular distribution list for MAGIC in late 1941, and they spent much of their time worrying about Europe in the period during which alarming evidence about Japanese moves dribbled in.

Postwar reforms in American intelligence organization have ameliorated these problems. Creation of the Watch Committee and later the Strategic Warning Staff improved the speed of communication and coordination. The need for

[18] Quoted in Julian Critchley, *Warning and Response* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc., 1978), p. 50.

[19] Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 1, pp. 138, 145.

[20] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Staff Report, U.S. Intelligence and the Oil Issue, 1973–1974*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, pp. 3–4.

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secrecy, however, still inhibits lateral movement of information even more than in previous years because of the large variety of reconnaissance and electronic collection mechanisms.

## Limits to Predictability

Success in warning can be indistinguishable from failure.[21] If the defender recognizes warning, predicts war, and responds in time with defensive preparations, the attacker may cancel the operation. The prediction then appears to have been wrong. The commander of the Japanese task force en route to Pearl Harbor in 1941 had orders to abort if surprise were lost. If the Israelis had mobilized in late September 1973, as they had the previous May when threatening Arab movements were detected, Sadat might have postponed his attack. The victim's intelligence is always at the mercy of the attacker's option to change his plans. If success in prediction does not nullify itself, however, it can induce complacency. The actual occurrence of a predicted attack does not offer the best grounds on which to evaluate the quality of warning.[22]

Pure bolts-from-the-blue hardly ever occur. Sudden attacks happen after prolonged political conflict. They often do not occur at the peak of tension, but they are usually preceded by periods in which the defender's leaders believe that war is possible. And they often follow a number of false alarms. The rountinization of tension desensitizes observers to the danger of imminent war. Crises are more common than the actual outbreak of war. American intelligence did not correctly assess the warnings coming from Korea in the spring of 1950 because there were similar situations all around the border areas of the Soviet Union, some of which appeared more dangerous.[23]

This simple fact of international relations makes it risky to draw political warning out of "learning curves." As Ezer Weizman noted ruefully after the Yom Kippur War: "There are two popular folk sayings that are as fatal to military concepts as they are to political ones: 'There is no wisdom like experience,' and 'History repeats itself.' . . . for the man of experience who relies on the stability of history, wisdom becomes a broken reed."[24] Historical context is of course a necessary and valuable grounding for strategic assessment, but not a reliable guide. The warnings at issue involve quick and major changes from normal behavior. Extrapolations from past behavior and from incremental changes are poor bases for anticipating such dramatic shifts.[25] Mathematical probability theory is no help in predicting one-time events when there is a small number of

[21] See Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976): 378.

[22] Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity," p. 173.

[23] James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), p. 64.

[24] Ezer Weizman, *On Eagles' Wings* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1976), p. 209.

[25] Chan, "Intelligence of Stupidity," p. 172.

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cases to use as the base. Forecasting is a chain of separate estimates about probability—predictions about conditions, events, or decisions that are the prerequisite to attack. Correct estimates of the probabilities in eight out of ten links in the chain is an admirable intellectual feat, but warning will nonetheless fail if the estimate in the ninth link is wrong. Great success in predicting enemy behavior under *normal* conditions of stress does not help prediction—and may hinder it—in the rare circumstances in which the stakes of the competition grow much larger.[26]

### *Indecision, False Alerts, and Fluctuations*

Simple indecision by the attacker can prevent clear signals from being picked up by the defender because there *are* no clear signals.[27] Conciliatory rhetoric by the state that eventually attacks may be seen later by the victim as calculated deception, but the rhetoric may actually be innocent, reflecting genuine ambivalence within the attacker's government. While agonizing over the decision of whether to strike, decision makers want to keep options open and minimize provocation. Doves may even be temporarily ascendant and use such signals not only to reassure the eventual victim and prevent the confrontation from worsening but also to dampen the enthusiasm of the pro-war faction with whom they are contending. This possibility is greatest when the attacker's government is a collective decision-making system, or when the motivations for surprise attack are defensive, and least in an absolutist dictatorship such as Hitler's. Indecision can occur even when the attacker's motives are purely aggressive and even up to the last minute. On 25 August 1939, the Wehrmacht received orders to cross the Polish frontier the next morning. Troops and tanks approached the border that night. Later in the evening Hitler ordered a stop because negotiations with Warsaw were on again. On 1 September orders came down again to invade the next day. Commanders expected another cancellation.[28]

Whether innocent or planned, such hesitancy deceives the defender. Schedule changes and deferral of D-days are more correlated with achievement of surprise than are attacks that occur on schedule.[29] Warning officers are embarrassed by predictions that do not pan out. If their fear of being labeled a "Chicken Little" does not lead them to hold off from a second or third such prediction, they may be derided as hysterical by decision makers tired of false alerts. An attacker able to fine-tune his plans is therefore well advised to undertake *fluctuating* preparations, to lend an up-and-down quality to strategic and tactical indicators the victim will discern. Fluctuation feeds the defender's ex-

[26] Robert Axelrod, "The Rational Timing of Surprise," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 244–45.

[27] See Michael I. Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War*, Jerusalem Paper No. 19 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1976), p. 11.

[28] R. T. Paget, *Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial* (London: Collins, 1951), p. 19.

[29] Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center of International Studies, 1969), pp. 176–79, 187, 188.

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pectation that nothing is likely to happen. The attacker may condition the victim by actually creating a *new* pattern of what is *normal*, against which subsequent actions are measured.[30] The "cry wolf" problem is where the attacker's go-stop-go option and the danger of basing predictions on extrapolations from past behavior come together. For example, the German attack on Norway in April 1940 preserved surprise because the Norwegian foreign minister had been immunized against the indicators. Before Christmas, and again in February, he had received warnings of impending German attack, and nothing had happened.[31]

In the same period numerous false alarms poured into allied intelligence that the Germans were on the verge of striking into France. On 9 May, the day before the actual attack, French intelligence was advised "Get ready! Attack tomorrow at dawn!" But on that day it saw no "abnormal German movements" and British Royal Air Force reconnaissance said there was "nothing unusual"—although German concentrations had been noted in earlier days.[32] The Dutch also failed to react to inside information. Colonel Hans Oster, deputy chief of German counterintelligence and a clandestine opponent of Hitler, had told the Dutch military attaché in Berlin each time the attack was planned. But Hitler postponed the attack numerous times between November 1939 and May 1940, so the Dutch were "overwarned," and Supreme Commander General I. H. Reynders ignored the reports. When Oster gave another warning ten days before the actual attack, the attaché did not even pass it on to The Hague.[33] The original German plan required six days of preparatory troop movements to attack. But the canceled attacks in November and January had accomplished most of those movements (the formations were kept in place after the cancellations), so the preparations just before 10 May were less unambiguous to the allies than they would have been had there been no previous false starts.[34]

Stalin also received numerous reports of a scheduled German attack, from March 1941 onward, which were not borne out. The Germans did delay the Barbarossa onslaught for five weeks. Soviet frontier troops grew less sensitive to evidence of threatening Wehrmacht activity in the three weeks before the attack because frequent alarms induced alert fatigue.[35]

[30] Roberta Wohlstetter, "The Pleasures of Self Deception," *Washington Quarterly* 2 (Autumn 1979): 54.

[31] George Burns Williams, "Blitzkrieg and Conquest: Policy Analysis of Military and Political Decisions Preparatory to the German Attack upon Norway, April 9, 1940" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1966), p. 465; Johan Jørgen Holst, "Surprise, Signals and Reaction: The Attack on Norway, April 9th, 1940—Some Observations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 1 (1966): 39.

[32] Quoted in Shirer, *Collapse of the Third Republic*, pp. 606–7.

[33] Henry L. Mason, "War Comes to the Netherlands: September 1939–May 1940," *Political Science Quarterly* 78 (December 1963): 557, 562–64. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 1, p. 135.

[34] Major L.F. Ellis, *The War in France and Flanders: 1939–1940* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 344–46.

[35] Sella, "Surprise Attack and Communication," p. 256.

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General Short, the army commander in Hawaii, was not impressed by Washington's 27 November 1941 warning of war because he remembered the alarmism of a navy dispatch of 16 October. Short and Admiral Kimmel had also received reports several times during the year that the Japanese in Honolulu were burning their codes. The first message alarmed them, but subsequent ones seemed less serious. When they heard in the week before the attack that the Japanese were burning papers in their consulate, the commanders did not react.[36] American intelligence predictions on Korea in 1950 and Israeli assessments of Egyptian movements in late September 1973 were also hobbled by earlier false alarms.

Crying wolf decreases the decision maker's sensitivity to warning and increases the intelligence officer's sensitivity to looking foolish by raising false alarms. Thus the simple norm of "when in doubt, *respond*" is unrealistic. And if indulged constantly, the urge to collect intelligence full-blast may be counterproductive not only politically and financially, but operationally as well. To fly 360-degree reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor with the planes available, the U.S. military would have had to reduce training, delay important shipments to the Philippines, exhaust crews, and run down the planes' airworthiness within a short time. "An extraordinary state of alert that brings about a peak in readiness," notes Roberta Wohlstetter, "must be followed by a trough at a later date."[37] (The United States today would face the same problem if it initiated airborne alert for the Strategic Air Command in response to crisis.) Readiness at the wrong time may yield unreadiness at the moment of real vulnerability.

At least in a small way, the problem of false alarm has been involved in most cases of surprise attack. To reduce the danger of relaxation induced by crying wolf, analysts and decision makers need to focus on the *differences* between previous false alarms and the enemy actions in the crisis at issue. The preparations for final attacks are usually not identical. Some exercises, deployments, and changes in communication patterns are noticeably more threatening than others. The technical nuances and details are crucial. Warning officers who are briefing decision makers, therefore, will raise the odds of response to the extent that they can show why the latest case differs from the earlier ones. If the differences are merely nuances, however, the weight of similarity may overcome suspicion. When Arye Shalev, the Israeli military spokesman in the cabinet meeting three days before the October 1973 War, interpreted new Syrian dispositions as defensive, he did note "some exceptional aspects" in the positioning of artillery and a bridging battalion. He also said ammunition uploading by Egyptian units did not suggest a routine exercise and might be a prelude to a genuine attack. Nevertheless, Shalev concluded, the weight of reliable evidence indicated an exercise, and he ascribed the intensity of Egyptian alert to fears that Israel might seize the moment to attack.[38]

[36] Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor*, pp. 137, 151.

[37] Ibid., p. 397.

[38] Zeev Schiff, *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973*, trans. Louis Williams (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1974), pp. 17–18.

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### *The Allure of Deferring Decision*

Because warning is a continuum, and because surprise attacks are the end products of prolonged tension rather than genuine bolts-from-the-blue, decision makers are used to living in an environment of *some* warning. The concern is how much accumulated warning warrants military reaction that will pose financial, diplomatic, and domestic political costs. As long as the issue is how much, it is seductively easy for decision makers to wait for more. They may do this without feeling irresponsible by undertaking partial measures of response—the illusion of sufficient hedging. One 26 September 1973, for instance, Israel reacted to Syrian troop concentrations by adding an extra brigade, artillery units, antitank positions, ditches, and mines to the northern front.[39] But this was not enough to stop the Syrians immediately when the attack came over a week later.

The most basic but least helpful kinds of warning are the general political indications of enemy ambitions to change the status quo or evidence of strategic thinking and operational military objectives. On the first point, it has become a truism that allied leaders need only have read *Mein Kampf* to know Hitler would resort to subterfuge and war. On the second, for example, one post mortem notes that the allies had warning, from writings on naval strategy a decade earlier, that the Germans would feel compelled to occupy Norway.[40] Neither of these underdetermining "facts," however, provides any basis for guessing the certainty, moment, or location of attack; they are always a matter of at least several possibilities.

Victims sometimes recognize escalating indicators of attack yet still wait too long before mobilizing because they expect the enemy to play out more diplomatic moves before striking. When logical political possibilities remain by which the adversary could hope to achieve its goals—especially if the defender is making obvious its willingness to consider conciliation and concession—it seems reasonable to say "the game is not up yet" and to play for time. During the Sudetenland crisis of 1939 evidence of military activity worried some in the West that the Germans might attack, but British ambassador Sir Neville Henderson was sure that Hitler would not march: "I think it is equally possible that he will do nothing irrevocably without giving us a possibly 24-hour chance to prevent the irrevocable."[41] And in that case Henderson was right. Two months later the Munich Conference ensued and Hitler got what he wanted without a fight. Evidence of enemy preparations to attack may be seen by a victim as a bluff, designed for diplomatic coercion. This is what Chinese warnings seemed to be between June and November 1950, before their intervention in force in Korea.

The attacker, though, can decide to skip rungs on the ladder of political escalation. Stalin, for example, expected an ultimatum before the Nazis struck and

[39] Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise,* p. 32.

[40] Holst, "Surprise, Signals, and Reaction," p. 36.

[41] E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939,* Third Series, vol. II: *1938* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), Document 553, p. 14.

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believed he still had the time in mid-1941 to temporize with economic concessions. In late 1941 the American interest was to delay conflict with Japan; despite consciousness that war might be imminent, "the President believed he still had some time."[42] And in mid-1945 the Japanese asked the Soviet Union to serve as an intermediary for a conditional surrender to the United States, making clear their willingness to grant Stalin substantial political and territorial concessions for this favor. Stalin deceived leaders in Tokyo, who believed he was seriously interested in negotiating. Thus they were stunned when Soviet forces, violating the Moscow-Tokyo nonaggression pact, struck in Manchuria in August.[43]

Another example of skipping stages in escalation prior to attack was highlighted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson's testimony that "the view was generally held [before the Korean War] that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression."[44] An intelligence cable from the Far East Command on 10 March 1950 noted that North Korea could be ready to attack the South by spring, but argued that plans in Korea would be contingent on Communist activities in Southeast Asia and that direct military action in Korea would "be held in abeyance, at least until further observations made by Soviets of results of their program in such places as Indochina, Burma, and Thailand."[45]

Two further examples help illustrate this point. Before the 1956 Sinai Campaign some observers believed Israel would use Palestinian *fedayeen* raids as a pretext for a limited reprisal designed to provoke Egyptian counteraction, which "would confuse the issue as to who was the aggressor, and allow Israel to launch unrestricted warfare against Egypt. . . . In fact the Israeli Government had decided to omit any intermediate steps."[46] And, in June 1967 Israel attacked rather than wait for diplomacy to play itself out; the notion that Israel *would* wait to give diplomacy a final chance was used for deceptive purposes.[47]

Sometimes victims assume erroneously that by the logic of the situation they have the initiative, the enemy will be reacting, and therefore they read alternative explanations into tactical indicators. In 1904, just before the Japanese surprise attack on Port Arthur, the consensus among the victim's arrogant elite was

[42] Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 269.

[43] John Despres, Lilita I. Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, *Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy*, R-1825-NA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, July 1976), p. 17. Stalin had terminated the nonaggression treaty before the attack, but the terms of the treaty required a full year's notice for abrogation.

[44] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East*, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Part 3, p. 1991.

[45] Quoted in Ibid.

[46] Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (New York: Obolensky, 1963), p. 179.

[47] Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 341.

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that the decision for or against war would be up to Russia.[48] In early April 1940 the British were planning their own intervention in Norway, estimated the Germans would need more divisions to invade Scandinavia than were available, believed their naval superiority in itself precluded an effective German initiative in the area, and interpreted relevant indicators as evidence of German desires either to engineer another break-out of heavy ships into the Atlantic or to interdict British convoys to Norway. When information arrived via Copenhagen that Hitler would attack Narvik and Jutland with small forces, the operation seemed too daring. "Incredulity thus was the first response in Whitehall to the Copenhagen message."[49]

Among the most critical factors associated with the probability of recognizing signals are the perceived rewards and costs of doing so. Officials may have to make very distasteful decisions if the warning is real: "Even a dim awareness of this prospect," notes Alexander George, "may subtly discourage the policymaker from believing the warning."[50] Officials have a natural incentive to wait as long as they think is possible because all the while that imminence of attack remains uncertain, the costs of preparing completely for it remain certain.[51] Intelligence cannot be *ignored* indefinitely. But it can be explained away. When a consumer is faced with data he prefers not to believe, he can fall back on four psychological mechanisms.

First, he can be more attentive to reassuring data. The threshold at which evidence confirming the individual's assumptions is recognized comes well before the threshold for contradictory evidence. Information that challenges reigning expectations or wishes "is often required, in effect, to meet higher standards of evidence and to pass stricter tests to gain acceptance than new information that supports existing expectations and hypotheses."[52] The consumer can also challenge the credibility of the source. An analyst or agency that has been chronically wrong in the past can be dismissed. Some political leaders also tend to be skeptical of advice from military sources and suspicious that professional soldiers manipulate information in order to gain authorization for desired changes

[48] "Japan was not a country that could give an ultimatum to Russia. . . . The Russians in Port Arthur scarcely considered the Japanese to be people" (Denis Warner and Peggy Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905* [New York: Charterhouse, 1974], p. 11).

[49] Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War,* pp. 120–22.

[50] Alexander L. George, "Warning and Response: Theory and Practice," in *International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control,* ed. Yair Evron (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1979), pp. 17, 19.

[51] "We also refused to believe our intelligence [in 1950] because it would have been very inconvenient if we had: we would have had to do something about it. In the end, of course, it was much more inconvenient not to have believed our intelligence, but those acquainted with statecraft and politics know how much easier it is to rectify an error of omission, even at tremendous cost, than to make an embarrassing decision in advance" (DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," pp. 451–52).

[52] Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 574.

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in posture. A consumer's belief that the person giving him information has an ideological axe to grind, or a vested interest in changing policy, will tend to discredit the information. Third, the decision maker can appreciate the warnings, but suspend judgment and order stepped-up intelligence collection to confirm the threat, hoping to find contrary evidence that reduces the probability the enemy will strike. Finally, the consumer can rationalize. He may focus on the remaining ambiguity of the evidence rather than on the balance between threatening and reassuring data, letting his wish become father to his thought. He can explain away mounting but inconclusive threats by considering other elements of the context, or believing that enemy mobilization is precautionary and defensive. In many cases such reasoning is quite correct. The likelihood a responsible policymaker will let himself think this way varies directly with the severity of the specific costs involved in response to the warning and with the availability of reassuring evidence. There are always *some* real data to dampen alarm. Such data can also be fabricated.

### *Deception*

Mixed signals can allow a reluctant defender to believe the worst is not yet at hand. An astute attacker can affect such a mix by injecting false indicators into the victim's view. If the intelligence *analysts* in the victimized state fail to see through the fabrication, then the efficiency of their intelligence *collection* system actually works against them. Improved observational technology hurts the victim if it monitors routine indicators that the attacker is purposely manipulating in a nonroutine way.[53] Deception can lull defenders by increasing the volume of "noise" and thus the victim's impression that the evidence is indeterminate, as Roberta Wohlstetter suggests, or, as Barton Whaley argues, by *reducing* the apparent ambiguity of the data, reassuring the victim that favorable signs outweigh dangerous ones.

Deception is cheap. Little investment in men and material is necessary, and the return is very high.[54] It can also compensate for the erosion of secrecy that is inevitable in the extended period during which the attacker gets his ducks in a row. "Secrecy and speed are mutually dependent on each other," notes Erfurth. "If secrecy cannot be maintained, speed must be increased; if speed is not practical, the enemy must be kept wholly ignorant." He concludes, along with General Alfred Krauss, that "confusion is the only effective method of maintaining secrecy."[55] Deception reinforces the attacker's timing by slowing the victim's perception and keeping the pace of its preparations behind the attacker's. Defenders well versed in intrigue are not less likely to be victims of deception than are more ingenuous leaders. A comprehensive survey yielded the conclusion that

[53] Axelrod, "Rational Timing of Surprise," p. 246.

[54] Whaley, *Stratagem*, p. 232.

[55] General Waldemar Erfurth, *Surprise*, trans. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), pp. 39, 6.

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"the deceiver is almost always successful regardless of the sophistication of his victim in the same art."[56] Stalin was alert to what he believed was British disinformation in 1940–41, but less sensitive to German deception. Paradoxically, alertness to the possibility of deception may increase susceptibility, by inhibiting revision of estimates: "Deception provides a readily 'available' explanation for discrepant evidence."[57]

The first stage of warning is the detection of changes in normal behavior of the adversary's forces. Monitoring standard operating procedures helps to detect this, but sometimes an attacker can conceal changes in posture, provide indicators that divert the perception of threat to other sectors, or emit signals that suggest a totally innocent explanation. An example of the first possibility is the care taken by the Germans to maintain a normal pattern of radio traffic before striking into France in 1940, so as not to let a precipitous rise in the number of transmissions alert the allies;[58] an example of the second is the flow of announcements from the Wehrmacht at that time emphasizing the role of Army Group B, to reinforce the allied supposition that the principal threat was further north in Belgium, rather than Army Group A's plunge through the Ardennes;[59] an example of the third is the development of a profile of maneuver exercises similar to the movement and concentration necessary to launch an actual attack, as Egypt did in May 1973.

Deception allows the victim to retain confidence in its intelligence collection, while not raising alarm. Thus while the attacker is directing communication security and command-and-control deception procedures, the victim's leaders may be telling themselves that their own forces are alert and responsive.[60] On the other hand, an attacker might purposely increase the number of signals, by spewing out large amounts of disinformation to overload the victim's intelligence and decision system, creating confusion and encouraging delay in response; "most information processing systems operate with little margin for coping with sudden increase in volume."[61] This can happen even if the surge of indicators is not artificially inflated. In the crisis leading to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the situation center at NATO headquarters was unable to handle the flow of information.[62] Sudden overload in military indicators

[56] Whaley, *Stratagem*, p. 146.

[57] Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective" (Paper delivered at the Twenty-first International Studies Association convention, Los Angeles, Calif., March 1980), pp. 16, 47.

[58] F. W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 32.

[59] Guenther Blumentritt, *Von Runstedt: The Soldier and the Man,* trans. Cuthbert Reavely (London: Odham's Press, 1952), pp. 65–66.

[60] Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Elliott, "The Calculus of Surprise Attack," *Air University Review* 30 (March–April 1979): 62.

[61] Whaley, *Stratagem*, p. 18.

[62] Jon McLin, "NATO and the Czechoslovakian Crisis, Part II: Invasion, Reaction, and Stocktaking," American Universities Field Staff Reports, West Europe Series, vol. 4, no. 4 (Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, February 1969), p. 6.

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is a warning itself. But as long as the situation still seems ambiguous, the reaction may be to wait until better sense can be made of the combined data.

Once the attack has begun, deception can still cripple the defender's response; tactical moves can amount to strategic deception. When the Germans launched the 1940 blitzkrieg it involved a strike into Belgium and the Netherlands that gave the French and British a mistaken impression of *déja vu*, suggesting a repetition of the Schlieffen Plan that began World War I. This view was reinforced by the allies' capture of the first attack plan (subsequently changed), which did resemble the 1914 operation.[63] As a result, there were no allied reserves to counter the thrust through the Ardennes.

## The Circumvention Option: Designing Around Deterrence

Few defense strategies designed to deter attack are invulnerable. A determined and inventive adversary can often discover a way to avoid the strengths of a defense posture and exploit its weaknesses. Designing around the victim's strategy is most devastating when the weaknesses to be exploited are ones not fully recognized by the victim. There is usually more than one effective option for changing the status quo, and a defender who covers a dozen of those options effectively is no better off if the attacker uses a thirteenth option.[64] Most decisive are operational innovations that accomplish what the victim's leaders consider impossible, for example, crossing "impassable" terrain, as the Germans did in the Ardennes in 1940, or as the Soviets did in the Manchurian campaign of August 1945 when they focused on the Transbaikal Front and crossed the Greater Khingan range.[65]

Some operations simply turn out to be more feasible than the defender's planners assume. So impractical did a German attack on Norway seem in 1940 that a British military intelligence official reacted to a warning by saying: "I wish I could believe this story. German intervention in Scandinavia is just what we want."[66] The most significant examples are innovations: those attacks that use technical or doctrinal surprises to neutralize the victim's strategy.

### *Technical Surprise*

The most militarily telling innovations are those in which the development of a new possibility is coupled quickly with an appropriate strategic and tactical concept, and is applied promptly in battle before the enemy becomes aware of, absorbs, and adapts to it. "Every weapon is dependent not only on the strength of

[63] Critchley, *Warning and Response*, pp. 21-22.

[64] See George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, pp. 520-21.

[65] Lilita I. Dzirkals, *"Lightning War" in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign*, P-5589 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, January 1976), p. 28.

[66] Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 1, pp. 117-118.

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the opposition but also on its own willingness to make immediate, maximum use of the latest technical developments and thus to remain at the summit of its period."[67]

American intelligence estimated that the range of Japanese fighters based on Formosa was insufficient for an attack on Clark Field in the Philippines. This *was* true until a month before Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese succeeded in increasing the range by adjusting engines and practicing rigorous fuel-conserving flight profiles.[68] There is no way to prevent intelligence failures in prediction of such short-term changes in threat if both the innovation and the attack occur in the window period before order of battle assessments are updated.

A minor innovation of this sort does not normally have massive consequences, but the chance that it will is improved if it is compounded by another such change. U.S. naval officers had grounds for complacency about the danger of attack with aerial torpedoes in Pearl Harbor, because the harbor was too shallow. They might have been alerted by the British attack on the Italian fleet in the harbor of Taranto which showed that torpedoes could be used in shallow water. Secretary of the Navy Knox noted this, but Admiral Kimmel did not worry because the torpedoes at Taranto still ran at twice the depth of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel rejected precautionary use of torpedo nets because they would tie up ship traffic. Until a month before the attack, this view was correct. Commander Minoru Genda, one of the principal planners of the operation, worried that use of torpedoes might have to be canceled. The Japanese managed, however, through a fin adjustment refined just a week before the fleet sailed, to develop torpedoes that would function even in the minimal depth of Pearl Harbor and used them with devastating effect on 7 December.[69]

A defender may know the enemy has equipment designed to accomplish certain tasks, but may assume it will not really work or can be countered easily, especially if it is simple. Israeli leaders in 1973 were impressed by the Suez Canal as a natural barrier. With little experience in wide water crossings themselves, they were not sensitive to how important such operations were in Soviet doctrine or to how well Russian advisers had trained Egyptians in the art of bridging. Arab use of infrared and other night-fighting gadgetry was also surprising.[70]

Major technical surprises are seldom absolute. Most breakthroughs are expected by some scientists or strategists in the victim nation. But there is no assurance that this awareness will be transmitted to or appreciated by enough experts to generate a new consensus of expectation in the scientific community; or

[67] General Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (London: Futura Publications Limited, 1974), p. 42.

[68] Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor*, pp. 358–361, 365.

[69] Ibid., p. 369; John Deane Potter, *Yamamoto: The Man Who Menaced America* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 53–54; Alvin D. Coox, "Pearl Harbor," in *Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air*, eds. Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1976), p. 145.

[70] Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise*, pp. 46–47.

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enough of the highest professional military to compel a change in defensive tactics and plans; or enough political leaders to authorize changes in spending, basing, readiness, or deployment. The fact that someone in the victim's elite warns does not mean the warning will yield results. This applies particularly to the joining of technical with doctrinal innovation. Some observers assert that the blitzkrieg of 1940 was not a surprise because J.F.C. Fuller, Basil Liddell Hart, or Charles de Gaulle anticipated it. But it was a surprise because those in authority did not anticipate it.

Strictly technical surprises are frequent. Most are minor or they are recognized and hedged against with new countermeasures. They are part of the natural ebb and flow of defense modernization and procurement. The ones crucial for surprise attack are those that occur just before a war, and are not detected or evaluated, or those that facilitate not only tactical tinkering but revolution in operational strategy.

### *Doctrinal Surprise*

Purely technical surprises involve short-term ignorance by the victim; surprises in doctrinal applications of weaponry involve long-term misjudgment. The British assumed the Royal Navy would dominate engagements in the Skagerak and the North Sea and failed to assess correctly the ramifications of the development of air power. Thus the Luftwaffe was decisive in the German attack on Norway.[71] The Germans also used airborne forces (paratroops and gliders) for the first time as the vanguard of attack in the Norway operation, with novel results. (The existence of airborne forces was nothing new; the Russians had developed them as early as the 1920s.) This German novelty did not sink into the consciousness of all the western defenders. The Dutch commander did issue a preliminary alert to his forces on the German border just before the attack of 10 May, but the warning was not passed on to all units behind the line because action was not immediately expected in interior sectors. As a result the two German airborne divisions that landed at Fortress Holland came up against troops that had not been alerted, in the interest of avoiding needless fatigue.[72] The Germans also used air transport to resupply advanced armored formations with fuel and to fly in 2,000 maintenance workers to forward repair bases. "The Allies were not thinking in such terms in May 1940," explained Major L. F. Ellis.[73] The fact that the Egyptian army in 1973 possessed Sagger antitank missiles was no surprise to Israel, but their distribution and usage was, and caused unanticipated losses of Israeli armor. Similarly, the Egyptians' simple use of a belt of surface-to-air missiles around ground forces as a substitute for offensive air superiority, to screen the army in the Sinai, contradicted Israeli assumptions about

[71] Holst, "Surprise, Signals and Reaction," p. 35.
[72] Mason, "War Comes to the Netherlands," p. 566.
[73] Ellis, *War in France and Flanders*, p. 346.

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the capacity of Israel's air force to forestall enemy advances on the ground. ("Logistical surprise" is a related possibility, as in the 1962 missile crisis, when the speed of construction of the Soviet sites in Cuba jolted American intelligence.[74] Moshe Dayan also cited Egypt's capacity to build and replace pontoon bridges as a logistical surprise in the October War.)[75]

The blitzkrieg against France is the clearest example of doctrinal surprise. The western allies knew well the strictly technical capabilities of tanks, but not their revolutionary operational potential when deployed independently of infantry and coordinated with air elements as they were by the Wehrmacht in May 1940. German success had little to do with any technical advantages per se. The allies had *both* quantitative and qualitative superiority in armored equipment.[76] The allies also had some doctrinal warning from German writings and the campaign in Poland of the "lightning war" strategy (although Manstein's plan for deep armored penetration of France was unprecedented). In this sense the Russians, a year later, had double warning. But in both cases the victims still suffered the effects of surprise because they had not had time to digest and internalize the implications within their military organizations (the Russians had pioneered such tactics under Tukhachevsky, but abandoned them in the interim).

German development of the concepts behind the blitzkrieg strategy was explicitly motivated by the desire to capitalize on surprise. World War I had demonstrated the near impossibility of preserving surprise in operations based on frontal infantry assaults and massed indirect firepower. The vast preparations required to move artillery and ammunition took too much time and were difficult to conceal.[77] Despite the long peacetime gestation of German ideas for armored warfare, allied military leaders failed to appreciate them. Failure to absorb this doctrinal warning is not surprising because generational views of strategic reality, annealed in the experience of earlier war, are not sensitive to fragmentary, inconclusive indicators of enemy innovation; moreover, doctrinal warning *is* fragmentary and inconclusive, because a revolutionary doctrine is often resisted within the military establishment that ultimately accepts it at the last minute.

Military strategists tend to mislearn, in cyclical fashion, the lessons of war concerning the relative dominance of offensive and defensive capabilities.[78] Victors do this more than losers; having won the previous war, they see more virtue in the dominant strategies of that war. Thus the French Army, beaten by the Prussian offensive in 1870, fixated on "*l'offensive à l'outrance*" (attack to exhaustion). This prevented appreciation of intelligence collected in 1913 on German use of reserves that implied the need for French forces to stay on the defen-

[74] Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," p. 698.

[75] Avigdor Haselkorn, "Israeli Intelligence Performance in the Yom Kippur War," Hudson Institute Discussion Paper 2033 (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., July 1974), pp. 1, 15n.

[76] R.H.S. Stolfi, "Equipment for Victory in France," *History* 52 (February 1970): 1–20.

[77] Guderian, *Panzer Leader,* p. 41.

[78] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 189.

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sive.[79] The war that followed was dominated by static defense and attrition. It was the German losers who reached first for strategic innovation and new offensive doctrine in 1940 when faced with the possibility of a replay of World War I. The Soviet Red Army had scant reason to be proud of its performance against Finland in 1939–40, but it did win the Winter War, and for a short but critical time learned its lessons too well. The storming of the Mannerheim Line became a model: the defense was to be ground down by gradual application of overwhelming force. "We ceased to deal seriously with mobile combat," Marshal Biriuzov recounted. "We relegated to oblivion the fundamentals of combat-in-depth tactics and of combined arms maneuvers which had been widespread before the Finnish campaign. . . . [In 1941] We had to retrain ourselves under enemy fire."[80] Biriuzov exaggerates, since the Red Army did begin to reinstitute armored formations before the onslaught, but the delay from mixed experience of the Winter War did little to help.

In light of history, we might ask whether the victors of World War II overlearned its lessons. The Warsaw Pact appears to be organized around rapid armored offensive. The United States also won World War II, but NATO's posture is more oriented to defensive operations. Some analysts, though not all, argue that the advent of highly efficient antitank guided munitions (ATGMs) heralds the pendulum's swing back toward the dominance of the defense.[81] There is ambiguous evidence that since the October War in the Middle East the Soviets have recognized the problems this creates for their strategy and have responded with even greater interest in the value of preemption and surprise. Yet it will be difficult for American observers to anticipate sea-changes in Soviet doctrine.

Doctrinal innovation may be a surprise when it unfolds on the battlefield because it is almost a surprise to the attacker who uses it: new concepts may bubble up from middle-level planners and the leadership may opt for them only at the last minute, after a long history of suppressing or arguing over them. Doctrinal revolutions in practice usually follow long and hesitant evolutions in theory. If a future victim fails to perceive the new doctrine during its peacetime gestation, before it has crystallized and really *becomes* the new doctrine, it is harder to fault its judgment. Should the victim be blamed for blindness to change when the attacker who later adopts it is still blind to it? Doctrinal factions contend within the military establishments of both attacker and defender. If the innovative faction barely wins in the former and barely loses in the latter, the defender's failure to be ready is disastrous but hardly egregious.

[79] Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), p. 61.

[80] Marshal S. S. Biriuzov, "The Lesson Learned Too Well," in *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II,* ed. Seweryn Bialer (New York: Pegasus Publishers, 1969), p. 137.

[81] See John Mearsheimer, "Precision-guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," *Survival* 21 (March–April 1979): 68–76, and sources cited in his notes 2 and 3, for arguments and counterarguments.

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Perhaps achievement of doctrinal warning can only be tentative, by paying close attention to the progress of dissident strategists or "oddballs" writing in enemy military journals, or by extrapolating from apparently anomalous aspects of enemy exercises, or by anticipating circumstances that would allow the enemy to shift its doctrine easily.[82] But a defender cannot plan against a *tabula rasa*, cannot have a totally flexible strategy of his own—that would be no strategy at all. A military establishment must organize and train according to some assumptions about enemy strategy, the best educated guess possible. Perhaps the western allies in 1940 did blunder because inertia or inattentiveness. But the Wehrmacht was incompletely committed to the blitzkrieg concept, not only until the May attack, but even beyond. Resistance to Guderian's tactics, and second thoughts in the direction of slowing the advance to secure flanks, continued as the attack progressed. Guderian was told to halt on more than one occasion and had to protest furiously to gain permission to press on.[83]

Some critics of U.S. defense policy charge that U.S. planners have endangered security by failing to understand Soviet doctrine, particularly on nuclear warfare. Richard Pipes believes the Soviets have a serious and ambitious nuclear strategy inconsistent with the dominant American conceptions of rationality and deterrence, and that Americans "are as oblivious to these staggering innovations in the art of war as the French and British in their time had been to German strategy of the armored Blitzkrieg. There is a striking parallel between their faith in passive defenses anchored on the Maginot Line and ours in a 'sufficient' deterrent."[84] Raymond Garthoff mined Soviet military writings too, but came up with very different conclusions, more reassuring ones that minimize the salient differences between dominant American and Soviet views.[85]

Pipes and Garthoff are both experts on the Soviet Union, yet disagree radically. How should military experts and policymakers, who do not read Russian and who are unfamiliar with the intricacies of Soviet politics and culture, decide to hedge against Soviet doctrine? There is no solution free of subjectivity or ideological inhibition. This limp answer, matched with the earlier analysis, suggests two unhappy conclusions for the future. First, the technical revolution in intelli-

[82] See Net Assessment Task Force, "The Critical Properties of Sudden Attack: A Study Proposal," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, November 1976), p. 75.

[83] Ulrich Liss, *Westfront 1939/40: Errinerungen des Feindarbeiters im O.K.H.* [Western Front 1939–40: memoirs of an alienated worker in the Army High Command] (Neckargemund, Germany: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1959), pp. 106–7, 143–44; Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 89–92, 99, 101, 107, 109–10, 117–19. Hitler also prevented the complete exploitation of the advance by stopping Guderian's forces short of Dunkirk, where the British Expeditionary Force was subsequently evacuated.

[84] Richard Pipes, "Rethinking Our Nuclear Strategy," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 October 1978. See also, idem., "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64 (July 1977): 21–34.

[85] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3 (Summer 1978): 112–47.

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gence collection of recent decades reduces vulnerability to surprise only at the margins, because miscalculation and sluggishness in political decisions are more the sources of surprise than lack of information. Second, since history provides few grounds for believing surprise can be avoided, the best defense posture is one that *assumes* surprise and provides a cushion for survival in the face of it. Surprise succeeds despite warning, so defense must succeed despite surprise.*

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# National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought

I. M. DESTLER

It was the third week of March 1980 and for the internationally minded the headlines leaped out from the page. The *New York Times* proclaimed a "U.S. Foreign Policy in Deep Disarray"; the *Washington Post* reported "Errors and Crises: A Foreign Policy against the Ropes." The subheads were no less damning: "Europe: Allies View Carter White House as Unpredictable and Insensitive"; or "Pakistan: The Policy Shift by Washington Was Too Sharp and Too Fast." All reinforced what was becoming a near-universal critique—that the conduct of American foreign relations lacked both continuity and coherence at a time when the need for both qualities seemed particularly urgent.

In April, President Jimmy Carter sought to recoup his fortunes, and those of his nation, by ordering a secret raid to rescue fifty-three American hostages held captive in Teheran. The mission failed, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest. U.S. allies were further shaken: they had just agreed to economic measures against Iran on the understanding that military force would not be employed. At home, Carter got considerable credit for trying, and his choice of Senator Edmund Muskie as Vance's replacement was widely applauded. But the general foreign-policy malaise nonetheless deepened in the months ahead, as did the impression of governmental disarray.

Criticism naturally focused on the Carter administration, on the president himself and his principal advisers. And, in consequence, people turned, with

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varying degrees of hope, to the remedies that might be available in the electoral process or in appointments to senior positions. The burden of this article is that American policymaking problems lie deeper, in continuing or recurrent institutional tensions. One such tension, widely noted, is what Edwin S. Corwin called the "struggle" between the executive and legislative branches "for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."[1] Less noted is the tension addressed here—between the evolution of the foreign-policy presidency and the requirements of careful, constructive U.S. participation in world affairs.

Americans are unavoidably dependent on their presidents for international leadership. But far from being consistent forces for policy integration, presidents have too often become sources of uncertainty, discontinuity, and idiosyncracy. And American institutions seem in fact to encourage this. As Americans approach Inauguration Day 1981, it seems appropriate to explore how and why this has come about and to consider what remedies might be available to President Ronald Reagan.

## The Basic Problem

Consensus eludes us on the content of current American foreign policy, but several propositions may perhaps command broad agreement: the relative power of the United States is less than it once was—militarily, economically, politically; the United States remains, for most world issues, the most important single nation and is certainly the leading power in the West; the world is less orderly, with power diffused, international regimes under stress, and dependence on unstable sources of oil; and effective coping within this world requires careful, continuous, consultative leadership by the United States in its dealings with allies and adversaries, linked to programs—defense, economic, energy—which support this leadership.

Filling this requirement for leadership is not solely, or even mainly, a process problem. No institutional arrangements could, by themselves, bring agreement on the proper size and role of American military forces or on how best to reduce and manage American international economic vulnerability. But the nature of these problems suggests what sort of institutions can best serve the United States. For the problems are both long term and crosscutting. This suggests a need for national security institutions that provide *continuity*—strong, permanent repositories of expertise, initiative, and operational competence within the executive branch—and structures and processes that promote *coherence*, through the management of tradeoffs, and the linking of U. S. actions to one another and to broader purposes.[2]

This world challenge differs in degree, but not in kind, from that which led to

[1] Edwin S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1940), p. 200.

[2] In this article the phrases "national security policy" and "foreign policy" are used interchangeably.

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creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947. The aim of this council, at least for a number of its promoters, was to constrain both the permanent agencies and the president by linking them to one another, through the persons of the cabinet members who would sit on the council as the president's senior advisers. Policy would thus be both stabilized and integrated. Yet gradually this reform was turned on its head. The National Security Council became in practice not the powerful, senior advisory forum that was envisioned, but the staff instituted under the council's name. Presidents employed this staff not just as a link to the permanent government but also as an alternative to it, at least for certain issues they deemed particularly important.[3]

Why did this happen? Dean Rusk provided part of the answer when he observed: "The real organization of government at higher echelons is not what you find in textbooks or organization charts. It is how confidence flows down from the President."[4] For though presidents inherit certain structures and institutions, they also create their own: through how they operate, whom they work with, what they demand. Their day-to-day signals condition, over time, their senior officials' responses, the relative power of these officials and of their agencies, and how these senior officials deal with *their* subordinates, among other things. It is unlikely that presidents calculate many of these effects in advance, or even that they understand very much about them as they are occurring. Nonetheless, it is the president's operating style and personal relationships as they evolve that structure U.S. policymaking on the most important issues.

This is particularly true for national security policymaking. International issues (together with economic issues) are where presidents feel most accountable, more so than ever in the nuclear age, and where they may see the greatest opportunity for historic impact. Partly for these reasons, presidents are major foreign-policy actors in an operational sense. They make foreign-policy statements, epochal and trivial, in carefully prepared speeches and impromptu press conferences. They decide many issues personally. They consult and negotiate with foreign counterparts.

Such daily personal policy engagement has a decisive effect on presidentially generated foreign-policy making systems. In responding to the president's immediate needs, these systems tend to undercut the influence of senior officials and established institutions which the president also needs, over the longer run, to make his administration's foreign policy coherent and effective. In extreme form, this produces split-level government, as under Nixon and Kissinger in 1969–73. Or it can produce chronic discontinuity in policy, as under Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance. In the end, the president is among those who pay the cost. But in his day-to-day world, he may see mainly benefits, as evidenced by the evolution of the primary presidential foreign-policy instrument, the NSC staff.

[3] See I. M. Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics* 29 (January 1977): 143–76.

[4] Quoted in *Life*, 17 January 1969, p. 62b.

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## The National Security Staff: The Professionals' Consensus

The primary foreign-policy issues manager for the last five presidents has been the assistant to the president ("special assistant" until 1969) for national security affairs. Under the formal aegis of the National Security Council, this aide has headed a staff of foreign-policy analysts and operators which has varied in size—no more than twelve under McGeorge Bundy (1961–66), rising to eighteen under Walt Rostow (1966–69) and to a peak of over fifty under Henry Kissinger (1969–75) before dropping into the forties under Brent Scowcroft (1975–77) and the thirties under Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977–81).[5] The staff has been a mix of "in-and-outers" and agency officials on temporary assignment, and its members are characteristically foreign-policy professionals rather than political appointees in the partisan sense. But they have been "political" in one crucial way—they have departed, to be succeeded by new staff, when the party affiliation of the president has changed.[6]

Over this twenty-year period, there has developed a semiarticulated consensus among practitioners, scholars, and public observers as to what the national security adviser should, and should not, be doing.[7] This consensus, originating in the sixties, was further developed and reinforced by reaction to the early Kissinger years (1969–73) and Watergate. The goal was that the national security assistant and staff should play at least part of the linking and constraining role originally envisaged for the council. To this end, they should concentrate on certain types of activities and avoid others (Table 1). The basic argument for this job description is essentially twofold. First, the assistant's performance of "outside leadership" activities preempts or undercuts other senior presidential advisers and the formally responsible institutions, particularly the State Department and its secretary. Second, it compromises the "honest broker" reputation for balance necessary to performance of the "inside management" functions,

[5] The numbers refer to substantive professionals, mid-career level and up, not support or communications personnel. Most have been in actual NSC slots, but a substantial minority have been "detailees" from the State Department and other national security agencies. Kissinger held two positions—secretary of state and national security assistant—from September 1973 to November 1975.

[6] Bromley Smith, a senior NSC staff member under Eisenhower, stayed on under Bundy and Rostow, becoming NSC executive secretary. Kissinger insisted on changing all the substantive aides except Harold Saunders (Middle East) and Roger Morris (Africa). William Hyland, deputy assistant to Scowcroft, stayed on the staff through most of 1977 to provide some continuity, and perhaps four other senior staff members under Ford stayed on for at least a year. These are, to the author's knowledge, the only significant exceptions to the rule of discontinuity in 1961, 1969, and 1977.

[7] I have in mind former senior officials like McGeorge Bundy, Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Andrew Goodpaster, Francis Bator, and Bromley Smith, and political scientists like Richard Neustadt, Graham Allison, Peter Szanton, Alexander George, David K. Hall, Robert H. Johnson (a former NSC aide), and myself. Obviously there are variations in views among those named, and none bears any responsibility for the way this consensus is characterized here. For recent statements of former senior officials, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing, The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 139–50.

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TABLE 1
*The National Security Assistant: The Professionals' Job Description*

| YES (Inside Management) | OK (In Moderation) | NO (Outside Leadership) |
|---|---|---|
| Briefing the president, handling his foreign-policy in-box | Discreet advice/advocacy | Conducting particular diplomatic negotiations |
| Analyzing issues and choices: | Encouraging advocacy by NSC staff subordinates | Fixed operational assignments |
| (a) Ordering information/intelligence | Information and "background" communicating with press, Congress, foreign officials | Public spokesman |
| (b) Managing interagency studies | | Strong, visible internal advocacy (except of already established presidential priorities) |
| Managing presidential decision processes | | Making policy decisions |
| Communicating presidential decisions and monitoring their implementation | | |
| General interagency brokering, circuit-connecting, crisis management | | |

most of which (unlike the functions outlined in the "outside leadership" column) are appropriately handled within the White House. As Bromley Smith put it in 1969:

> the theory was that the special assistant's greatest usefulness to the President is to be absolutely neutral so that the principals have full confidence that their views will be presented to the President, and that the assistant is not taking advantage of his position by introducing his own views. Once that uncertainty develops, then it's a very difficult situation.[8]

No one would expect that any real-life system would follow such guidelines completely, despite the tendency of presidents to stress the inside, low-profile role whenever an assistant is newly designated. But even when allowances are made for personal idiosyncracies, the divergence has been impressive. National security assistants have frequently undertaken tasks in the "outside leadership" column of Table 1, becoming prominent public spokesmen, diplomatic operators, and advocates pushing their own policy lines. And the Bundy-Rostow-Kissinger-Brzezinski sequence has identified the job, in the mind of the informed public, as "president's intellectual" much more than staff facilitator. In fact, one can infer from recent practice an alternative role conception, far less confining than that of facilitator—that of a senior freewheeling aide and ad hoc operator, serving the president personally and flexibly as the institutionally encumbered secretary of state no longer can. One result is congressional com-

[8] Oral History for Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, Tape no. 1, 29 July 1969.

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plaints of lack of access to the assistant and demands that he be subject to Senate confirmation and available for testimony before Congress. As Senator Edward Zorinsky puts it, "It's clear that we have two secretaries of state . . . and it's time we made the other one accountable, too."[9]

This divergence from the consensus prescription did not come about all at once. In fact, Bundy generally concentrated on activities within the consensus prescription, at least in comparison with most of his successors. But it was under Kennedy and Bundy that the job was redefined so that the assistant could move into more visible and operational activities if he was so inclined, and if his president allowed or encouraged it.

## Presidential NSC Staffing in Practice

The position of special assistant for national security affairs was created by Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 to superintend the formal, interagency policy-planning system conducted under the National Security Council. He was from the start a political appointee, but the NSC staff continued—as under Truman—to be a career staff in the "neutral competence" tradition. By 1960, the formal NSC system was widely criticized as a cumbersome papermill, irrelevant to most of Eisenhower's actual policy decisions. Reflecting this consensus, which his own work indeed had helped to shape, Richard Neustadt's transition memo to President-elect Kennedy listed the special assistant's job as one "on which to defer decision." He warned, "This post should be avoided by all means until you have sized up your needs *and* got a feel for your new secretaries of state and defense."[10]

Kennedy did not avoid the post, but he did transform it. He gave the position to Bundy, but centered its responsibilities on management of the president's personal, day-to-day foreign and defense business, a job performed for Eisenhower by his staff secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster.[11] Thus Kennedy, in Bundy's words, "deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation."[12] With the job now tied to the daily activities of an activist president, it now had enormous potential for engagement and influence. Bundy re-

[9] *Washington Post*, 11 May 1979. See also Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The National Security Adviser*. Brzezinski's testimony of 17 September 1980 on the Billy Carter affair, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, was apparently the first formal appearance of a national security assistant before a congressional committee. He confined his remarks to that specific investigation.

[10] "Memorandum of Staffing the President-elect," 30 October 1960, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass., p. 20.

[11] Interestingly, Neustadt did recommend, as a matter of high priority, that Kennedy designate "a Personal Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief-Elect," who was to be "more than a Goodpaster; more an assistant than a channel and alert to every facet of your interest and your work" (ibid, pp. 7–8).

[12] Bundy to Senator Henry Jackson, in U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 1:1338.

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mained basically a facilitator, more oriented toward making the system work than toward monopolizing the action himself and excluding others. But his personal strength and broad competence attracted much business. So did his recruitment of a small number of particularly talented senior aides to carry the president's flag in interagency battles. In a 1964 interview, Robert Komer, one of the most aggressive of the senior aides, conveys much of the flavor of the operation:

> [The NSC label was] merely a budgetary device. Since NSC already had its own budget, it was sacrosanct. So instead of adding people to the White House staff, Bundy carried them all over here. But, in fact, Kennedy made very clear we were his men, we operated for him, we had direct contact with him. This gave us the power to command the kind of results that he wanted—a fascinating exercise in a presidential staff technique, which, insofar as I know, has been unique in the history of the presidency.[13]

According to Komer, the staff acted as "eyes and ears" of the president, who wanted "a complete flow of raw information over here." It was also a "shadow network which clued the president on what bidding was before a formal, interdepartmentally cleared recommendation got to him." Thus "the president had sources of independent judgment and recommendation on what each issue was all about, what ought to be done about it, from a little group of people in whom he had confidence—in other words, sort of a double check." Finally, it provided "follow-through," working "to keep tabs on things and see that the cables went out and the responses were satisfactory, and that when the policy wasn't being executed, the president knew about it and he could give another prod."[14]

This type of staff could not help but put the slower moving State Department (or *any* established organization) somewhat in the shade. And though an internal memo stressed that the staff was "*not*—though this is a hard rule—a place meant for men trying to peddle their own remedies without Presidential backing,"[15] particular members of the staff, such as Komer and Bundy's deputy Carl Kaysen, did become identified with strong policy preferences which they worked to advance. But these were preferences generally encouraged by the president even when he felt unable fully to support them.

The most important point about the Bundy operation for purposes of this article, however, is that while its activities more or less conformed to the consensus job description, the vigor and activism with which these activities were conducted pulled power toward the White House staff. As Bromley Smith put it: "It is true that although State officers had the authority, they did not exercise it. They did not exert leadership at the various levels. Therefore, when the Presi-

[13] Oral history interview with Robert W. Komer, John F. Kennedy Library, Part 4, 31 October 1964, pp. 20-22. Quoted with permission.

[14] Ibid.

[15] "Memorandum for the President: Current Organization of the White House and National Security Council for Dealing with International Matters," 22 June 1961, National Security Files, Kennedy Library, unsigned.

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dent had to have something done, it was almost easier for McGeorge Bundy to call a meeting in the Situation Room, bang all the heads together and get things going. The tendency was to do it that way."[16]

By the time Bundy was succeeded by Walt Whitman Rostow, the Johnson administration's overriding foreign preoccupation had become the war in Vietnam. Rostow had strong, quasi-ideological convictions about the war, which tended to disqualify him as an honest broker on this issue. He also lacked Bundy's strong orientation toward process, being more an "idea man" interested in personally generating new policy formulations. Moreover, Rostow entered office under a handicap—Johnson, apparently determined to demonstrate he did not need "another Bundy" to help him conduct foreign policy, denied him Bundy's full title. Thus, Rostow was designated simply "special assistant to the president," with "national security affairs" deleted. Nonetheless there was basic continuity in the day-to-day functions performed, as Rostow acted as staff focal point for the president's personal foreign-policy business and for interagency coordination.

In terms of institutional development, then, the Rostow period was a holding action. It was left to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to demonstrate the potential of the assistant position for foreign-policy dominance, at least on the issues most important to the president himself.

Nixon clearly intended, from the start, to establish a truly White House centered system of foreign-policy making, and Kissinger was both his personal and institutional instrument to this end. Much of the early emphasis, however, was on buttressing still further the assistant's procedural role, above all by casting him as the initiator and screener of a large number of interagency policy studies designed to generate options for presidential decision. The system was represented, not without sincerity it appears, as an alternative to "catch-as-catch-can" Kennedy-Johnson policymaking. The bureaucracies would know where an issue was being reviewed and when it was being decided, so that they could weigh in: a kind of procedural due process. And they would know the decisions the president actually took.

This formal system continued through the Nixon administration (and through the Ford administration). But before two years had passed, it had been clearly supplanted by the Nixon-Kissinger taste for secret management of public issues. Kissinger became the prime negotiator on Vietnam, China, and SALT. "Back channels" were employed to an unprecedented extent to exclude the normally responsible officials at the State Department from key communications with foreign powers. Kissinger made many specific decisions himself. He became a strong advocate of particular policy courses inside the government. And last of all, mainly as a product of his obvious de facto role as Nixon's senior foreign-policy subordinate, he became, in 1972, the administration's prime public foreign-policy spokesman. In short, Nixon-Kissinger practice obliterated all the old distinc-

[16] Johnson Library Oral History, Tape no. 1.

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tions between what the assistant did and what a strong secretary of state would have done. The staff man became the key line operator in every important respect.

This use of the assistant gave Nixon considerable control and flexibility over those issues he handled from the White House. On matters where the State Department, Defense Department, or other established institutions inescapably had a major operating role, or those to which the assistant could give only limited personal time, the outcome was less salutary. As Kissinger later described it, referring particularly to the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971, "the result was a bureaucratic stalemate in which White House and State Department representatives dealt with each other as competing sovereign entities, not members of the same team."[17]

This pattern changed, of course, with Kissinger's appointment as secretary of state and Gerald Ford's ascension to the presidency a year later. Kissinger took his strong policy role with him and used the new public platform to cement his position. Brent Scowcroft, first as deputy assistant and then as assistant to the president for national security affairs, played that role as the consensus description says it should be played. One reason was that Scowcroft's professional convictions supported this role conception. A second was that Kissinger's predominance kept the role from growing—Scowcroft never appeared, for example, on "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation." A third was that President Ford tended to accept the advisory arrangements he inherited or those that his aides developed for him, rather than to assert any strong preferences. Ford's adaptability is illustrated by the fact he employed very different advisory systems for differing policy areas: on foreign policy he depended on one predominant aide; on economic policy he worked with and reinforced a formal, participatory policy review system based on a cabinet committee (the Economic Policy Board); and on domestic policy he worked with unstructured "ad hoc-racy."

Jimmy Carter came to power committed to cabinet government, openness, and decentralization. He and those who influenced him were reacting, in the main, to Kissinger's one-man show. But Carter also saw himself personally as a policy initiator and manager who wanted alternatives from his staff. And the person he wanted for national security assistant was not a manager content to remain in the shadows, but an ambitious, highly visible policy thinker who had been a valuable counselor early in Carter's presidential quest. And in staff recruitment Brzezinski gave priority at the outset to "idea people" to support him in supplying this presidential market, at the cost of professional competence and experience in the management of policy.[18]

The result of all this has been a foreign-policy making system that has never developed a clear, coherent pattern. At times, especially early in the administra-

[17] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 887.

[18] See Philip Odeen, "National Security Policy Integration" (Report to the President under the auspices of the President's Reorganization Project, September 1979), reprinted in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The National Security Adviser*, pp. 106–28.

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TABLE 2

*Number of Entries under Assistant's Name in* New York Times Index

| Bundy | Rostow | Kissinger | Scowcroft | Brzezinski |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 (1961) | 31 (1966) | 150 (1969) | 16 (1976) | 147 (1977) |
| 15 (1962) | 18 (1967) | 145 (1970) | | 145 (1978)* |
| 21 (1963) | 56 (1968) | 292 (1971) | | 112 (1979) |
| 29 (1964) | | 592 (1972) | | 59 (1980)† |
| 91 (1965) | | | | |

* The *New York Times* was on strike from 10 August through 5 November 1978 and published only an abbreviated, "for the record" edition during this period.

† January–May only.

tion, Secretary of State Vance was the president's preeminent adviser; in 1979 and 1980, the national security assistant often seemed ascendant, though other White House aides had foreign-policy influence also. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski has not conducted most major negotiations himself, though China normalization is an important partial exception. But Brzezinski is, more than any of his predecessors, identified as an advocate of particular policy directions; his reported efforts to intervene in Iran's revolution, in fact, seem to have reflected his own impulses rather than any clear policy determined by the president.[19]

Brzezinski has also been a highly visible policy spokesman. And while Kissinger's visibility tended to follow his attainment of influence and policy success, Brzezinski's seems more independently generated—by his own flair for public expression, and by the media's natural interest in a newsworthy incumbent once Bundy and Kissinger demonstrated the job's potential. In any case Brzezinski continued a trend—interrupted by Scowcroft: the emergence of the assistant as a major, visible foreign-policy figure in his own right (Table 2).

Interestingly, most of the assistants themselves have expressed strong misgivings about this development. Kissinger has "become convinced that a president should make the secretary of state his principal adviser and use the national security adviser primarily as a senior administrator and coordinator to make certain that each significant point of view is heard."[20] Bundy sees particular danger in the position becoming "a separate, competing source of visible public advocacy within the executive branch."[21] Scowcroft sees it as "very much a substantive job," but a "private" one, giving priority to coordination, adding that "by and large it is wrong for the national security adviser to be a negotiator."[22]

[19] See William H. Sullivan, "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980): 175–86, and Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewis, "Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story," *Washington Quarterly* 3 (Spring 1980): 3–40.

[20] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 30.

[21] Personal interview with McGeorge Bundy, 4 January 1980, New York, N.Y.

[22] Personal interview with Brent Scowcroft, 5 February 1980, Washington, D.C.

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Brzezinski declared when his appointment was announced that he did not see it "as a policy-making job," but "as heading the operational staff of the President" and "above all, helping him to facilitate the process of decision."[23] Some of this can be written off as ritual deference of White House aides to the norm of anonymity; some can be seen as retrospective self-interest: as Henry Kissinger might paraphrase Sophie Tucker, "I been both national security assistant and secretary of state—secretary of state is better." But there is serious conviction here also. Bundy has expressed the broader concern well.

> One of the most astonishing phenomena of the years of our permanent engagement in world affairs has been the increasingly intermittent effectiveness of those members of the Cabinet—the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury at a minimum—who should be, individually and in concert, the President's most powerful and valuable associates in the conduct of foreign affairs. Ever since Franklin Roosevelt lost confidence in Cordell Hull, the occupants of the White House, more often than not, have contented themselves with ad hoc arrangements designed around major weaknesses in the Cabinet. . . . I do not know just why this should be so, but I do know it deserves correction. . . .
>
> . . . [For] while [staff] can complement and reinforce a good relationship between the Presidency and a major executive agency, they can never create one by themselves. For that the Cabinet officer is the indispensable man. He works for the President, and the Department works for him. If these two propositions do not hold . . . the President's need for action, combined with the natural tendency of any bureaucracy to by-pass weakness, will tend to produce a distorted and eventually enfeebled process of executive action.[24]

As Bundy's observation suggests, the evolution of the assistant position seems part of a broader phenomenon—the rise of ad hoc, personal, "political" staff instrumentalities serving the president, and the decline of institutional staff in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) as well as the established cabinet positions. This evolution responds to the president's immediate needs and caters to his personal convenience, but does not serve his broader, long-term need to lead a strong, loyal, and responsive government. It reinforces an exaggerated sense of the importance of specific presidential decisions—even on third- and fourth-order issues—while neglecting the officials and institutions, empowered by statute and ongoing engagement, that must carry weight for policy on most issues, most of the time. And it changes the role of staff from *mediating* between the president and senior officialdom to that of *substituting* for officialdom, reducing the president's perceived need to work with and through established institutions at all.

[23] At Carter Press Conference of 16 December 1976, Plains, Ga., quoted in *New York Times*, 17 December 1976.

[24] Bundy, "Towards an Open Foreign Policy" (December 1973), reprinted in Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, *Appendices*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), appendix A, p. 37.

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It favors innovation (visible but sometimes transient) over continuity within an administration, and connection between its efforts and those of its predecessors. Rather than serving as a bridge between administrations, presidential staffing widens the gulf. The personal tendency of Carter (and Defense Secretary Harold Brown) to go beyond Ford's Vladivostok formula on SALT II was reinforced by the simultaneous arrival of committed aides with strong views on SALT—not just Brzezinski but also his duputy, David Aaron. The case for building on the past was heard but overridden, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was dispatched to Moscow with the egregiously unsuccessful "comprehensive proposal" of March 1977. This episode sowed the seeds of serious future difficulties with SALT at home and abroad, with Carter one of the principal losers.[25]

Staff-dominated policymaking provides the president with a responsive personal environment (his senior experts, just down the hall, a minute's walk away) while reducing the extent to which he works personally with senior statutory aides who have competing institutional loyalties—the secretaries of state and defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and thus shielding him somewhat from the political and institutional realities of the world outside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The senior military staff officers early in the Carter administration were apparently unhappy not just with the substance of some early Carter decisions but with the way he made them. They felt excluded from serious advisory contact. Their frustration reinforced the argument of Carter critics that he was soft on national security, something which again cost him clearly.

While maximizing the president's capacity to pull specific decisions into his own hands, it weakens his capacity to multiply his ultimate leverage through delegating relationships of personal confidence with senior line subordinates. If issues are repeatedly appealed to him, and he supports one adviser sometimes, another at other times, the adviser charged with exercising day-to-day bureaucratic, congressional, and international leadership is undercut, because he is perceived as not speaking for the president in any consistent, continuing way. And effective execution of policy may prove impossible. Contrast, for example, Carter's delegation of the multilateral trade negotiations to Robert Strauss and his continuous, detailed immersion in the SALT II treaty, with which Vance and Paul Warnke were struggling.

Heavy reliance on the national security staff seems to serve the goal of policy integration—its purview is, after all, broader than that of any foreign-policy agency, including the State Department. But in practice, integration is usually achieved only selectively and sporadically as aides give priority to serving the president's personal needs (and sometimes to seizing particular issues themselves). Thus in 1963, Neustadt noted that "the 'personal side' [of Kennedy's foreign-policy staffing] seems firm enough, but not the other side, the 'institutional side.' " And in September 1979 Philip Odeen's report for Carter sounded

[25] See Strobe Talbott, *Endgame* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), chap. 3.

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a similarly understated warning that "despite this stress on the personal advisory role, the [NSC] staff's institutional role must not be neglected."[26] In fact, not only is comprehensive integration seldom attained, national security advisers and their staffs have tended above all to focus on State Department business—that is, political-strategic relationships—paying considerably less attention to defense and foreign economic questions. This too may reflect presidential inclinations, but it also means that the staff coordinates less, and competes more, with the State Department and its secretary.

## Conclusion

To cope more effectively in today's world, the United States needs a foreign-policy making system that combines continuity—the capacity to pursue steady, purposive policies—with integration, the capacity to link these policies or, in Tom Hughes's phrase, to "manage the contradictions" among them.[27] In the best of institutional circumstances, there would be tension between these two goals. In practice neither seems well served, and one important reason is how the foreign-policy presidency has evolved over the past twenty years.

It would be better to have a system that both reinforces the ongoing departments and agencies and broadens their outlook by linking them. The logical prescription for this is the traditional one: strong agency heads (above all, the secretary of state) with close ties to the president; and low-profile White House-EOP staffs which facilitate communication and questioning up, down, and across. This seems the best hope of promoting steady relations and personal alliance building between executive and legislative leaders, and between U.S. officials and foreign counterparts.

There is only one problem: the president has to agree. Not that he must endorse such a system formally; this would be useful but not necessary and certainly not sufficient. Rather, he has to behave in a way that reinforces such a system, rather than undercuts it. Organizational change will be durable only if linked to a viable pattern of presidential engagement in foreign policy, one that meets his needs as well as the broader needs of the nation.

Can presidents be brought to accept constraints on their personal power and their day-to-day flexibility? Can they, as a result, impose or accept constraints on their staff aides, to the end of reinforcing and regularizing the larger policy-making system. Can presidents be brought to make the real-life policymaking "systems" which they generate conform more closely to what many looking at

[26] Neustadt, testimony in U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *Administration of National Security: Staff Reports and Hearings* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 81, and Odeen, "National Security Policy Integration," p. 109. Neustadt hoped that the secretary of state's office could play the primary institutional support role.

[27] Thomas L. Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," *Foreign Policy* 31 (Summer 1978): 34–55.

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the broader system have prescribed? American tradition is against such constraints. Institutionally, Americans are quite permissive to presidents. A British or Japanese prime minister is quickly supplied with "private secretaries" from the career service, men astute in serving politicians but within established broader traditions of governing. By contrast, a U.S. president-elect is generally advised that there are few firm rules, that he should structure his policy staffs to meet his particular needs, and that anything is legitimate if it serves him as he perceives things.

But what he gets in flexibility, he pays for in public expectations. Americans tend to expect far more from the president than any human being could conceivably deliver. After the Iran rescue mission, for example, Hugh Sidey wrote in *Time*: "It is a season for new resolve, for a display of determination that this White House has never reached before. These days cry out for daring, defiance. . . . How [Carter] puts this all together will decide if he survives as President, if the U.S. marches ahead or cringes."[28] It was as if, through sheer personal will, Carter could somehow transcend the excruciating limits of U.S. options that the real world had imposed and that the mission had so starkly illuminated!

If the United States is to develop more reliable executive policy institutions, Americans need a more realistic conception of presidential leadership, one which both presidents and president-watchers can find attractive; one which both deemphasizes the president's role as a decider of specific issues and elevates his role as leader-executive in the broadest political sense; one of a president who works his will not just by great decisions but also by choosing, supporting, and influencing strong subordinates with broad policy mandates; one of a leader who uses his personal leverage to nourish policy conceptions and policy coalitions that will further his goals, and who employs his staff to link him to these broader political and institutional realities rather than to shield him from them. In the end, his staff aides need to serve his subordinates' needs as well as his own.

Obviously, organizational changes will avail little unless they mesh with such broader presidential leadership patterns. There seem, however, at least three broad structural options. The first option assumes that idiosyncratic presidential engagement in day-to-day decision making will continue to drive the system. The second and third options depend on some pattern of stable delegation of authority to senior cabinet advisers.

### *White House Dominance*

If presidential policy engagement seems likely, most of the time, to pull the senior White House national security aide into activities which, at minimum, make it impossible for the secretary of state to emerge as a credible policy leader, it might be sensible to make the best of it. One would then try to build

[28] Hugh Sidey, "Days that Call for Daring," *Time*, 5 May 1980, p. 25.

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stronger, more enduring central direction around this established aide and action channel. His title might be elevated (for example, to "First Secretary of the Government," a position proposed by Nelson Rockefeller in 1960), his staff might be expanded, and the secretaries of state and defense might be more subordinate to him. Or his status might be made formally more ambiguous, for example, simultaneously presidential assistant and director of an EOP office of national security affairs. In any case, he would be highly visible and confirmed by Congress, though an understanding might be sought to limit his appearances on Capitol Hill.

This option has one obvious strength: it establishes one supreme presidential agent and overseer who would clearly speak for the United States on international issues, as long as the president did not override him. But the president might view him as a competitor, as Nixon increasingly saw Kissinger. Or in his effort to protect his presidential relationship, this agent might well give such priority to serving him personally that he neglected the institutional task of directing the broader government. The result might thus be to weaken the connection between the president and the ongoing agencies, at least on those issues to which this aide could not give his personal attention. This option would then create some integration but little continuity.

### *Low-Profile White House Facilitator*

A president who governed by choosing strong subordinates and working with and through them would need a foreign-policy facilitator with broad substantive reach but a relatively anonymous, process-oriented style. He would need, in other words, to implement the consensus job description outlined earlier in this article. He might do this simply through careful personnel selection. But as long as the current title exists, so will its legacy. So it would seem preferable, if this option is chosen, to eliminate the job of assistant for national security affairs and place the facilitator in a position a notch lower, such as the currently vacant post of executive secretary of the NSC. This change might be reinforced with an understanding that the appointee would serve at the pleasure not only of the president, but of the secretaries of state and defense as well.[29] For this role to be played with the combination of strength and restraint it requires, the occupant should be a person with demonstrated management skills, developed in a demanding institutional environment.

To this analyst, this seems clearly the best option—if it will work. One objection to it is that in practice the president is likely to demand substantive advice from the facilitator, whatever his title, and this risks turning him and his staff into strong advocates who will be distrusted by the agencies. A possible means of averting this would be for the president to appoint a separate aide or aides as

[29] For a fuller argument for taking this course, see I.M. Destler, "A Job That Doesn't Work," *Foreign Policy* 38 (Spring 1980): 80–88.

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foreign-policy counselor(s).[30] This solution might in turn generate its own problems: the counselor might end up managing particular issues, thereby undercutting the facilitator, or he might use his privileged location to secure presidential endorsement of his own "happy thoughts" (to use FDR's nice phrase) before they had been subject to the scrutiny a staff system should provide. The problem it addresses, however, is real; the president will want and need substantive counsel, and even if he trusts the advice he receives from his key secretaries, he will want to supplement and test it elsewhere. But this does not require that White House aides be the main source of alternative views; they will certainly be so to some degree, but it is better if they serve more as connectors to others whose judgment the president respects.

### *Facilitator Plus Institutional National Security Staff*

At least one other structural arrangement seems plausible: a staff facilitator in the White House combined with a separate EOP National Security Staff. The former would be personal and "political," tied to the tenure of the president. The latter would have a "political" head, but would be staffed predominantly by officials pursuing careers in government foreign-policy making. The division of labor would resemble that in the Eisenhower system between Goodpaster, the aide for day-to-day policymaking, and Gordon Gray, who oversaw interagency policy planning under the NSC. This would mean, at least formally, giving up on the office of the secretary of state (and perhaps also on the office of the secretary of defense) as the source of this sort of broad-gauged institutional support. It also might prove a weak solution—the EOP office, separated from the president's daily action channel, might have trouble developing handles for influence unless it developed good personal ties to the facilitator and his staff. But if effective, it could prove a source for continuity and analytic competence, in support of American foreign policy broadly conceived.

At the heart of the matter lies the paradox with which this article opened. The president is both solution and problem. He is the United States's only available source for central foreign-policy leadership. Yet in practice, presidents often bring idiosyncracy and discontinuity. If American policymaking institutions cater above all to short-run presidential needs, to his day-to-day flexibility and even whim, they will compound the problem. But if they are also designed to be connectors, bridges, responsive to others' needs, giving some value to continuity, can the president live with them? Will he accept the constraints they end up imposing on him?*

[30] See Peter Szanton, "Two Jobs, Not One," ibid., pp. 89–91.

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# The German-American Connection in the 1980s

LEWIS J. EDINGER

German-American friendship is a "factor of world stability which everyone can and must reckon with" proclaimed the foreign minister of the German Federal Republic thirty-five years after the German surrender in World War II.[1] It was a familiar theme. For more than three decades West German and American opinion leaders have celebrated harmony between their countries, and public opinion polls have borne them out.[2] Just recently, in spring 1980, the West Germans showed themselves true to their words by joining the American trade embargo against Iran and by following Washington's call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. They drew, however, a line on American demands for significant restrictions on their flourishing trade with the Soviet Union.

It is clearly not an unbounded friendship and should not be mistaken for a love affair. West Germans and Americans respect each other, but feelings of mutual affection are not as evident as in Anglo-American relations. The association between the United States and the German Federal Republic is more like a business partnership for mutual profits, involving sober cost-benefit calculations based on separate interests. It requires a good deal of reciprocity, trust,

[1] German Information Center (New York), *Relay from Bonn*, 9 May 1980.

[2] Thus, 53 percent of West Germans in a January 1980 poll considered the United States their country's best friend in the world (France was next with 14 percent), and 60 percent of Americans in an April 1980 poll counted the Federal Republic among the best friends of the United States (46 percent named France). For the first poll see Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach, *Allensbach Report* 1980/E3, for the second the German magazine *Der Stern*, 30 April 1980.

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and enduring perceptions of interdependence between the partners to be indeed a viable factor of world stability.

The question is whether such an association will be feasible in the future. In the view of a number of observers the golden age of close German-American cooperation is over. According to one new study, for instance, stability in the relationship between the Federal Republic and the United States has already given way to "fluidity" and "uncertainty."[3] Conceivably the two countries are drawing apart by small and unspectacular moves as their leaders seek to cope with divisive domestic- and foreign-policy problems. Perhaps the much lauded friendship will before long prove to be more nominal than real.

This article examines West German military, economic, and political concerns that seem to be particularly important for relations with the United States in the 1980s and considers what roles the Federal Republic might play on the basis of established patterns and possible future developments. And it deliberately avoids conjecture about particular persons and specific events, about precisely who is likely to do what to whom and when. To enhance the analytical perspective, observers must stand back from the imposing immediacy of current events such as national elections and international summit meetings. Prominent individuals and dramatic issues are often fascinating subjects, but they also tend to obscure or distort the view to what lies ahead.

Of course, what roles West Germany might play in future relations with the United States depends to a very large extent on American actions in world affairs. This analysis, however, will focus on conceivable West German options in the 1980s and consider these sequentially in terms of three overlapping dimensions. One is the bipolar and primarily military East-West dimension. A second is the preeminently economic multipolar dimension that takes in relations between the Federal Republic and various Western, Communist, and Third World countries. The third dimension covers elements in the domestic politics of the Federal Republic that are likely to condition West German policy choices in international politics.

The short-range analysis of these relationships proceeds from three fundamental premises: there will be no major shift in the overall military balance between the superpowers in the near future; a worldwide depression with truly catastrophic economic conditions in the United States, the Federal Republic, and other Western industrial countries will not occur; and the West German political system will not radically depart from the present liberal-democratic regime.

The basic thesis of this article is quite simple, perhaps deceptively so: for the foreseeable future the German Federal Republic is bound to remain a close and essentially subordinate ally of the United States. By force of circumstances, if not by choice, West German leaders will probably take their cues for critical domestic- and foreign-policy decisions first and foremost from Washington

[3] Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: "A Special Relationship?"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 281.

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rather than from Moscow or Paris. It seems most unlikely that the West Germans will be able to free themselves from American military and economic dominance, and it may well be that most of them will not even want to. In that case it will remain entirely up to American decision makers to exploit, diminish, or altogether end the dependency status of the Federal Republic.

## The Bipolar East-West Dimension

West Germany's roles in international affairs are obviously conditioned first and foremost by the adversary relationship between the two superpowers. In common opposition to the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic and the United States have developed over more than three decades an exceptionally close bilateral security association within the pluralist NATO alliance.[4] Under the terms of the NATO treaty either country now has the right to pull out on one year's notice. But neither is likely to do so in form or fact as long as the German-American military association serves the interests of the senior as well as junior partner.

To be sure, there are bound to be disputes over joint defense policy that may stir passions on both sides of the Atlantic. After all, Americans and West Germans view the costs and benefits of their military association from quite different geopolitical perspectives. The former tend to see East-West issues holistically in global terms; the latter particularistically in regional terms. To American policymakers NATO is a key element in a worldwide collective security arrangement against the Soviet Union; to West German policymakers it is first of all a political arrangement that puts American combat troops in the Federal Republic and protects West Berlin. The United States relies on the Federal Republic for strategic forward bases and missile sites and on the *Bundeswehr* (Federal Forces) for the largest and most effective component of conventional European NATO forces under American command. The West Germans for their part count on unqualified and massive American military commitments as they try to maintain a low military profile and strictly defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. Have they any alternatives?

Since the establishment of the Federal Republic, there have been constant warnings from American and West European observers that German leaders might voluntarily or involuntarily come to follow a course of military disengagement toward a more neutral stance between the superpowers. Some commentators are concerned because they consider the West Germans especially susceptible to Soviet nuclear blackmail and threats against West Berlin. Others

[4] As one writer has it, "the underlying cause" of the "remarkable and lasting rapprochement between two ex-enemies was their common interest in withstanding the power of the Soviet Union" and "the life-and-death question of their relation with the East" (see Roger Morgan, *The United States and West Germany 1945–1973: A Study in Alliance Politics* [London: Oxford University Press, 1974], p. 247).

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worry more that West Germany could succumb to the lure of Soviet offers for reunification through neutralization.[5]

For American global strategists West German military disengagement, in any form and for whatever reason, constitutes probably the "worst case" peacetime scenario for the Western alliance. It is hardly plausible under conditions of East-West bipolarity and military standoff in Europe. To be sure, if war in Europe should become more of a real rather than a hypothetical possibility, the problem of the Federal Republic's vulnerability to nuclear attack may well turn into a most troublesome issue for its military association with the United States. But by all indications West Germans would then rather have more American military protection through the alliance than less through disengagement. It may be that some West German leaders really hope to find a way to the eventual reunification of the German nation through negotiations with the Soviet leadership. If so, it is a long-range objective and not one for the immediate future of the coming decade.[6] A disengagement policy would now be entirely inconsistent with strong popular sentiments of distrust toward the Soviet Union and support for alliance with the United States.[7] As matters stand, no West German government is likely to take the gamble and risk the loss of American commitments to safeguard West Berlin and West Germany.

A very different conception of the role West Germany might play in the East-West conflict rests on the assumption that the German-American military association is increasingly of greater value to the Federal Republic than to the United States. From this premise evolves what seems to some a "best case" scenario for American policymakers: A wealthy, politically stable, and strongly anti-Communist Federal Republic as America's ideal junior partner in the East-West conflict—devoted, dependable, and even more closely bound to the United States by security ties than now. In exchange for assured military protec-

[5] Some suggest in this connection that the Soviet Union might lure the Federal Republic into accepting "Finlandization" as a neutralized European state rather than a neutral one like Sweden or Switzerland. Others again point to German-Russian cooperation under the Treaty of Rapallo in the 1920s and maintain that, now, as then, there are Germans who want their country to be an intermediary between East and West.

[6] A former Social Democratic member of the West German Parliament thus sees "a practical policy of peace, compromise, cooperation, and detente" as keeping "the way to reunification open, whenever that might prove feasible" (Claus Arndt, "The Effect of Detente on the Two German States," *West European Politics* 2 [May 1979]: 238, 241).

[7] In 1978 the military alliance with the United States was supported by 57 percent of a cross-section of West German adults, as against 27 percent who favored neutrality (in 1961 and 1973 the two positions received equal support). In a January 1980 poll, after the Soviet move into Afghanistan, 63 percent considered West German security endangered by the Soviet Union (compared with 66 percent in 1952 and only 28 percent in 1977). The proportion of those who wanted the Federal Republic to align itself more closely with the United States rose from 36 percent in 1973 to 49 percent in January 1980, whereas those who wanted it to cooperate equally with both superpowers dropped from 54 percent to 41 percent. See Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach, *Allensbach Report* 1980/E3 and 1980/E4.

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tion, such a West German client state would provide the American patron with unconditional support to the limit of its resources.

It is an appealing vision for a good many Americans, especially for those who long for a revival of the relatively uncomplicated U.S. hegemony over West Germany in the cold war era of the fifties. And it calls for a good deal of wishful thinking. There are no indications that any West German government could and would agree to tie the Federal Republic in that fashion to the United States.[8]

West Germany's nonnuclear status and exposed geopolitical position in Europe certainly seem to make it more dependent on America's strategic forces than Britain and France. Current military studies strongly suggest that the Federal Republic could not and would not be defended by conventional NATO forces. And it appears that supposedly more adequate American medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads will not be operational in West Germany before the mid-1980s, if then. For the foreseeable future West Germany is moreover neither likely to acquire its own nuclear deterrent forces nor share the use of its allies' weapons.[9]

It might seem, then, that the West Germans would be compelled to accept greater subservience to the United States if that should become Washington's price for assured American protection. Such a conclusion, however, assumes what seems right now a rather implausible combination of circumstances. East-West tensions would have to escalate to a point where both leaders and public in the Federal Republic feared an imminent Soviet invasion. Next they would have to believe that they had no choice but pay the price demanded by the United States to escape the cost of occupation or destruction. And then they have to feel certain that American decision makers had the capacity and the will to furnish the promised protection. In short, the threat of war would have to appear real, the benefits of U.S. protection would have to seem greater than the cost of yielding to the USSR, and American deterrent power would have to be credible for West Germans.

A third conceivable role for the Federal Republic in the 1980s would be a leading part in the political management of the pluralist Western alliance. By all indications, divergent national conceptions of collective security interests are putting increasing strains on the cohesiveness of the so-called Atlantic Community. Both American and West German observers have pictured the Federal Republic as particularly well qualified to play the part of a mediator under these circumstances because it is more tightly integrated into NATO than other members and less closely identified with the pursuit of national security interests. In this view its excellent relations with the United States and France will

[8] Some critical West German writers have characterized such a development as the "Finlandization" of their country by the United States rather than the Soviet Union.

[9] The vague suggestion by two prominent French Gaullists, in 1979, for some sort of Franco-German nuclear force was evidently taken seriously by no one else except some alarmed American commentators.

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enable the Federal Republic to mediate Franco-American disputes on East-West issues. And it might also be more effective than the United States in restoring military cooperation between Greece and Turkey as it is on better terms with both of these long-feuding NATO countries.

No doubt, the Federal Republic is coming to play a more prominent part in NATO, and its leaders, along with others, will do their best to hold the alliance together. But the notion that West Germany, in particular, should take on the political management of NATO in Europe carries as little appeal in that country as the idea that its defense forces should assume military responsibilities outside the NATO area. As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has put it: "We do not want to nor can we play a . . . singular role in the Alliance. Nor will we allow ourselves to be pushed into such a special role."[10] It is unacceptable on the basis of the Federal Republic's exceptionally sensitive geopolitical and military situation. And it conflicts with the West Germans' efforts to overcome distrust abroad by maintaining a low defensive profile in the East and not flaunting their economic power in the West. Gaullist conceptions for leading in Europe may do for France and perhaps England. But for West Germany such conspicuous claims to sole leadership are ruled out by lingering memories of nationalist aggrandizement under the disastrous Nazi regime.

In sum, it seems more or less improbable that the West Germans will move toward military disengagement from their American ally, or become more subservient to the United States on security matters, or assume the leadership of NATO in Europe. Most likely the Federal Republic will continue to be a sometime reluctant, and even recalcitrant, but essentially loyal collaborator of the United States in the global rivalry between the superpowers. Quite possibly, however, West Germans will embrace this role with little enthusiasm if the United States should seem not to care enough about their East-West concerns.

The validity of American treaty commitments and the possibilities for détente in Central Europe promise to become the most devisive security issues. With respect to the former, military experts and opinion makers on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed serious doubts about the ability of the United States to live up to its commitments for safeguarding West Berlin and the Federal Republic.[11] Not many West Germans have great confidence in American prom-

[10] Speech before the Social Democratic Party Convention in Berlin, 4 December 1979, reported in German Information Center (New York), *Statements and Speeches*, 11 December 1979. See also Alfred Grosser, "Western Europe" in *The United States in the 1980s*, eds. Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1980), esp. pp. 713–15; Christopher J. Makins, "The Atlantic Alliance," in *Setting National Priorities*, ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 465–71.

[11] For instance, the American Fred C. Ikle takes a Soviet military threat in Europe for granted but holds that the United States does not have the nuclear weaponry to keep it in check ("Arms Control and National Defense," in *The United States in the 1980s*, Duignan and Rabushka, pp. 430–35). The German Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, on the other hand, is not convinced of a Soviet threat. But he also doubts that the United States has the power to check an attack and concludes that in case of war the Federal Republic would either be quickly overrun by Soviet forces or devastated by

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ises on that score.[12] Should the threat of war increase, most West Germans are not likely to trust policymakers in Washington to risk a nuclear attack on the United States on their behalf. And without the required confidence in the credibility of American deterrent power, West Germans will not put much stock in NATO's flexible response strategy for the graduated employment of nuclear weapons in defense of their country. Widespread fears that even a limited war in Central Europe would mean certain disaster for the Federal Republic could thus undermine popular pro-American sentiments.

Divergent American and West German conceptions of nonbelligerent relations with the Soviet Union might also turn out to be a source of serious controversy. This is particularly suggested by recent disagreement between Washington and Bonn over the possibility and desirability of keeping East-West tension "normal" in Europe while these tensions rise elsewhere. As policy and opinion in the United States have turned strongly against global détente and arms agreements with the Soviet Union, American leaders have called for a much tougher stand toward the East by the West Germans as well. Most of these, however, have preferred to adhere to a well-established *Ostpolitik* (Eastern Policy) for regional détente and arms limitation in Central Europe through peaceful and gradual negotiations with the Communist countries.[13]

Along with a special *Deutschlandpolitik* for "intra-German" relations with East Germany, *Ostpolitik* is one of the three key elements of current West German foreign policy; the military association with the United States and the economic association with the members of the European Community are the others. The political, economic, and social ties that were established with the East European Communist countries more than a dozen years ago have gradually become less controversial and less charged with emotions as both sides have found them to be increasingly valuable. In the case of the German Democratic Republic these contacts loom particularly large for West Germans who see them as easing the lot of encircled West Berlin and of their fellow Germans under Communist rule.[14] From an American point of view, however, such a policy

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American nuclear weapons. See his *Wege in die Gefahr* [Paths to danger] (Munich-Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976), pp. 221–33.

[12] Even before worsening Soviet-American relations increased such concerns, a July 1979 poll showed only 12 percent expressing strong confidence in American commitments and merely 54 percent any confidence at all. Reported in Office of Research, International Communications Agency, "West German Public Opinion on Major Issues" (Washington, D.C.), 28 February 1980.

[13] Thus, 74 percent of West Germans in a January 1980 poll wanted their government to continue with a policy for regional détente, despite the Soviet move into Afghanistan, and only 17 percent were opposed (ICA, "West German Public Opinion"). According to another survey, *Ostpolitik* was as popular in January 1980 as it had been in 1973: 51 percent considered it a worthwhile policy, 28 percent did not, and the rest had no opinion (Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach, *Allensbach Report* 1980/E4).

[14] Chancellor Schmidt thus told James Reston in March 1980 that his government had bailed out some 50,000 East German political prisoners in the preceding year alone and maintained that this would have been impossible without détente (*New York Times*, 7 March 1980). Lesser West German

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allows the Soviet Union to use East Germany as a pawn for influencing West German defense and foreign policies by promising substantial improvements or threatening further deterioration of intra-German relations.[15] And this could turn out to be a matter of some consequence since every West German government is obliged under the constitution to seek closer relations between the two parts of the former Reich.

## The Multipolar Economic Dimension

The future of German-American relations seems more complex and obscure when the analytical focus is shifted from the plane of strategic East-West alignments to the web of international trade and finance. The crucial questions here concern the evolving relationship between the two leading Western economic powers and the global issues of major concern to both of them. On this dimension international conditions tend to be more fluid and uncertain, policy problems to be closer to the daily welfare concerns of Germans and Americans, and disputes between the Federal Republic and the United States to be less restrained than on military security problems.

Economically the Federal Republic is one of the most important countries in the world. Its rates of unemployment and inflation have been among the lowest in the West; its volume of trade is second only to that of the United States and its currency is stronger. It is an affluent country whose present leaders intend to keep it so, if at all possible in close cooperation with other countries of the European Community as well as the United States, and by profitable trade with Communist as well as prospering Third World countries. The attempt to find the necessary delicate balance between military and economic security concerns is, however, proving to be a difficult undertaking for West German political and economic leaders. In particular it has placed the Federal Republic in more conspicuous and controversial roles in world affairs than most of its leaders want it to play.

Like Alice in Wonderland, who drank what turned out to be a magic potion for quick growth and then found herself in a rather confining situation, the Federal Republic must make the best of constraining conditions beyond its control in coping with unintended consequences of its spectacular economic expansion. After having made great gains in world trade with the help of an undervalued Mark and an overvalued dollar, the West Germans now find that to protect the principal measure of their own economic prestige and success, a strong and stable Deutsche Mark, they need to safeguard the primacy of the dollar as well.[16]

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officials also hold that *Ostpolitik* has already permitted the repatriation of close to a quarter million ethnic Germans from the USSR and East European Communist countries and that continuing détente might well permit the emigration of another 3 million to the Federal Republic.

[15] See Melvin Croan, "New Country, Old Nationality," *Foreign Policy* 37 (Winter 1979–80): 160.

[16] As Andrew Shonfield has noted, the outstanding development in the economic relations of the

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To keep German-American relations in perspective in this connection it should be remembered that the so-called West German economic giant is still dwarfed by the United States. The GNP of the second largest trading nation remains at less than one-third that of the largest, and its economy far more dependent on foreign commerce. Imports and exports account for one-quarter of the West German GNP, compared with one-tenth of the American, and as much as one-third to one-half of the output of major West German industries is for export.[17] Moreover, the Federal Republic does not have the power of the United States to shape world market conditions and to control global economic arrangements. It commands comparatively few critical raw material and energy resources of its own, and its much smaller domestic market for capital investments and consumption imposes greater limits on national measures for dealing with international economic developments.

The West German economy is thus decidedly more sensitive to currency fluctuations and protectionist constraints on international trade than is the American economy. West German policymakers have a correspondingly greater interest in a stable world monetary order and in minimal restrictions on what their country can buy and sell abroad. And they fear that the fortunes of the Federal Republic as a leading participant in international trade might become more and more subject to unpredictable economic developments in the United States. While current trends are too uncertain to venture any specific predictions in these areas of German-American relations, it is instructive to look at key problem areas from the German view.

Unreliable sources and unpredictable prices for badly needed imports of raw materials and energy supplies cause West German political and economic leaders a good deal of concern. The most important export industries depend on such minerals from developing countries as tin, cobalt, and manganese. For some critical industrial raw materials a few countries are the principal suppliers and might conceivably place the West Germans under political as well as economic pressure.[18] The Federal Republic moreover does not have such direct and exceptionally advantageous supply lines as Britain and, especially, France main-

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Western world at the end of the 1970s was that the Federal Republic was forced by the unavoidable emergence of the Deutsche Mark as a second reserve currency to move center stage "much like a minor actor who unwittingly stumbles backward into the limelight" ("The World Economy in 1979," in *Foreign Affairs Special Issue on the World 1979,* p. 600). As in confirmation, West German Finance Minister Hans Matthoeffer observed elsewhere that the guardianship of a substitute currency in international markets was "a role the Germans never intended to assume" ("The View from Bonn," *United States-German Economic Survey 1979* [New York: German-American Chamber of Commerce Inc., 1980], p. 22).

[17] The periodical *Der Spiegel* in its 26 May 1980 issue gave these figures for exports for 1979: 66 percent of electrical products, 46 percent of machine building, 44 percent of precision instruments and optical products, 40 percent of automobile production, 39 percent of iron and steel output, 36 percent of textiles, and 34 percent of chemical products.

[18] Note, for example, that South Africa on the one hand and Zimbabwe on the other provide much of the chrome, manganese, and asbestos for West Germany's industries and along with Turkey and the Soviet Union, most of the copper.

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tain with their former dependencies in Africa and Asia. Stockpiling of critical raw materials may provide some temporary, if costly, safeguards against unacceptable price increases and unpredictable embargoes, and over the long run, better sources of supply, synthetic substitutes, and technological developments could conceivably improve the West German bargaining position. But for the near future, at least, policymakers in West Germany face much greater problems than their counterparts in the United States in seeking to provide for an assured flow of essential raw materials to key industries.

An even more urgent policy concern for the West Germans is the rising economic and possible political cost of fuel imports. The Federal Republic contains fairly substantial, but increasingly hard-to-mine coal deposits. The West Germans are therefore not as dependent on foreign energy supplies as the Japanese, though far more so than their British and American competitors in the world markets. By present indications, however, and barring an unexpected technological breakthrough, considerations for public health and fuel efficiency will continue to limit severely the use of both native and imported coal in West Germany.

For most of its energy needs the Federal Republic depends on imported oil and gas. About one-quarter of such supplies come from North Sea sources and are bought from Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands at OPEC prices. The West Germans would like to purchase more but their conservation-minded allies plan to sell them less. Their principal sources of oil remain countries in the Middle East and North Africa that are at odds with West Germany's American friend—notably Iran, Libya, and Algeria. And for natural gas the Federal Republic has come to depend increasingly on the Soviet Union.

All this has given West German leaders economic and political arguments for proceeding rapidly with a nuclear power program for greater energy self-sufficiency. By current quasi-official estimates the Federal Republic must over the next two decades double the some nineteen atomic plants it now has built or has under construction if it is to maintain a relatively modest rate of economic growth. Toward this end, and to boost exports, vast public and private funds have been invested in the development of fast-breeder reactors and nuclear reprocessing plants that produce their own plutonium fuel from enriched-uranium imports.

German-American relations have been strained on this account. In the view of West German proponents of nuclear power the United States has been less than helpful in the development of a program which they insist is for strictly peaceful purposes. Some suspect that the United States government served the American nuclear-power industry when it successfully pushed the West Germans in 1969 to adhere quickly to the restrictive Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ever since, it has seemed to distrustful West Germans that their American friends have imposed uncalled-for limitations on uranium sales to the Federal Republic—to the point of briefly halting all shipments in 1977—not just to prevent the global proliferation of nuclear weapons through a "plutonium economy" but to further American economic interests.

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It should therefore come as no suprise that the West Germans have in recent years moved to reduce their dependency on the United States for nuclear fuel and technology. They now rely on it no longer for all, but only for 40 percent of their enriched-uranium supplies and buy just as much from the Soviet Union, with expectations of getting more. Another ally and military nuclear power, France, has been far more ready than the United States to work with the Federal Republic on the joint development of fast-breeder reactors. Actual plant construction has, however, moved along more slowly than in France and in other countries where sponsoring authorities have met with less resistance from opponents of nuclear power.

The Federal Republic's future export trade also poses problems for German-American relations. After more than two decades of seemingly unlimited expansion, West German manufacturers face more protectionism and stiffer competition in their established foreign markets. Worldwide demand for ordinary "made in Germany" products has fallen off as Japan and industrializing smaller Asian countries have offered to sell such standard items as steel, cars, and electrical appliances at lower prices. The West German plant-construction industry, which earlier managed to capture half of the world market outside the United States, has suffered from the loss of lucrative contracts in oil-rich countries. And West Germany, like Japan, is for political reasons in no position to compete with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France in pushing massive arms sales to Third World countries.

West German exporters therefore feel pressed to adapt their trade quickly to changing and apparently deteriorating global economic conditions. Leading industries are seeking new markets for high-quality products, and major commerical banks want new investment opportunities for promising foreign ventures. They look for help to the West German government and central bank and can count on it, at least as long as such public assistance does not seriously endanger the soundness of the Deutsche Mark, the solidarity of the European Community, and the security association with the United States.

Business enterprises and government agencies in the Federal Republic are engaged in a concerted, long-range campaign to best the competition in foreign markets for advanced technology and sophisticated services. It calls for substantially greater private and public expenditures for research and development in such fields as nuclear engineering and computer science, more government tax subsidies for the development and production of such export items as automated plants and telecommunications systems, and additional government loan guarantees for private ventures in politically risky foreign settings.[19] The campaign involves furthermore extensive trade negotiations with Communist as well as Western and Third World countries.

[19] In West Germany the state does not directly subsidize risky trade ventures as in other European countries. Instead the national government insures bank credits for the export goods and service to countries that are judged to be unreliable trading partners because they might default on their debts or cancel contracts.

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Barring a rather improbable trade war between the United States and the European Community, it seems that most West German commerce will continue to be with allied countries through the 1980s, but not at a significantly increased rate. The trade campaign in Third World countries most likely will further emphasize long-term capital investments—especially in richly endowed and tightly ruled industrializing nations such as Brazil—and stress the transfer of advanced technology to suppliers of industrial raw materials. Perhaps most promising economically for West Germany, but also politically most troublesome for relations with the United States, is the growth of trade with Communist Eastern Europe and, especially, the Soviet Union.

West Germany's proximity to the Soviet bloc creates both extraordinary security problems in times of military tensions and exceptional economic opportunities in times of détente, which became evident when the Federal Republic concluded the Eastern Treaties in the early 1970s. Although these agreements were primarily designed to "normalize" political relations with the Eastern European Communist countries, they led immediately to an enormous upsurge of trade with the Soviet bloc. Both West Germany and its Eastern trading partners have by now acquired substantial interests in more extensive economic collaboration. Sophisticated West German capital goods and technical assistance are very much sought after in East Germany and Eastern Europe; they constitute by far the largest part of nonagricultural imports from Western countries. Under a recent commercial agreement to extend a flourishing trade into the next century, West German industry is to provide its Soviet customers with substantially more steel and chemical products and advanced technology; West Germany, in return, is to receive more much-needed fuel and critical raw materials from the Soviet Union.

West German trade with the Soviet Union, with only one-third as much in exports and half as much in imports, is still well below the volume of trade with the United States. But it may come to carry more weight in German-American relations if economic conditions in Western countries should deteriorate further. West German government and economic leaders are in any event likely to go on opposing American efforts to place greater limits on the transfer of technology to the Soviet bloc. In their opinion an expanded embargo on so-called strategic goods would cause their country a good deal more long-lasting economic harm than the United States and other Western countries.

In the last analysis West Germany's economic fortunes remain, however, tied to those of the United States. They depend particularly on the fate of the American dollar, still the dominant currency in international commerce. Conventional notions about trade flows and monetary transactions have to some extent been confounded in recent times by the activities of multinational corporations and by wandering Euro- and Petrodollars, but some basic rules are still appropriate. Under the prevailing system of floating exchange rates the value of the Mark is supposed to rise and fall freely against that of the dollar. A low rate of exchange should in theory help the West Gemans to sell exports and a high rate should make it easier for them to pay for imports. But all this assumes monetary

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stability in world currency markets and in trade patterns shaped by market forces. Such perfect conditions for West German global commerce do not exist now and are most unlikely in the future.

The decline of the dollar and the accompanying rise of the Mark have brought changes for the West German economy. The greater strength of the Mark has boosted German capital investments in the United States and other dollar markets and softened the inflationary impact of the more expensive fuel imports in the Federal Republic. At the same time, it has not as yet placed West German exports at a great competitive disadvantage, at least in part because a less favorable rate of exchange for the producing country has been largely offset by a higher rate of inflation abroad. A shrinking foreign trade surplus suggests, however, that the Federal Republic could soon face serious balance of payment problems.

Evidently the most immediate concern of German economic leaders is the danger of an uncontrollable appreciation or depreciation of a wildly fluctuating Mark. They are particularly worried about the unwanted emergence of the Mark as a substitute reserve currency for an undervalued dollar because it threatens to make the Mark more vulnerable to international money speculations and to undercut the West German Federal Bank's tight counterinflationary control over the domestic capital market. The difficult question for policymakers is how these monetary pressures can be relieved at minimal risk and cost to a trade-dependent economy.

One suggested solution is a Bonn-Washington monetary axis. It would make the Mark and the dollar mutually supportive currencies under an exclusive German-American economic partnership, a notion long favored by U.S. Treasury officials and publicized by prominent American economists and business journals.[20] After all, in addition to their close military and political ties the two leading Western economic powers are already joined in a symbiotic commercial association based on a large volume of reciprocal private trade and investments, numerous common business ventures, and extensive intergovernmental monetary and fiscal arrangements. The United States and the Federal Republic together account for one-fourth of world trade; two-thirds of international financial accounts are settled in either dollars or Marks; and West German foreign aid complements American military assistance to allied and Third World nations. Business leaders in the two countries moreover are largely in accord on trade and monetary questions.

These may seem to Americans powerful arguments for an economic partnership, but the proposal carries absolutely no conviction in the Federal Republic. To West Germans this proposed monetary axis appears designed to exploit the

[20] See, among others, Fred C. Bergsten, "The United States and Germany: The Imperative of Economic Bigemony," in *Toward a New International Order*, ed. Bergsten (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975); "Germany: The Reluctant Ally," *Business Week*, 3 March 1980; W.R. Smyser, "German-American Relations," *The Washington Papers*, vol. 8, no. 74 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), esp. pp. 12, 14.

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strength of their Mark for the benefit of the dollar and, more generally, subordinate the economic interests of their country to those of the United States. In this view such a Bonn-Washington axis would inevitably undermine Bonn's carefully nurtured relationship with Paris and cause destructive conflicts in the European Community. Furthermore, the proposed partnership seems to its critics more likely to increase the West Germans' vulnerability to American pressure than to give them greater influence over American global policies.

Should we then expect the indicated balance of payment problems to push the Federal Republic rather in the opposite direction, toward a more nationalistic stance in economic rivalry with the United States? Current protectionist trends in the United States and other Western countries suggest that there might be a reactive development along similar lines in West Germany. Perhaps so, particularly if American policy should raise new barriers to West German trade. But such an independent role seems rather improbable, at least in the shape of the old economic nationalism or the new forms favored in Britain and France. The Federal Republic is not only more deeply committed to liberal trade policies than other Western countries but stands to lose more by going protectionist on its own.

What seems most likely at this time is that the West Germans will do their best—and pay large sums, if need be—to obtain protection from the new European currency bloc against destabilizing dollar fluctuations. Launched in the spring 1979 on the insistence of their government, the rather complex European Monetary System (EMS) is supposed to safeguard the Mark, along with associated currencies, against economic pressure from outside the bloc.[21] Some commentators suspect that the EMS is designed to promote West German interests at the expense of other member countries, but others see it as a significant step toward greater economic unity. At this point the European Monetary System is still too new and untried to judge its worth and tell whether it will be a help or hindrance for German-American relations.

For the United States, as for the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic will probably remain the foremost, if not determining, economic power in Europe for some time to come. And its leaders can be expected to use the European Community to advance more far-reaching West German global concerns. The European Community, as a West German observer noted not long ago, provides "a multinational framework in which West Germany can pursue her interests in ways which are more acceptable to her neighbors than multilateral policies would be"[22]

The West Germans are therefore likely to seek further European integration, but quite possibly their most important partners in the European Community

[21] The system makes the Mark the most important element in a basket with the currencies of Britain, France, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

[22] Christoph Bertram, "European Security and the German Problem," *International Security* 4 (Winter 1979–80): 111.

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will not want to go along. Ruling French leaders may at present stress the need for unity and, especially, Franco-German collaboration in calling for more Western European independence from the United States. In France, however, as in Britain, there is a great deal of opposition to the European Community that is at least in part based on the fear that the current preeminence of the Federal Republic will lead to its future predominance over its economically feebler partners. Such sentiments could very well grow substantially if the economic gap should become even more pronounced. In that event a consequent weakening of the European Community would probably intensify West German dependence on the United States. Thus, while West Germans will no doubt strive to keep the best of both their American and European connections and avoid forced choices between partners, this may prove to be an increasingly difficult balancing act. It could eventually turn out to be easier for the Federal Republic to work out new collaborative arrangements with other major industrial nations, including Japan, that would over the long run also be more appropriate for changing North-South relationships.[23]

## The Domestic Politics Dimension

The internal politics of the German Federal Republic do not loom very large in the perspective of American analysts of strategic East-West relations and worldwide economic developments. West Germany's exceptional stability in recent times has, furthermore, led American observers to turn from their search for signs of a Nazi revival or a radical leftist upsurge to more exciting developments in other countries. This probably makes for less distorted interpretations of West German politics, but it also tends to downplay domestic developments more than seems warranted.

The internal politics of the Federal Republic bear on future relations with the United States especially in two respects: the stability of policy; and the governing capacity of the established democratic regime. An assessment of the relative importance of these factors depends a good deal on both what is being examined and the priorities of the analyst. Each factor may be considered in terms of an assumed need for effective and efficient government vis-à-vis the desire to have responsible and responsive government in West Germany. Correspondingly, analysts may favor the complacent or the alarmist view of West German politics. The complacent analyst sees little reason for concern: The Federal Republic is believed to have a strong and effective democratic regime with an exceptionally high capacity for handling difficult policy problems. In this view, one should not attach too much importance to domestic political disputes because, at bottom, West Germans overwhelmingly support their established institutions and policies.

[23] On these points see Makins, "The Atlantic Alliance," pp. 465–67; and Simon Serfaty, "The United States, Western Europe, and the Third World" (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980).

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The alarmist, on the other hand, sees plenty to worry about. In this view the West German regime has serious shortcomings and West German public opinion is potentially very unstable. Some alarmists are most pessimistic about the political system's ability to cope with pending military and economic security problems; others are particularly worried about the supposed delegitimization of public authority in the Federal Republic. Those who think it necessary to maintain present patterns of government and foreign policy at all costs fear that incoming leaders might make major changes. Those who are more troubled by what they see as an ongoing erosion of civil liberties and an ossification of representative structures believe that the regime may become more authoritarian because West Germans are ill-prepared to deal with stressful conditions in a democratic fashion.

For the purposes of this article, there is no need to examine these conflicting views at greater length. It is instructive, however, to note that both complacent and alarmist observers tend to focus on particular features of West German politics to make rather one-sided arguments that lead to foregone optimistic or pessimistic conclusions.

Foreign-policy stability and continuity appear to be supported, if not assured, by an unusually well-established consensus among top leaders on basic issues. The monetary policies of the central bank and the trade policies of the national government have been helped immeasurably by the support of both business and labor leaders.[24] Participation in the Western alliance is not disputed among opinion makers, as it is in France, nor is membership in the European Community, as it is in Britain. Practically all major political figures and senior government officials in the Federal Republic see the need for close ties with the United States as well as for cautious deals with the Soviet Union.

Such senior leaders have won much praise in the United States for overcoming West German reluctance to take on new European and global responsibilities commensurate with the economic power of the Federal Republic. But elderly Germans and Americans who now play prominent roles in promoting a close collaborationist relationship between their countries fear that it may soon deteriorate as a new generation of leaders takes power. The departing seniors in Germany are products of an era when pro-American sentiments were more pronounced and self-assertiveness less pronounced than now. And it may well be that hereafter West German leaders will not be as inhibited in criticizing particular American policies and policymakers. But it does not follow that they will therefore be ideologically decidedly more anti-American than their predecessors or, for that matter, more or less European, pro-Communist, or nationalistic.

[24] The internationally applauded deflationary measures of the West German central bank owe much of their success to trade union restraint in wage settlements. In 1979, for example, the Metal Workers Union, by far the largest labor organization, reduced its wage demands to less than inflationary adjustments of pay scales. It should also be noted, however, that a system providing exceptionally high unemployment compensation payments as well as the repatriation of unemployment by sending some of the 2 million foreign workers in West Germany home have made it easier to institute deflationary measures in the Federal Republic than in other Western industrial nations.

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The changed tune is more likely to reflect relatively greater West German and diminished American influence in Europe and the world.

In any event, the views and actions of top West German leaders may not matter as much as observers are sometimes led to believe by election contests and summit conferences. Stability and continuity in foreign policy seem to be supported by the pronounced trend toward more executive government by administrative rather than elected officials. In contemporary West Germany most foreign-policy problems are normally handled as a matter of routine by high and often not so high career civil servants in various federal ministries and the central bank. Individuals and groups outside the government, especially big business, often provide influential advice. But the elected rulers, who are ultimately responsible to the Parliament and the voters under the constitution, usually have little time for details and tend to concentrate on top-level "crisis management" decisions.

It appears, then, that there may very well be continued agreement on basic foreign-policy questions at the leadership level. But what about the future governing capacity of the liberal democratic regime and its legitimation of public authority for unpopular decisions? These might soon be tested as they have not been since the establishment of the Federal Republic. The salad days of ever-growing personal affluence are over, and the modernizing process of reindustrialization involves extensive technological unemployment. The export of German capital for investment in the United States and other countries has begun to exceed the inflow of funds for investments in new jobs and retraining programs for workers in the Federal Republic. Could the established regime cope with major industrial conflicts and widespread political protest movements and still remain true to its liberal democratic foundations? Or is it likely that policy stability and continuity can only be maintained at some cost to democracy in West Germany?

These may be rather abstract questions for Americans who have come to take political stability in the Federal Republic for granted and consider it a model democracy. If necessary, the present regime could probably draw on reserves of supportive good will among West Germans and thus weather destabilizing pressures for quite some time. But it seems to quite a few observers of current developments that the regime cannot, and in some views, should not, remain as it is. As they see it, the prevailing West German commitment to socioeconomic and political stability in fact generates destabilizing tensions. It is said to promote intolerance toward dissenting opinions and to bring into question the constitutional principles of representative government that provide democratic legitimation for public authorities. Many of these critical observers refer in particular to a so-called legitimacy crisis of a party system that seems to them too ossified, too unresponsive, and too closely tied into the machinery of the state to provide for popular democratic government.[25]

[25] Peter J. Katzenstein discusses many of these issues provocatively and with great acumen in "Problem or Model? West Germany in the 1980s," *World Politics* (forthcoming).

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West German foreign relations will most certainly continue to influence domestic political developments to some extent and be influenced by them. This holds especially for the all-important association with the United States. American policy toward the Federal Republic has been a major stabilizing element in West German politics and, by the same token, more a factor for conservation than for change. In international affairs, however, American economic policies have induced West Germany to take on more active and independent roles. As a consequence of these changes in foreign relations, domestic politics may conceivably also be transformed to enhance the authority of the governors and reduce the opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in policy processes.*

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# The Public-Interest Movement and the American Reform Tradition

DAVID VOGEL

Beginning in the late sixties, a new force emerged in American politics: the public-interest movement. An important part of this movement consisted of a wide variety of law firms, research centers, lobbying groups, membership associations, and community organizations committed to public policies that attempted to reduce the power and privileges of business. By any measure, their impact has been impressive: throughout most of the 1970s, the relationship between regulatory and corporate officials was more strained than at any time since the 1930s. In sharp contrast to the quarter-century following World War II, the most vocal criticisms of government regulation since the late sixties have come from businessmen—not their critics.[1] Public-interest activism succeeded in significantly narrowing the boundaries of managerial discretion; many corporate abuses were reduced and those that continue are now less likely to go unchallenged.[2] In sum, public-interest groups are to the last decade what the trade-union movement was to the thirties and the muckrakers were to the Progressive era: the driving force behind increased restrictions on corporate prerogatives.

At first glance, this political phenomenon appears to represent another example of American interest-group pluralism. Pluralists never argued that self-

[1] See, for example, Leonard Silk and David Vogel, *Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), chap. 2.

[2] See Joan Claybrook, "Crying Wolf," *Regulation* (November-December 1978): 14–16; John Tirman, "Business Wars on the Regulators," *Nation*, 30 December 1978, pp. 730–33; and Steven Kelman, "Regulation that Works," *New Republic*, 25 November 1978, pp. 16–20.

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interest was the only motivation for political participation. While denying that there actually existed such a notion as the "public interest," pluralist theory would appear to have little difficulty appreciating that various groups and individuals might seek to cloak themselves in its mantle in order to achieve ends that corresponded to their own particular conception of the common good. Not surprisingly, recent studies of public-interest politics appear to accept the pluralist interest-group model of American politics; they read like updated versions of David Truman's *The Governmental Process*.[3] We learn of the aims, tactics, political resources, and organizational structures of these new lobbies and are offered case studies of their successes and failures in influencing public policy. While their conclusions might be slightly less sanguine than those expressed in *Who Governs?,* their methodology is quite similar to Dahl's. Far from challenging the pluralist view of American politics, they in fact confirm it: their studies provide empirical proof that potential political resources are widely distributed in the United States and that the system does contain a considerable amount of "slack." They reinforce Dahl's contention that in the "normal" American political process "there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision."[4]

If this approach illustrates some of the vitality left in pluralist theory, it also demonstrates its persistent shortcomings. What is still lacking is an adequate appreciation of the place of the public-interest movement in the history of corporate capitalism in America. Like labor, the public-interest movement is not simply another interest group. It represents a historically conditioned response to the problems posed for American politics by the rise of the large business corporation in the latter third of the nineteenth century. More generally, the political ideology that informs public-interest activism needs to be understood in the context of the American political tradition.[5]

This article examines public-interest groups from the perspective of some of these broader concerns. It is interested less in their substantive demands—which have been amply treated elsewhere—than in their political philosophy: what is

[3] See, for example, Mark Nadel, *The Politics of Consumer Protection* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Walter Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); Richard S. Lewis, *The Nuclear Power Rebellion* (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Jeffrey M. Berry, *Lobbying for the People* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951).

[4] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 145.

[5] The first major gathering of "public-interest advocates," held in 1976 in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of Public Citizen, Inc. (an organization sponsored by Ralph Nader), included representatives of more than 100 citizen organizations—most of which had either been established or significantly revitalized since the mid-sixties. See *Public Interest Perspectives: The Next Four Years* (Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen, 1977). See also John Holcomb, "Public Interest Lobbies," *Enterprise* (December 1977): 3-5, and Gerald R. Rosen, "The Growing Clout of 'Do Good' Lobbies," *Dun's Review* (April 1977): 44-51.

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the vision of politics that underlies their political strategy? And what are the limitations of that vision?

## The Strategy of the Public-Interest Movement

Public-interest activism is based on a mistrust of both business and government. Its supporters believe that the regulatory agencies responsible for disciplining corporations have been no more successful than the marketplace in assuring that corporations behave responsibly: instead of regulating business, the government has more often been regulated by it.[6] In contrast to those both on its right and its left, public-interest advocates do not believe that business domination of the administrative process is the inevitable consequence of a capitalist or market system.[7] Rather, they attribute the shortcomings of government regulation of business to the limited number of political interests that participate in the formulation and implementation of regulatory policies. Public-interest advocates contend that the American political system is deficient because only a small portion of those interests affected by public policies have effective political and legal representation.[8] Moreover, these unrepresented interests are not a random group of interests; they tend to be those which the masses of individuals have in common. The public-interest movement often refers to itself as a "citizen's movement," a "consumer's movement," or "people's movement," precisely because it is the interests of individuals in these relatively "public" roles that it believes lack sufficient access to the policy process.

If the reason why public policies are biased in favor of business is that corporations are both able to participate fully in the formulation of regulatory policy and to secure redress for improper government action, then the program for reform is self-evident: the public-interest movement wants current unorganized interests to have the same privileges and prerogatives of organized ones. Thus corporations, although they seek the appointment and election of officials sympathetic to their concerns, do not rely upon the good will of public officials to represent adequately their interests; their lobbyists actively participate in the deliberations of regulatory agencies, and if a decision is made that they regard as legally improper, their attorneys appeal it in the courts. The public-interest movement wants citizens and the representatives of citizen interests to enjoy

[6] This point is stressed repeatedly in Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, and Neil K. Komesar, eds., *Public Interest Law* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[7] See, for example, Marver Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955); Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (Chicago, Ill.: Quandrangle, 1963); Edward Greenberg, *Serving the Few* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974); George Stigler, *The Citizen and the State* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[8] "Government, like all other institutions, rarely responds to interests not represented in its deliberations" (Ernest Gellhorn, "Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings," *Yale Law Journal* 81 [January 1972]:403).

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precisely these same rights and resources. Its central contention is that public policy can only reflect the public interest to the extent that those who pressure the state are an accurate reflection of those who are affected by it.

But how are citizens to acquire the ability to compete effectively with corporate lawyers and lobbyists? How can the political system be made genuinely pluralist? Somewhat paradoxically, the public-interest movement argues that the promotion of pluralism is the responsibility of government. They want the state to change the rules of the game so as to reduce the political representation of business and increase the representation of those affected by business decisions. The passage of laws regulating particular areas of corporate conduct are thus necessary but not sufficient; if the power of business is to be effectively countered, government must also make sure that public-interest groups are also able to participate in their interpretation and enforcement.

Just as the previous generation of reformers demanded that government enact policies that compensated for the deficiencies of the marketplace, so do public-interest activists seek the adoption of policies that reflect the shortcomings of government regulation. They argue that the most effective way the government can increase public control over business is by enacting policies that increase the power of the public-interest movement over government. The movement no more trusts the government to make decisions in the public interest than does business: what it wants are the same opportunities to influence public policy that business has historically monopolized.[9]

What are the policy implications of this perspective? How can government put the interests of citizens on a par with those of business? The most important concrete proposals of the public-interest movement involve procedural issues, public subsidy, and agency representation.

Procedural issues fall into roughly three parts. First, consumer and environmental groups want to be able to use the judicial system to challenge agency and corporate decisions that they regard as violations of the public interest. They want the judicial requirements of standing to be sufficiently liberalized so that public-interest organizations can use the lawsuit to advance a wide variety of environmental, aesthetic, and other noneconomic values.[10] Their goal is to have

[9] Richard A. Frank, Joseph N. Onek, and James B. Steinberg, "Public Participation in the Policy Formulation Process" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy, January 1977), pp. 1–2.

Joseph Sax makes a similar point in *Defending the Environment: A Handbook of Citizen Action* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 57, 60.

[10] This discussion of the political strategy of the public-interest movement is based primarily on the following sources: Frank, Onek, and Steinberg, "Public Participation"; Simon Lazarus and Joseph N. Onek, "The Regulators and the People," *Virginia Law Review* 57(1973): 1069–1108; *Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law in America* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Public Interest Law, 1976); Charles R. Halpern and John M. Cunningham, "Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy," *Georgetown Law Journal* 59 (May 1971): 1095; and Andrew S. McFarland, *Public Interest Lobbies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1976), chaps. 1 and 2.

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the courts consider public rights, such as clean air, water, open space, the seashore, on a par with traditional private-property rights.[11] Since the courts have broad discretion to determine under what circumstances citizen groups may sue on behalf of the "public interests" when no personal economic injury is alleged, public-interest organizations also advocate the passage of regulatory statutes containing provisions that explicitly recognize the right of citizens to sue if regulations are not being adequately enforced.[12] More importantly, public-interest advocates have strongly supported the passage of regulatory laws that severely limit the discretion of the agencies responsible for enforcing them, thus making it easier for public-interest lawyers to challenge the agency's decisions in the courts.[13]

There is also an additional category of rights that the public-interest movement is interested in expanding: the right to information.[14] The right of privacy, like that of private property, is a major legal prop of corporate power. The public-interest movement wants the public's right to information about a variety of dimensions of corporate conduct to receive the same protection from the courts, administrative agencies, and the legislature that these bodies have historically accorded to the corporation's right to privacy. The Freedom of Information Act and the amendments to it represent a first step in this direction; the public-interest movement would like to see its principles apply to the deliberations of the private sector as well. Similarly, public-interest lawyers want disclosure requirements to reflect not simply the interests of shareholders, but of all the corporation's constituencies.

[11] The notion of standing advocated by the public-interest movement was clearly expressed by the Court's decision in *Environmental Defense Fund Inc.* v. *Hardin*. See Lazarus and Onek, "The Regulators," p. 1101.

The classic statement of the public-interest position is Christopher D. Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing?* (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufman, Inc., 1974). The adoption of Stone's position would represent a 180 degree turn from the nineteenth century when, as Morton J. Horowitz documents in *The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), the courts often ran roughshod over injuries to the rights of real property owners in order to further economic development.

[12] The best-known examples of regulatory legislation containing this proviso are the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. Ideally, public-interest advocates would like legislation that enables citizens and citizen organizations to appeal to the courts *all* the decisions of regulatory agencies that they believe violate the intent of the Congress.

[13] The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires all administrative agencies to establish procedures that consider "environmental amenities and values in their decision-making and to include an environment impact statement [EIS] with every recommendation" (quoted in Karen Orren, "Standing to Sue," *American Political Science Review* 70 [September 1976]:724). "There can be no doubt that a major effect of the EIS requirement has been to give environmental groups a legal and political instrument to cancel, delay, or modify development projects that they oppose" (Eugene Bardach and Lucian Pugliaresi, "The Environment Impact Statement versus the Real World," *Public Interest* 49 [Fall 1977]:23).

[14] See Thomas Schoenbaum, "The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility," *Fordham Law Review* 40 (1972): 588.

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Finally, public-interest advocates want legislation that guarantees due process for "whistle blowers," in both the private and public sectors.[15] Since many abuses are first known to individuals who work within a corporate or public bureaucracy, encouraging these employees to "go public" with their stories provides an additional mechanism by which the effectiveness of regulation can be monitored by the public.

Increased public disclosure, liberalized standing requirements, and due process for "whistle blowers" are each informed by an attempt to put the rights of those affected by corporate decisions on a par with those who make corporate decisions. By expanding public rights, public-interest advocates aspire to reduce private ones; they attempt to reduce the rights of property owners by increasing the rights of citizens.

The expansion of public or citizen rights is, however, only the first stage of the public-interest movement's program for disciplining business. The disproportionate impact of business on the political process is due not simply to the protection accorded to private-property rights; public-interest spokesmen argue that it is also the enormous financial and organizational resources of corporations—particularly when contrasted with the representatives of the public—that enable them to distort the intent of regulations. It logically follows that formal equality of opportunity is insufficient: if those affected by corporations are to be able to have their interests effectively represented, they require resources as well as rights. In essence, the public-interest movement wants the federal government to engage in a kind of political affirmative action program for those lacking sufficient resources to participate adequately in the American interest-group process. They justify federal subsidy not only on the grounds that it is necessary for pluralist democracy to actually work, but on the grounds that the government already subsidizes the political participation of corporations via the tax code: what they want is at least equal treatment.

The most common form of indirect public subsidy of the public-interest movement's legal fees has taken place through the private attorney general concept. Under this concept, courts have the discretion to award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs if the plaintiffs had conferred a substantial public benefit by enforcing a federal statute through their lawsuit. The rationale for this doctrine is quite consistent with the major thrust of the public-interest movement's political philosophy: the government is officially recognizing that citizens have a critical role to play in the enforcement of the letter and spirit of public law and accordingly deserve compensation. In 1975 the Supreme Court delivered a major blow to the practice of public-interest law by restricting the authorization of attorney's fees to suits brought to enforce only those statutes that provided for the compensation of attorney's fees (as of 1976, forty-six federal laws fell into this category). Congressional action to overturn the effect of this decision has

[15] See Charles Peters and Taylor Branch, *Blowing the Whistle: Dissent in the Public Interest* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). Also see David E. Ewing, "Protecting 'Whistle-Blowers,' " *New York Times*, 1 September 1977.

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rapidly become a major political priority of the public-interest movement.[16] Public-interest advocates also would like the awarding of interim attorneys' fees in protracted cases and, in addition, would like the courts to calculate attorney's fee awards in public-interest cases at marketplace rates.[17] Moreover, the public-interest movement has strongly supported the use of what amount to public-spirited "bounty hunting" provisions in various federal regulatory statutes. These give citizens a financial incentive to assist the government in enforcing its own laws.[18]

Judicial review gives citizens the opportunity to redress grievances after a government agency has acted improperly; it does not speak to the issue of participation in the original deliberations of the agency, an issue that has become a major preoccupation of public-interest lawyers.[19] Specifically, they want federal regulatory agencies to subsidize directly the participation of representatives of currently unrepresented interests. This might take several forms, including the waiving of transcript and copying fees, regularly informing public-interest groups about impending agency activities in which they might be interested, paying the attorney's fees of public-interest groups, defraying the costs of expert witnesses, and subsidizing the travel and other out-of-pocket expenses of public-interest adovcates. Since 1975, Congress has passed legislation authorizing four regulatory agencies to provide grants to defray the costs of participation by parties that would otherwise be unable to represent their interests in rule-making proceedings. Public-interest organizations argue that unless this practice becomes the norm, rights of participation are meaningless.[20]

The movement strongly supports legislation that not only authorizes the reimbursement of the various costs of citizen participation in a broad range of administrative proceedings (this is the substance of a bill proposed by Senator Kennedy), but also clearly specifies the circumstances under which departments and agencies must provide for adequate public representation—thus making public-interest representatives as independent as possible from the regulatory bureaucracies.[21]

Public-interest advocates have also strongly pressured for a liberalization of

[16] A study of public-interest law noted: "Establishing the authority of courts to award attorneys' fees is of the greatest importance for the institutionalization of public interest law in this country. . . . There are few funding mechanisms for public interest law that offer so many potential benefits and few that are of comparable importance (*Balancing the Scales*, pp. 318–19).

[17] Ibid., p. 349.

[18] See, for example, William Brown, *How to Stop the Corporate Polluters and Make Money Doing It* (San Francisco, Calif.: Bellorophon Books, 1972).

[19] See, for example, Ernest Gellhorn, "Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings," p. 359; Roger C. Cramton, "The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process," *Georgetown Law Journal* 60 (February 1972): 525; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Public Participation in Regulatory Proceedings*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 1977.

[20] See Lazarus and Onek, "The Regulators," pp. 1096–97.

[21] See Edward M. Kennedy, "The Case for Public Financing of Citizen Participation in Agency Proceedings," *Citizen Participation* 1 (September-October 1979): 3–4, 16.

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the tax laws restricting lobbying by tax-exempt organizations.[22] In 1970, fifteen public-interest organizations formed a coalition to challenge pending IRS restrictions on their efforts. A provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976—lobbied for intensively by public-interest organizations—allows public-interest groups to spend up to 20 percent of their budgets on lobbying without forfeiting their tax-exempt status under Section 510(c)(3). Public-interest activists obviously would like the law to be liberalized still further, preferably removing all restrictions on lobbying by public-interest groups and thus enabling them to protect in Congress the victories they have won in the courts.

There is also a third means by which the federal government can increase the resources available to citizen groups; they can help defray some of the costs of mobilizing large numbers of consumers—thus helping the public-interest movement to overcome some of the barriers to collective action analyzed by Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action*.[23] The most frequently advanced proposals for organizational subsidy involve class-action suits and utility consumers. The former represent a major vehicle by which relatively diffuse, that is, public, interests can bargain with corporations on a basis of rough equality, and much of the movement's political energies have been devoted to liberalizing the conditions under which consumers can sue as a class.[24]

Perhaps the most imaginative form of public subsidy advocated by public-interest spokesmen would affect the consumers of utility services.[25] Dissatisfied with the performance of state public-utility commissions, Nader and his associates have proposed that utility companies be required to include in their monthly statements to their consumers a form inviting customers voluntarily to tax themselves a few extra dollars per year. These monies would be collected by the utility company and turned over to a residential utility consumer action group (RUCAG). RUCAG would hire a professional staff to monitor the performance of both the utility and the regulatory agency. Its directors would be elected by those consumers who agreed to fund it, and each consumer would retain the right to withhold his contribution if the organization did not effectively serve his interests. Under the provisions of legislation currently pending in over twenty state legislatures, RUCAG would have semiofficial status to represent formal-

[22] See Richard Corrigan, "Tax Report/Public Interest Law Firms Win Battle with IRS Over Exemptions, Deductions," *National Journal*, 21 November 1970, pp. 2541-49; Charles Goetz and Gordon Brady, "Environmental Policy Formation and the Tax Treatment of Citizen Interest Groups," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 39 (Autumn 1975): 211-31; and Richard E. Cohen, "Public Interest Lawyers Looking Out for Their Own Interests," *National Journal*, 19 June 1976, pp. 860-64.

[23] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schochen Books, 1965).

[24] "The advantage of class actions is that they allow many small claims to be aggregated in one economically feasible lawsuit" (Ralph Nader and Cirardeau A. Spann, "The Justices Slam the Door," *Nation*, 12 November 1977, p. 496). See also, Philip Schrag and Michael Multsner, "Class Action: A Way to Beat the Bureaucracies without Increasing Them," *Washington Monthly*, November 1972, p. 57.

[25] See Robert B. LeFlar and Martin H. Rogol, "Consumer Participation in the Regulation of Public Utilities: A Model Act," *Harvard Journal of Legislation* 13 (February 1976): 235-97.

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ly the interests of utility consumers before agency proceedings. The RUCAG concept is readily generalizable to a wide variety of goods and services: public-interest advocates have envisioned check-off or voluntary contribution schemes for the consumers of automobiles, major appliances, airline tickets, and insurance, among others.[26]

While each of these proposals addresses the strengthening of the capacity of representatives of presently unrepresented interests to pressure the government, none of them involves any changes in the governmental structure itself. There is, however, a third set of policy proposals advocated by the public-interest movement that does focus directly on the structure of the bureaucracy. These proposals differ only in form, not in substance, from those designed to increase the political effectiveness of nongovernmental representatives of public interests. Their purpose is to increase the public-interest movement's political impact by giving it a foothold within the regulatory bureaucracy. The new administrative units that they would create do not have any direct regulatory responsibilities over business. Rather their role is to help the public-interest movement monitor those government officials that do.

The best-known and most controversial example of this kind of policy innovation is the proposal to create an independent consumer agency.[27] The consumer protection agency (CPA) would be unique among government regulatory agencies in that it would have no direct authority over the private sector. Rather, its responsibility would be to represent the interests of consumers before existing regulatory agencies; in this sense it can be considered as a kind of in-house public-interest law firm, its efforts paralleling and assisting those of the consumer movement itself.

The CPA, however, can also be understood in terms of the theory of "civic balance." The public-interest movement regards a substantial section of the bureaucracy—including much of the regulatory machinery—as under the direct control of the profit sector. These captured departments and agencies are considered a critical factor in explaining the extraordinary success of business in influencing the direction of public policy: not only do they protect the profit sector from effective public supervision, but they constitute a lobby within the government, attempting to secure for their "clients" additional largess. Accordingly, if the public-interest movement is to counter effectively the political influence of business, it too requires a captive agency—one that identifies with its interests in much the same way that the Defense Department identifies with de-

[26] For example, Marty Rogol, director of the Public Interest Research Group, has suggested that "it would be worthwhile to explore the idea of trying to build into a federal funding package a requirement that, for every $100,000 paid to nursing homes . . . a certain amount has to be set aside for resident advocacy and similar programs" (*Public Interest Perspectives*, p. 73). Clearly this principle could be readily extended to a wide variety of federal programs.

[27] For a historical background of this proposal, see Richard Leighton, "Consumer Protection Agency Proposition: The Origin of the Species," *Administrative Law Review* 25 (Summer 1973): 269–311.

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fense contractors. And just as a revolving door has traditionally existed between various governmental units and corporations, so does the public-interest movement aspire to be able to shuttle its activists back and forth between regulatory agencies and public-interest organizations with equal ease and predictability.[28]

## The American Political Tradition

The public-interest movement's mistrust of regulatory officials is in part due to the control of the executive branch by Republican presidents between 1969 and 1976—the very years of the movement's development. Its suspicion of bureaucratic authority is also linked to the traumas of the Vietnam War and Watergate—which helped undermine the liberals' faith in a strong executive. But these developments do not adequately account for the movement's political orientation. Most obviously, many of the themes underlying the procedural reform proposals of the public-interest movement were developed prior to the Vietnam War. For example, the notion of participation was an important part of New Left ideology. Similarly, the idea that the federal government should use its power to give the powerless the financial, organizational, and legal resources they needed to advance their political interests was an integral part of Johnson's "War on Poverty." Moreover, the election of a president relatively sympathetic to the concerns of consumer and environmental organizations in 1976 did not diminish the movement's concern with procedural issues. Quite the reverse: it gave their demands considerable impetus. Carter's election was promptly viewed as providing the movement with an opportunity to make procedural reforms its major legislative priority.

In fact, the political perspective that informs the public-interest movement is not at all peculiar to the last decade; it is deeply rooted in the American political tradition. Its key elements—the importance of individual initiative, the fear of public authority, the value of increased political competition, an uneasiness with majoritarian democracy, the fascination with law and legal procedures, the emphasis on voluntary organizations—all can be found in both Hartz and Tocqueville. The central preoccupation of the public-interest movement is identical to that which concerns Madison and Dahl, namely, what are the conditions that are necessary for pluralist democracy to function properly? The emphasis of the public-interest activists, like that of the political actors described in Boorstin's *The Genius of American Politics*, is on means rather than ends.[29]

[28] There remains, however, one critical distinction: unlike employees in the profit sector, individuals who move to government from the nonprofit sector generally tend to increase their salaries. Indeed, the sixty-odd individuals from the public-interest movement who received jobs in the Carter administration may be the first group of people in nearly 100 years to increase their income by transferring from the private to the public sector. See Linda Charlton, "Government Service Is No Financial Sacrifice," *New York Times*, 12 February 1978.

[29] See, for example, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Roy P. Fairfield (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1961); Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); Daniel Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

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Their vision of the good society is defined less by what that society decides than by how it decides. Public-interest activists are fundamentally engaged in that most American of occupations, namely, constitution making and revising.

The public-interest movement is largely concerned with one of the central problems of Anglo-American political thought, namely, the relationship between private and public authority. What links the approach of the movement to this problem with the mainstream of the Anglo-American political tradition is the movement's emphasis on preserving and enhancing private rather than public power. The procedural reforms advocated by the public-interest movement attempt to shift responsibility for the control of business from public officials to private citizens; these reforms aim to reduce the dependency of the citizenry upon the state. The reforms are an attempt to transfer the initiative for the making and implementation of public policy from the public sector to civil society. As Ralph Nader has noted:

> A number of . . . procedural rights are characterized as rights that are enforceable by individual citizens themselves. That's a very important distinction in the framework of law. . . . Which laws can only be enforced by government and which are primarily enforced by citizens? How can we extend the latter, which permit broad, decentralized access for advocates throughout the country? These laws don't rely so exclusively on who happens to be appointed to what agency or department of government, and they also permit diversity of initiative throughout the country.[30]

The attraction the courts hold for the public-interest movement—aside from the obvious fact that its ranks are disproportionately populated by lawyers—is the opportunity they provide for citizens to redress directly their grievances. The judicial system represents the public-interest movement's version of direct democracy; it enables individuals and organizations to take the enforcement of the law into their own hands. The movement's emphasis on the courts is not simply a short-term political tactic; rather, the judicial system is its model of democracy in action. Public-interest activists not only want to subject virtually all agency decisions to judicial review; they want agencies themselves to make decisions according to a judicial model.[31] Their goal is to make administrative law "a surrogate political process designed to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decisions."[32]

The common-law system, like the market system to which it is historically related, emphasizes the virtue of competition: both systems assume that the interests of all are best served when relatively equal forces are engaged in an adversary relationship. More critically, both emphasize the role of the state in providing the arena of conflict, not in determining how it should be resolved. This judicial model of state authority has deep historic roots. While consumer and

[30] *Public Interest Perspectives*, p. 2. See also, Sax, *Defending the Environment*, pp. 57, 60.

[31] For a sophisticated defense of this position, see Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," *Harvard Law Review* 89 (May 1976): 1281–1316.

[32] Richard B. Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," *Harvard Law Review* 88 (June 1975): 1670.

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environmental groups are unique in that they have explicitly emphasized the use of the courts to resolve their disputes with business, "the containment of interest conflict within diverse forums of adjudication is an observable pattern of American politics."[33] Both corporations and labor unions during the first half of the twentieth century sought to protect their interests by pressuring the state to establish quasi-judicial mechanisms, namely, the regulatory agencies for business and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for labor. The public-interest movement is essentially following this pattern: like business and labor, it wants the state to provide it with the opportunity to define and defend its own interests in an adversary setting.

Quasi-judicial modes of intervention reflect a particular American conception of the state. Historically, Americans have made two sets of contradictory demands on their government. On the one hand, they have wanted public assistance and support. At the same time, they have wanted the locus of power in the society to remain within civil society. In brief, they have wanted public assistance, but not public control. They have wanted a state powerful enough to give them the rights and resources necessary to advance their economic and social objectives, yet weak enough not to encroach on their autonomy. The result is the pattern of "interest-group liberalism" and "small constituencies" described by Lowi and McConnell; as such, it is a pattern in which the public-interest movement fits perfectly.[34]

Like both labor and business, the public-interest movement wants the state to give it the financial resources and legal authority it needs to pursue its quarrels with its "adversaries." Indeed, the public-interest movement in large measure owes its very existence to the federal tax laws that exempt various activities from federal taxation. Just as the NLRB in effect represents a massive government subsidy to the legal costs of organizing trade unions, so would offices of consumer advocacy within the regulatory commissions and the establishment of a consumer protection agency in effect represent a legal subsidy to the public-interest law movement: their establishment would reduce the number of lawsuits that private plaintiffs would have to initiate.

Just as unions want public assistance to help insure that the power of every employer is countered by an organization of employees, so does the public-interest movement want the state to help it form an organization of consumers to monitor the activities of each regulatory agency. In effect, it wants the state to help create and sponsor a series of "shadow governments." The liberalization of consumer class-action suits and authorization of check-off provisions in utility bills are roughly modeled on the union shop, though they lack the latter's element of compulsion. Similarly, the private attorney general provision that the public-interest movement wants to append all federal regulatory laws does not

[33] Orren, "Standing to Sue," p. 724.

[34] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage Press, 1966).

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differ in principle from the myriad services that the government supplies to the private sector as a matter of course—ranging from the statistical data gathered by the Department of Commerce to the funding of highways and dams: both business and the public-interest movement want the state to underwrite as large a share of their costs of "doing business" as they possibly can.

Without doubt, the public-interest movement is attempting to increase the power of the state in American society. But like business in the nineteenth century, it wants that authority to be used exclusively against its adversaries. A parallel can be drawn: the public-interest movement wants to use the courts in precisely the same way that business used them in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both want activist judiciaries dedicated to reducing the autonomy and power of those they oppose. Equally important, the public-interest movement wants the federal government to assist it in a way that does not interfere with it. Each of the procedural reforms it advocates is designed to insure that the initiative for government intervention remains with the private—nonprofit—sector, namely, itself. The desire of nonprofit organizations for public assistance is essentially no different from Lockheed's. One suspects that few in the audience were shocked when a congressional committee staffer told the first national meeting of public-interest advocates: "All of you know about your needs for funds in order to participate effectively in a federal proceeding, or to go to court to challenge an agency's decisions. So I think we can begin from that standpoint: You need the money and what better place is there to look than the source of all money, the federal government."[35]

But from the perspective of American history, there is nothing especially bizarre about the federal government being asked to subsidize directly or indirectly the bringing of lawsuits against its own agencies. The defense industry—which was created by government spending—then turns around and devotes a considerable portion of its energies to lobbying for a high level of military expenditures while the trade-union movement, which would not exist in its present form without the Wagner Act, represents an important source of political pressure on the federal government to increase social-welfare expenditures. The public-interest movement is part of this tradition.

## The Break with New Deal Liberalism

The solution offered by the public-interest movement to the problem of disciplining the power of the corporation, on the other hand, does run directly counter to the principles that have dominated left-liberal thinking in the United States since the thirties. Rather than being innovative, in a number of critical respects the public-interest movement represents a throwback to the pre-New Deal tradition of American reform.

The defining feature of the left-liberal New Deal tradition is its embrace of

[35] *Public Interest Perspectives*, p. 64.

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public authority. Regarding the state as the agent of the public interest, it holds that the first and only alternative to the power of big business is that of big government. As Galbraith argues, "It takes a large public bureaucracy to police a powerful private bureaucracy."[36] Writers working in this tradition have a remarkably uniform explanation for the evident inadequacies of government control of business, namely, that public authority has become excessively weak and fragmented. Their alternative is not simply to strengthen the authority of the government over business—a solution to which the public-interest movement is sympathetic—but, more critically, both to increase the concentration of power within the federal government and to strengthen the authority of the state over society as a whole. This strain of reform can be labeled "bureaucratic statism." It includes planners such as Rexford Tugwell, Michael Harrington, and Michael Reagan; critics of pluralism such as Grant McConnell and Theodore Lowi; and most notably John Kenneth Galbraith.[37] Its politics range from left-liberal to democratic socialist. Bureaucratic statists have dominated much of the criticism of business-government relations in America in the generation since the New Deal.

The public-interest movement, however, represents a decisive break with this aspect of the New Deal legacy. The procedural reforms advocated by the public-interest movement are specifically meant to be antibureaucratic; they are an attempt to strengthen the regulatory process through participatory rather than bureaucratic mechanisms.

Unlike bureaucratic statists, the public-interest movement does not believe that the more centralized bureaucratic decision making becomes, the more likely it is to reflect the public interest. Like all other private groups, public-interest organizations are extremely jealous of whatever footholds they have been able to establish in the bureaucracy. They are extremely wary of the periodic efforts of the presidency to make public policymaking more coordinated and coherent—efforts that New Deal liberals have tended to support. Thus, environmental groups were unenthusiastic about the Carter administration's desire to create a Department of Energy—fearing that environmental considerations might be shortchanged. Similarly, the agency for consumer advocacy would clearly decentralize the making of regulatory policy. In *Taming the Giant Corporation*, Nader and his associates insist that the funding of the agency entrusted with responsibility for enforcing the provisions of the Federal Corporate Chartering Act *not* go through the Office of Management and Budget, an office whose fiscal controls over the federal bureaucracy New Deal liberals have traditionally looked on with sympathy. More recently, the public-interest movement

[36] Quoted in Lazarus, *The Genteel Populists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 37.

[37] See, for example, Michael Harrington, *The Twilight of Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976); Michael Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973).

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has strongly opposed administration efforts to require that new government regulations of business be cleared by administrative units under the control of the White House, fearing a loss of autonomy for the various regulatory agencies to whom it has access.[38]

Without doubt the judiciary is the public-interest movement's favorite branch of government. It epitomizes their ideal of public authority without public bureaucracy. This same branch of government was the arch villain of the New Dealers because it threatened to undermine the autonomy of their administrative agencies. The Administrative Procedure Act, which increases the opportunity for judicial scrutiny of regulatory commission decisions, was enacted over strong liberal opposition in 1946. In a striking reversal, the public-interest movement has advocated that its provisions be considerably strengthened. Similarly, a major concern of those working with the tradition of bureaucratic statism has been to strengthen the independence and autonomy of bureaucratic officials. Nader, by contrast, has precisely the opposite notion of civil service reform. He wants to increase the vulnerability of federal employees to pressures from those outside the government who feel that their complaints are receiving inadequate attention.

If the principles of bureaucratic statism trace their political origin primarily to the New Deal, then participatory statism more closely harkens back to the Progressive era. Nader himself has stated that he has modeled his efforts on that of Lincoln Steffens, and in *The Genteel Populists*, Lazarus makes the parallel explicit.[39] In fact, there are a number of obvious similarities between the public-interest activists and the reformers of the Progressive era. Both are drawn heavily from the upper middle class, are primarily concerned with the social impact of economic activity (as contrasted with the level of economic activity itself), and rely heavily upon the media for their impact. In addition, both are concerned with revitalizing the role of the citizen and are committed to increasing direct public participation in the political process. Both also put a great deal of faith in the efficacy of disclosure as a mechanism for disciplining both business and government. But most fundamentally, both are uncomfortable with public bureaucratic authority; the Progressives sought to exercise this authority in the name of "efficiency"; the equivalent buzzword for the public-interest movement is "participation."[40]

The perspectives of the public-interest movement contrast strikingly with those of the two major critiques of public policy published during the sixties, McConnell's *Private Power and American Democracy* and Lowi's *The End of*

[38] A recent example is a lawsuit filed by environmental groups to prevent the Carter administration from modifying strip-mining regulations promulgated by the Interior Department. See "Two Complaints," *New Republic,* 3 February 1979, pp. 5–6.

[39] Lazarus, *The Genteel Populists*, p. 12.

[40] See McConnell, *Private Power*; Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (New York: Atheneum, 1974).

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*Liberalism.*[41] These writers attacked the reforms of the Progressive era and the New Deal on the grounds that they had actually weakened public power. Not only had decision making within the public sector become too fragmented, but the boundaries between what was private and what was public had become blurred. What was left was a sort of American version of corporatism, with public policy made by small private and public groups lacking any central direction. But the direction in which the public-interest movement wants to move is precisely the opposite of that advocated by Lowi and McConnell: the reforms advocated by the public-interest movement provide almost a textbook illustration of what Lowi and McConnell are criticizing.

For example, McConnell argues that the dominance by private interests of the governmental process can be reduced to the extent that the size of the political constituencies involved in public policymaking are increased. The public-interest movement, however, has little faith in majoritarian democracy; like the interest groups McConnell describes, they want the public policy decisions affecting business to be parceled out among a large number of small constituencies—albeit including public-interest organizations—with each public-interest organization focusing on a particular dimension of government policy.

While it is true that Lowi's plea for judicial democracy, that is, clear legislative standards, is reflected in the Clean Air and Water Acts, Lowi also severely criticizes the effective delegation of the making of public policy to private organizations. But clearly public-interest groups want nothing so much as to receive "official" recognition from the government; their demands for subsidy are essentially corporatist. Paradoxically, the public-interest movement believes that the public interest can only be adequately represented through the efforts of private interests. The collapse of the distinction between public and private does not trouble public-interest activists. On the contrary, they welcome it; they want to enjoy the same relationship with the state and its agencies that they perceive business interests to be enjoying. In sum, their own quarrel with interest-group liberalism is simply that its principles have not been extended far enough.

## A Critique of the Public-Interest Movement

The central political mission of the public-interest movement is to enable those affected by corporate decisions in their roles as citizens, consumers, and taxpayers to have the same influence over public policy as business. The objective, however, mistakenly assumes that genuine political pluralism is possible within the framework of a market system. The power of the corporation in American society, however, is not based on the rights of private property, its extensive participation in the regulatory process, its ability to exchange personnel with various regulatory agencies, or its extensive legal resources. The public-interest movement could counter all these rights and resources, and business would still

[41] Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, and McConnell, *Private Power*.

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enjoy a disproportionate influence over the political process. The more important reason public officials display so much deference to the preferences of corporate executives is that the economic viability of particular communities, regions, and the nation as a whole are largely dependent on the rate and location of corporate investment.[42]

The public-interest movement simply has no resource that can match the power of capital. Unlike both business and labor, the public-interest movement has nothing that it can withhold from civil society in order to make credible its political demands. Corporations can refuse to invest, and workers can refuse to work. But what can public-interest organizations refuse to do? Public-interest activists have no activity in society outside of their role as pressure groups; they have no source of power independent of the political process. Press conferences, consumer boycotts, and demonstrations are certainly not without impact.[43] But in the long run they cannot match the power to halt or curtail economic production. Paradoxically, like the Federal Aviation Administration which demands increased appropriations every time there is an airplane crash, the public-interest movement uses every administrative, judicial, legal, and legislative defeat of its views as an argument for the necessity of increasing the political and legal resources available to citizens and reducing those available to business groups. They argue, in effect, if only we had just one more limitation on corporate political activity or additional amounts of funds for public-interest lobbyists or lawyers, then our views would triumph.[44] But the movement is simply chasing a mirage.

The lack of parallels between the social position of business and the public-interest movement is, however, more than simply a cause of perpetual frustration for public-interest activists. It creates a far more serious problem. Precisely because public-interest activism has a far weaker base than does both business and labor, it is much more dependent on public assistance if it is to compete effectively in the political process. Public policy may have significantly contributed to the growth of both big business and organized labor, but these institutions also have extensive histories that cannot be attributed exclusively to government support. This is not the case with the public-interest movement. Not only its effectiveness, but its very existence has been fundamentally dependent on decisions made by the political process.

[42] Orren, "Standing to Sue," p. 724. A recent statement of this position can be found in Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); also see Eckardt C. Beck, "Ending Pollution Blackmail," *New York Times*, 8 May 1978.

[43] For an exhaustive study of the impact of citizen pressures on business decisions, see David Vogel, *Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenge to Business Authority* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

[44] For example, following the defeat of CPA, Mark Green wrote that "until some version of public funding of public elections cuts the cord between business giving and members voting citizen interests will forever compete at a disadvantage in the political marketplace" ("Why the Consumer Bill Went Down," *Nation*, 25 February 1978, p. 207).

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In one sense, the public-interest movement is highly aware of these realities: that is why it devotes considerably more attention to pressuring for subsidized political participation than does either business or labor. Moreover, the movement has put forth considerable effort to devise mechanisms of financial support that are as independent as possible from political pressures. But at the same time, the movement does not appear sufficiently sensitive to the potential perils of public subsidy. For with the possible exception of direct mail solicitations—and even here the granting of privileged postal rates creates a potential vulnerability[45]—there is virtually no way for the public-interest movement to acquire the funds it needs to counterbalance more adequately corporate resources that are not dependent on the decisions made either by some public agency, the courts, or the legislature.

The movement insufficiently appreciates the extent to which public subsidy is not, and indeed cannot be, free. To paraphrase Justice Marshall, the power to grant tax-exempt status is the power to destroy. Each new direct or indirect subsidy that the movement receives from the state not only increases its power vis-à-vis business, it also increases its vulnerability to the political process—and thus indirectly to business. The price the movement has paid for reducing the dependence of a variety of regulatory agencies on business has been to increase dramatically its own dependency on government. Seen from this perspective, the Supreme Court, the Internal Revenue Service, and Congress have emerged as the primary governmental institutions responsible for "regulating" the public-interest movement.[46]

Moreover, the public-interest movement is so obsessed with reducing the power of the corporation over the government that it overlooks the variety of circumstances under which the autonomy of the corporation cannot be reduced without simultaneously reducing the independence of all institutions—including the public-interest movement itself. This concern is not simply academic. During a recent session of Congress, public-interest and corporate lobbyists found themselves allies for the first time: both strongly opposed the lobbying disclosure requirements advocated by Common Cause on the grounds that such disclosures would handicap their legitimate political activities.[47] Ironically, the more closely the political power of public-interest groups approaches that of business, the greater is the likelihood that they will find themselves subject to the same restrictions on the representation of special interests—a category that

[45] See "Non-Profit Groups that Lobby Slated for Mail-Fee Break," *Wall Street Journal*, 1 June 1977.

[46] One of the most notable instances of the withholding of tax-exempt status in order to handicap a public-interest group effectively destroyed the Project on Corporate Responsibility. See "The PCR and the IRS: A Case Study," *Economic Priorities Report* 5, no. 1 (1974): 36.

[47] See James M. Perry, "Restrictive New Lobbying Rules?" *Wall Street Journal*, 3 April 1978. See also Gail Robinson, "Second Thoughts on Election Law," *Environmental Action*, 28 August 1978, pp. 9–11.

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the public-interest movement formerly thought was exclusively occupied by the profit sector.

The public-interest movement's most distinctive contribution to the American reform tradition is the emphasis it places on public participation in government. Increasing the participation in the regulatory and judicial processes by those affected by corporate decisions is not simply the central political strategy of the public-interest movement; it is also the linchpin of its legitimacy. Public-interest advocates take considerable pains to emphasize that the preferences of the interests they represent are not themselves identical with the public interest. Instead, advocates tend to define the public interest in procedural terms, arguing that public policies are capable of reflecting the interests of the public only to the extent that all affected parties participate in the policies' formulation.[48]

Ironically, although the movement's defenders want to increase citizen participation in order to reduce the privileges associated with the ownership of private property, the public-interest movement's defense of citizen participation is remarkably similar to the bourgeoisie's historic justification of private-property rights. Just as spokesmen for business in the eighteenth century argued that the protection of private-property rights advanced everyone's long-term interest, not simply those who happened currently to own property, so does the public-interest movement contend that extension of the rights of citizen participation is in the public interest, not simple in the interests of those groups that currently employ the public-interest mantle. Moreover, if business argued that everyone, in principle, could become a property holder, so does the legitimacy of the public-interest movement rest on its promise that the opportunities for increased participation for which it struggles are meant to be available to every citizen.

Both property rights and the right to participation are thus defended less in terms of the substantive merits of the demands of those who happen to be either property owners or public-interest activists at any given time, and more because the granting of these rights by the state makes it more likely that government policy will reflect the interests of the citizenry as a whole. Clearly, at least some of the success the public-interest movement has had in winning support for its rights of access from those who do not necessarily share the movement's substantive goals can be traced to its ability to distinguish between the particular political objectives of its constituencies and the broader procedural values with which the movement publicly identifies.[49]

But like the bourgeoisie, public-interest advocates are not really interested in

[48] A public advocate noted in 1975, "We've stopped representing ourselves as representing 'THE' public interest. We represent significant public interests which would otherwise not be adequately represented" (quoted in Lynn Cunningham et al., "Strengthening Citizen Access and Governmental Accountability" [Washington, D.C.: Exploratory Project for Economic Alternatives, 1977]).

[49] Nader argues, "I think we can develop the broadest consensus behind a number of major or new procedural remedies or the deepening of old procedural resources. That consensus can make the public interest movement a force in society" (*Public Interest Perspectives*, p. 2).

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expanding opportunities for participation for the sake of some vague procedural notion of the public interest; their emphasis on procedural rights is essentially a tactic designed to advance their substantive goals. Public-interest groups do not want participation for its own sake; they want it for the sake of the concrete victories over business that it promises to bring. They do not really want to participate; what they actually want is to win. In reality, public-interest activists have no independent measure of the extent to which the political or legal systems are indeed accessible to all those affected by them, save the extent to which they are actually able to triumph over business. For example, while public-interest lawyers have waged protracted battles over the right to standing, or over financial subsidy for representation before regulatory commissions, on the grounds that the interests they represent deserve to be heard, the achievement of those goals are only intermediate ones: after all, what is the value of being "heard" if the decision goes against you anyway? In fact, neither business nor the public-interest movement actually favors genuine pluralism: instead both believe that the particular interests they represent are themselves the public interest. From this perspective, the public-interest movement's goal of achieving the same relationship to the political process that business has historically enjoyed should be taken literally: the public-interest movement actually wants to dominate the policy process just as business has traditionally done. It bases its claim on the principle of balance; what it really wants is hegemony.

But ironically, the rights for citizen participation for which the movement has struggled in order to better advance the substantive goals of its constituencies have turned out, in fact, to be value-neutral. Thus, the majority of the requests for information filed under the Freedom of Information Act have come from businesses seeking to acquire information about their competitors.[50] In addition, the requirement that adequate environmental impact statements be filed before new construction projects receive governmental approval is increasingly being used by various local political and civic interests to prevent construction projects that they dislike for reasons having nothing to do with the protection of the environment.[51] And most dramatically, there is the emergence of various conservative "public-interest" law firms that evidently have taken quite literally the public-interest movement's public commitment to make the judicial process open to everyone.[52] The movement thus finds itself trapped by its own ideology: it cannot oppose these efforts without undermining the basis of its own legitimacy.

Moreover, just as bourgeois ideology assumed that everyone was, or could be, a property owner, so does the ideology of the public-interest movement as-

[50] Warren Weaver, Jr., "U.S. Information Act: Difficulties Despite Successes," *New York Times*, 8 August 1977.

[51] C. Christian Hill, "Businesses Are Finding Environmental Law Can Be Useful to Them," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 June 1978.

[52] Robert Lindsey, "Tax-Exempt Foundations Formed to Help Business Fight Regulation," *New York Times*, 12 February 1978.

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sume that everyone is, or could be, a politically committed citizen. But both views are false and for the same reason: they fail to recognize the extent to which life in a market economy may undermine the ideals of liberal democracy. They mistake the rhetoric of liberal democracy for the reality of capitalism. For the increased access to the state for which the public-interest movement has so painstakingly fought, which, like property ownership, is available in principle to everyone, in reality is open to only a few.

In reality, the only way that one can really live as a "public citizen" is to make a living at it; the public-interest movement has succeeded so well, in part because it has been able to make defense of the "public interest" into a source of private, economic gain, however modest. But precisely because it has succeeded in making opposing business into a business—albeit an unprofitable one—the public-interest movement finds itself facing the same legitimacy crisis as does business. Like business it is criticized as elitist.[53] Only a relatively small number of people have actually taken advantage of the increased opportunities to participate in the policy process that the public-interest movement has made possible—and most of these are public-interest professionals rather than typical citizens. It is almost as difficult to become a professional public-interest advocate as it is to become a capitalist.

In sum, the more successful the public-interest movement has been in accomplishing and realizing both its substantive and procedural demands, the more powerful and pervasive has become the role of government. But the greater the intervention of government in American society, the more the exercise of governmental authority is perceived by the citizenry as an illegitimate interference with their lives. Thus while the public-interest movement promises increased public participation, what it actually delivers to most institutions and individuals is increased regulation. It promises to make public bureaucracies more accountable, but what it has actually done is to increase their number and size. As a result, increased citizen participation has failed to accomplish one of its most important stated objectives, namely, that of increasing the legitimacy of government regulation of business.[54]*

[53] The charge that public-interest activists are elitist is made with increasing frequency. See, for example, William Tucker, "Environmentalists and the Leisure Class," *Harper's*, December 1977, pp. 49–80.

[54] See, for example, Marjorie Boyd, "The Protection Consumers Don't Want," *Washington Monthly*, September 1977, pp. 29–34; "Regulators and the Polls," *Regulation* (November-December 1978): 10, 11, 54.

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# Guatemala as Cold War History

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN

With the increasing accumulation of interpretive scholarship on international relations following World War II, most episodes in the cold war have been written and rewritten, evaluated and reevaluated. One striking exception, however, is the 1954 American intervention in Guatemala, which led to the overthrow of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman's constitutionally elected government. This article studies the antecedents, events, and consequences of that coup.

Analyses of hitherto unavailable archival data and of interviews with American participants in the coup who were privy to the covert aspects of the operation suggest that this event was a significant link in the unfolding chain of cold war history. Writings to date on the overthrow of Arbenz tend to be short on detailed documentation and analysis and to treat the coup illustratively. These accounts depict the United States intervention in Guatemala either as a background incident in the escalating cold war, as an example of the inordinate influence of economic interests (in this case the United Fruit Company [UFCO]) on American foreign policy, or as a way station in the evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency. These treatments fail to emphasize sufficiently that the coup typified the foundations of cold war diplomacy, providing a model to be emulated, and resisted, in subsequent years.[1]

[1] The most widely cited source remains Ronald Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944–1954* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), although more recent studies such as Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 151–77; Max Gordon, "A Case History of U.S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954," *Science and Society* 35 (Summer 1971): 129–55; and Stephen Schlesinger, "How

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## The Guatemalan Revolutionary Movement

The overthrow of Jorge Ubico Castaneda during Guatemala's 1944 Revolution brought to an end the system of authoritarian government that had lasted since the republic gained its independence in 1821.[2] Led primarily by middle-class intellectuals and junior army officers, a small minority squeezed between "the financially powerful upperclass and the masses of unscrubbed and unlettered Indians," Guatemala's revolutionaries resented the country's lack of political freedom and of economic opportunities, regarding themselves as spokesmen for all the unrepresented segments of society.[3] They had no single leader or general, nor was there a coherent body of literature on which they founded their ideas. Rather, the leadership espoused a general program to modernize and democratize Guatemala. In brief, the revolutionaries' rhetoric called for the liquidation of the latifundia-minifundia agrarian system which was dependent on external markets of expansion, its replacement by a modern capitalist mode of production, the establishment of representative governing institutions, and a rearrangement and revitalization of the traditional social structure.[4]

These broad revolutionary objectives coalesced into a more coherent program with the March 1945 inauguration of Juan Jose Arevalo as the first president of the post-*caudillo* (military strong man) era. Elected by an overwhelming majority, Arevalo set the tone for Guatemalan reforms over the next ten years.

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Dulles Worked the Coup d'Etat," *Nation*, 28 October 1978, p. 425 draw on better data. Works depicting the intervention as a background episode include Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1975*, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 159-61; and Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 700-701. Representative exponents of the economic thesis are David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), pp. 163-86; and Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 229-36. The foremost example of treating the coup as a stage in the CIA's development is David Wise and Thomas Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 165-83.

[2] For information on the Ubico government and its overthrow, see Kenneth J. Grieb, *Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala 1931-1944* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979); Richard H. Immerman, *They Cried Wolf: The United States and Guatemala, 1954* (Austin: University of Texas Press, forthcoming); and Walter A. Payne, "The Guatemalan Revolution, 1944-1954: An Interpretation," *The Pacific Historian* 17 (Spring 1973): 1-32.

[3] Manuel Galich, *Por que lucha Guatemala: Arevalo y Arbenz, dos hombres contra un imperio* [Why Guatemala fights: Arevalo and Arbenz, two men against an empire] (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Elmer, 1956), pp. 75-76; Bernard Rosen, "Counter-Revolution: Guatemala's Tragedy," *Nation*, 31 July 1954, pp. 87-89; Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 455-56; Susanne Jonas, "Guatemala, Land of Eternal Struggle," in *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, eds. Ronald Chilcote and Joel Edelstein (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), p. 151; Frederick B. Pike, "Guatemala, the United States, and Communism in the Americas," *Review of Politics* 17 (April 1955): 233.

[4] Galich, *Por que lucha Guatemala*, pp. 73-75; Robert L. Peterson, "Guatemala," in *Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions for the Quest for Stability*, eds. Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), p. 78.

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Unlike his predecessors, and for that matter his successors, the new president was a civilian intellectual who had spent most of his adult life teaching at the University of Tucuman in Argentina. His publications on the psychology of development and the concept of social integration were well known throughout Latin American academic circles. Politically, Arevalo called himself a "spiritual socialist," by which he meant that he conceived of the state as an aggregation of collective interests and values and viewed the function of government as serving equally the individual and the collectivity. To Arevalo, democracy was a social, not an individual, system, and it was the government's responsibility to prevent particular interests from becoming obstacles to the needs and progress of society as a whole.[5]

Nevertheless, Arevalo repeatedly pointed out that he was not a Marxist. Rejecting the concept of class struggle in favor of the ideal of social harmony, he advocated the rights of private property and opposed the "ingenuous distribution of material goods for the silly economic leveling of men who are economially different." He described spiritual socialism as "the psychological freedom of the individual" which would promote within all Guatemalans "psychological and moral integrity." Arevalo believed spiritual socialism to be a liberating doctrine, one that protected personal interests without producing selfish antagonisms.[6]

While such apparently idealistic utterances left many outside observers either skeptical or suspicious, in Guatemala spiritual socialism resulted in a host of programmatic reforms. Soon after Arevalo's inauguration the National Assembly ratified a new constitution containing over sixty provisions for strengthening the democratic process, for initiating social reforms, and for establishing governmental agencies and programs. Based on the writings of Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson, and other Western thinkers, the constitution emphasized a decentralization of powers, with authority no longer vested in a single leader but divided among the executive, legislature, and judiciary. This was a radical departure from the previous caudillism. Included in the 1945 constitution were articles granting universal suffrage to all adults except for illiterate women; guaranteeing freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and providing for the organization and unrestricted operation of political parties—except for Communist and other "foreign or international" groups. Perhaps the most liberal

[5] Jonas, "Land of Eternal Struggle," pp. 151–52; Marie-Berthe Dion, *Las Ideas Sociales y Politicas de Arevalo* [The social and political ideas of Arevalo] (Santiago, Chile: Prensa Latinoamericana S.A., 1958), pp. 10–15, 47, 52–54, 71–76; Angela (Delli Sante) Arrocha, *Juan Jose Arevalo, pensador contemporaneo* [Juan Jose Arevalo, contemporary thinker] (Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1962), pp. 26–36, 58–61.

[6] U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Boaz Long to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 27 November 1944, National Archives Record Group 59, Diplomatic Branch, 814.00/11-2754 (hereafter NA); Juan Jose Arevalo, "Conservadores, liberales y socialistas" [Conservatives, liberals and socialists], in his *Escritos Politicos* [Political writings] (Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1945), pp. 146–47; Dion, *Las Ideas*, pp. 115–16.

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constitution in Latin America, it laid the foundation for a major overhaul of the Guatemalan system.[7]

Most of Arevalo's efforts went into the economic sector. He did promote many social reforms—such as massive public health and literacy programs—but he understood well that economic ills were at the root of Guatemala's underdeveloped conditions. The 1945 constitution created the Ministry of Economy and Labor and the Department of Cooperative Development to aid in the development of the country's productive potential. Soon thereafter the administration set up the Bank of Guatemala and the Institute for the Development of Production to diversify Guatemala's economic base and to stimulate investment by providing accessible credit and by encouraging technological and industrial growth. Although it did not pass a comprehensive agrarian reform bill, the Arevalo government prepared the groundwork for the 1952 legislation. It established commissions to study Guatemala's agricultural problems and examine reforms in other nations. The new government also nationalized the properties confiscated from Germans during World War II, using some as experimental farms and renting others to individuals or cooperatives. Arevalo's most far-reaching measure, however, was the passage of the Law of Forced Rental, which sought to control land rents by compelling large landowners to lease uncultivated property at rates not to exceed 5 percent of the value of the crops produced.[8]

Since Guatemala was predominantly a country of agricultural workers, agrarian and labor legislation were inextricably intertwined. Within the first two years of the Arevalo administration the National Assembly enacted laws that protected employees from wanton dismissals and provided rudimentary guidelines for workmen's compensation. Then in 1947 Arevalo promulgated the Labor Code, which required compulsory labor-management contracts, expressly acknowledged the right to organize, established the principle of minimum salaries, and set standards for better working conditions. The next year the National Assembly amended the Labor Code to include schedules for severance payments, mandatory preferential hiring of Guatemalan workers if all other conditions were equal, and protection for women and child workers. Criticized by large employers such as United Fruit, Arevalo's labor legislation became one of the most controversial reforms of Guatemala's revolutionary program.[9]

[7] Merdardo Mejia, *Juan Jose Arevalo o el Humanismo en la Presidencia* [Juan Jose Arevalo or humanism in the presidency] (Guatemala: Prensa C.A., 1951), pp. 59–68; Mario Monteforte Toledo, *Guatemala—monografia sociologica* [Guatemala—sociological monograph] (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1959), pp. 310–11.

[8] Guillermo Toriello, *La Batalla de Guatemala* [The battle of Guatemala] (Mexico: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1955), pp. 36–37; "Social Revolution in Guatemala," *World Today* 10 (July 1954): 280–81; Jonas, "Land of Eternal Struggle," pp. 152–55; Lehman Fletcher et. al., *Guatemala's Economic Development: The Role of Agriculture* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1970), p. 136; Samuel Guy Inman, *A New Day in Guatemala* (Wilton, Conn.: Worldover Press, 1951), pp. 26–28; Monteforte Toledo, *Guatemala*, pp. 433–34.

[9] Richard Allen LaBarge, "Impact of the United Fruit Company on the Economic Development

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Abiding by the constitutional limit of one six-year presidential term, Arevalo supported Arbenz, his minister of defense, in the 1950 national election. With the backing of all the parties in the governing coalition, Arbenz's election was all but assured. His chief opponent was Chief of the Armed Forces Francisco Javier Arana, the leading candidate of the conservatives, many of whom had sympathized with, and even encouraged, the more than twenty-five attempted coups which Arevalo had thwarted during his six-year administration. But Arana was assassinated in 1949, leaving only Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes to champion the opposition's cause.[10] Long identified with some of the most repressive policies of Ubico's regime, Ydigoras Fuentes stood no chance, and Arbenz won an impressive victory. The possibility of his involvement in Arana's assassination, however, clouded his victory, muting the otherwise confident celebration over the peaceful and punctual transfer of executive power for the first time in the 130-year history of the Guatemalan Republic.[11]

Arbenz was popular with the Guatemalan people. Tall and good looking, his fluent and vibrant voice made him the revolution's leading spokesman. Always Arevalo's foremost advocate, he campaigned on a platform of expanding the first administration's programs. Specifically, he spoke of the need to develop an autonomous economy that would no longer be subject to fluctuations in the international market. He explained that Guatemala had to exploit its own resources, increase the rate of employment of its population, and develop a diversified economy that was technologically innovative and fiscally sound. As Arbenz put it in his inaugural address, the fundamental objective of his administration would be "to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a predominantly feudal economy into a modern, capitalist one."[12]

Having dedicated his government to this ambitious task of modernizing

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of Guatemala, 1946–1954," in *Studies in Middle American Economics*, eds. LaBarge et. al. (New Orleans, La.: Middle American Research Institute, 1968), p. 48; Luis Cardoza y Aragon, "Land for the Many," *Nation*, 14 March 1955, p. 224; Juan Jose Arevalo, *Informes al Congreso* [Reports to Congress] (Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1948), pp. 53–54; Galich, *Por que lucha Guatemala,* p. 97.

[10] Prior to the July assassination, Milton K. Wells of the U.S. embassy in Guatemala reported that "it is difficult not to attach significance to rumors that he [Arana] is seeking the right opportunity and a reasonable excuse for a military coup d'etat." (The opposition used its unsubstantiated charges that Arbenz plotted the coup, in fact, to attempt a coup.) Wells to Secretary of State, 12 November 1948, NA 814.00/11-1248; Wells to Secretary of State, 18 July 1954, NA 814.00/7-1849; Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States, 1948–1950," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary File (PSF) Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

[11] Inman, *New Day*, p. 13; Schneider, *Communism*, pp. 32–34; American University, Special Operations Research Office, *Case Study in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala, 1944–1954* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 16; *Hispanic American Report* 3 (March 1950): 12 (hereafter *HAR*).

[12] Quoted in William C. Affeld to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, NA 814.00/10-2644. See also, Galich, *Por que lucha Guatemala*, pp. 221–23; Andrew E. Donovan II to Secretary of State, 2 January 1947, NA 814.00/1-247; Jacabo Arbenz, "4 enfoques del programa administrativo actuel" [four focuses of the actual administrative program], in *Transformacion economica de Guatemala:*

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Guatemala, Arbenz put together an all-encompassing legislative program. It included the transformation of practically the country's entire economic infrastructure: the construction of factories, the improved exploitation and acquisition of mineral resources and other raw materials, the building of avenues of communication and transportation, and the further development of modern banking institutions and systems of credit. But comprehensive diversification required more basic changes. The latifundia-minifundia system that required so many agricultural laborers had to be eliminated in order to create an urban work force. More land had to be used to grow staple foods as opposed to export crops, since reliance on imports would continue to drive prices higher in the cities. And technology had to be applied to increase agricultural yields, thereby discouraging the traditional practice of leaving hundreds of acres fallow so that the soil could be replenished naturally.[13]

To begin this process, in June 1952 Arbenz announced Decree 900, or the Agrarian Reform Bill. Certain of its components caused little difficulty—for example, the institution of new credit facilities, the careful monitoring of prices, the adjustment of tariff regulations, the provision of tax incentives, and the expansion of research programs. At the core of the program, however, was the expropriation and redistribution of land. The Ministry of Agriculture would expropriate and distribute the *idle* land of those latifundias with more than 223 acres. Almost immediately these guidelines were amended to permit those proprietors with holdings between 223 and 669 acres to keep one-third of their total fallow, and to exempt permanent pastures and woods that were being economically exploited and those fields with a slope in excess of 30 degrees. The controversy that ensued over this agrarian reform—especially as it applied to United Fruit—dramatically brought the Guatemalan Revolution to the attention of the American public. More importantly, it convinced any remaining skeptics in the Eisenhower administration that the programs of the Arbenz government were Communist inspired.[14]

## Guatemalan Communism and the Cold War Ethos

When Arevalo first became president, few Americans feared his possible Communist affiliations. Edward Reed, charge d'affaires of the United States em-

*hacia una reforma agraria* [The economic transformation of Guatemala: towards an agrarian reform], ed. Alberto Ordonez (Guatemala: Prensa C.A., 1951), pp. 10–18; and Arbenz, *Discourses* [Speeches] (Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1951), p. 14.

[13] Arbenz, "4 enfoques," pp. 12–18; Antonio Collard, "Problemas economicos-sociales de Guatemala" [Socio-economic problems of Guatemala], in *Transformacion*, Ordonez, pp. 141–45.

[14] Alfonso Bauer Paiz, "La reforma agraria en Guatemala" [Agrarian reform in Guatemala], in *Transformacion*, Ordonez, pp. 172–76; Thomas Melville and Marjorie Melville, *Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 44–45; Nathan L. Whetten, *Guatemala: The Land and the People* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 132–56; A. Fuentes-Mohr, "Land Settlement and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala," *International Journal of Agrarian Affairs* 2 (January 1955): 32–33.

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bassy in Guatemala, wrote the State Department that the new president "desired a moderately liberal and constitutionally stable form of government."[15] Nevertheless, since Arevalo was relatively unknown in the United States, some extreme anti-Communists, such as former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Spruille Braden, suspected that he had traveled among radical circles. As a precaution the State Department sought the opinion of the embassy in Argentina. Responding for this embassy John F. Griffiths wrote: "As far as are concerned the suspicions that might be had about Arevalo . . . it is my considered opinion that anyone even reasonably well informed about his teachings, writings and general activities would be inclined to pass over such suspicions as being so utterly without foundation as to call for no response."[16]

But his vague doctrine of spiritual socialism, his enactment of sweeping reforms such as the 1947 Labor Code, and increased union agitation against major enterprises including United Fruit created a general uneasiness within the Truman administration. Under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, charged at this time with foreign intelligence responsibilities for Latin America, investigated and compiled dossiers on Arevalo and many other prominent Guatemalans. The FBI agents focused their attention on labor leaders.[17] Government experts reasoned that since unions in Guatemala were a post-Ubico phenomenon, any native organizer was unquestionably inexperienced and susceptible to the advice and manipulation of veteran Communists. These pundits particularly feared the influence of Vicente Lombardo Toledano of the Confederated Workers of Latin America (CTAL), which had many Communists within its ranks. Although based in Mexico, Lombardo Toledano made numerous trips to Guatemala to give aid and counsel to the nascent labor organizations.[18]

Within a few years State Department officials extended their fear of Communist influence in Guatemalan unions to a more general concern for Communist influence in the Guatemalan government. They alleged Communists were active in all of the government propaganda outlets including the information offices, the official newspapers, and the government-owned radio stations. Even more worrisome was their contention that Arevalo positioned Communists high in his administration.[19] Among those suspected was Augusto

[15] Edward Reed to Secretary of State, 13 January 1945, NA 814.00/1-1345.

[16] Interview with Spruille Braden, New York City, 16 November 1977; John F. Griffiths to State Department, memorandum, 8 January 1945, NA 814.00/1-1345.

[17] FBI reports to the State Department are quite extensive and have remained closed until recently declassified under the Freedom of Information Act. These documents can be found in the correspondence between Hoover and Frederick B. Lyons, the State Department's chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, and his successor, Jack D. Neal, throughout the late 1940s in the NA 814.00B decimal file.

[18] Tapley Bennet, State Department memorandum, "Some Aspects of Communist Penetration in Guatemala," 23 March 1950, in *The Declassified Documents Quarterly* 1 (Washington, D.C.: Inverness: Carrollton Press, Inc., January-December 1975), p. 179B.

[19] Numerous State Department missives illustrate this concern. A good summary is a 1948 report

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Charnaud MacDonald, Arevalo's minister of economy and labor, who charge d'affaires Milton K. Wells described as extremely hostile to foreign elements and the driving force behind the government's failure to defend aggressively United Fruit's interests. Wells and other observers considered the foreign ministry a particular locus of Communist sympathizers. For example, in evaluating Guatemala's ambassador to the United States, Jorge Garcia Granados, the FBI claimed that he had assumed a new name and, drawing on a traditional anti-Semitic aspersion, sought to impugn his political character by asserting that he was part Jewish and operated under the front of various Jewish organizations.[20]

The notable aspect of this putative evidence of communism within the Guatemalan government is its dependence on McCarthy-like techniques to accuse supposed Communists. For example, the most widely cited indications of Communist penetration were the hardships encountered by the United Fruit Company. These difficulties first surfaced in the late 1940s, when the newly organized Guatemalan workers struck several UFCO operations. But the real challenge came after 1952, when Arbenz used the Agrarian Reform Bill to expropriate close to 400,000 acres of UFCO property. The law stipulated that compensation should be paid in twenty-five year guaranteed nonnegotiable bonds and should be determined by the property's declared tax value—in this case close to $2 million. The expropriation and meager offer of compensation horrified UFCO and government officials. Like McCarthyite indictments of the State Department after the "fall" of China, experts believed that Communists had to be behind such an outrage.[21]

Yet even President Eisenhower conceded that the expropriation was not conclusive proof. He wrote of Guatemala in his memoirs, "Expropriation in itself does not, of course prove Communism; expropriation of oil and agricultural properties years before in Mexico had not been fostered by Communists." For this reason Eisenhower buttressed his argument by adding more circumstantial evidence, in particular, Guatemala's reaction to the Korean War. He concluded that the Guatemalan government must have been in league with the Soviets and Chinese, for "it accepted the ridiculous Communist contention that the United States had conducted bacteriological warfare in Korea."[22]

This coincidence between the Guatemalan allegations and similar ones by the Soviet Union was also a major determinant in John Moors Cabot's conviction that Guatemala had succumbed to the Communists and that some action was

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by Milton K. Wells which Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett requested the embassy in Guatemala prepare. Lovett to U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, 7 October 1947, NA 814.00B/10-747; Wells to the Honorable Secretary of State, "Communism in Guatemala," 6 May 1948, NA 814.00B/5-648.

[20] Wells to Secretary of State, 19 December 1947, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, VIII, 1947*, pp. 718-19 (hereafter *FRUS*). The only evidence against MacDonald was his apparent lack of sympathy for UFCO. See Jack D. Neal to Mr. Wilson, 19 March 1948, NA 814.00/3-1948.

[21] For details of the Guatemala-United Fruit controversy, see Immerman, *They Cried Wolf*.

[22] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 421-22.

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necessary. In a 1954 speech Eisenhower's assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs condemned the Guatemalan government on the same charges the president would level nearly a decade later. His tenuous logic illustrates the nature of the reasoning used during this period: "We find it difficult, for example, to be patient, after all the blood and treasure we have poured out in Korea to safeguard the Free World, when the official Guatemalan newspaper follows the Communist line by accusing us in effect of bacteriological warfare just after our airmen have returned to tell us of the tortures to which they were subjected to extract fabricated confessions."[23]

The prime illustration of this principle of guilt by association was the well-known "duck test." In 1950 Richard C. Patterson, Jr., then ambassador to Guatemala but already declared persona non grata by the Arevalo government and recalled to Washington, explained in a speech how to uncover Communists. His explanation is particularly instructive in that it makes explicit this "methodology" and how it could be applied to detect Communists and Communist influences.

> Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of detection—the "duck test." The duck test works this way: suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says "duck." But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also, he goes to the pond and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.[24]

When he testified to the House of Representatives in 1954, Patterson's successor John Peurifoy similarly relied on the duck test. Referring to Arbenz he stated, "I spent six hours with him one evening, and he talked like a Communist, and if he is not one, Mr. Chairman, he will do until one comes along. . . . He had all the earmarks."[25]

The United Fruit Company effectively used this overarching fear of Communist subversion in order to evoke government and popular sympathy for its plight. Under the astute guidance of its prestigious public relations counsel, Edward Bernays, UFCO launched a massive publicity campaign. It sponsored junkets to Guatemala for leading newspaper and magazine reporters, and often also for their publishers. It enlisted prominent individuals such as former Assistant Secretary Braden, who had also been a long-time diplomat in Latin America, and ex-Roosevelt aide Thomas Corcoran to lobby among their influential friends in Washington. Understanding that the Communist threat overshadowed the expropriation controversy, these United Fruit agents emphasized

[23] John Moors Cabot, *Toward our Common Destiny* (New York: Rinehart, n.d.), p. 87.

[24] Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Fifth draft of speech to Rotary Club, 24 March 1950, Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Papers, Box 5, "Ambassador to Guatemala, 1948-1951," Harry S. Truman Library.

[25] U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, *Ninth Interim Report of Hearings: Communist Aggression in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 12.

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the supposed international conspiracy, not particular economic grievances. They succeeded. In 1954 the *New York Times*, reflecting the dominant view within the White House, State Department, and Congress, wrote that the "constant harassment here [in Guatemala] to which the company [United Fruit] now is being subjected is largely a Communist tactic."[26]

The approach taken by the United Fruit Company suggests that while policymakers were well aware of the difficulties faced by the UFCO, these difficulties in and of themselves were *not* sufficient reasons for the eventual decision to intervene. As Eisenhower noted in his memoirs, the Roosevelt administration protested Mexico's expropriations prior to World War II, but the appropriate policy was negotiation. But in Guatemala the expropriation of United Fruit's holdings became linked to the fear of a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere. This fear, more than the expropriation, led to the intervention.

This analysis of the Eisenhower administration's motives coincides with the president's personal views on relations with developing nations. He felt that policies that defended particular economic interests without considering the adverse effects such policies would have on nationalist movements were shortsighted and "victorian."[27] Eisenhower argued that the Western powers should make gradual concessions to satisfy the spirit of nationalism in developing nations, thereby assuring their continued support. As he wrote in a letter to the *New York Herald Tribune*'s Executive Vice-President William Robinson a month after the Guatemalan coup, within these countries "there is a strong communist leaning among certain groups." If the United States constructed policies inimical to the economies of developing nations, he continued, "we will most certainly arouse more antagonism," and the possibility of these countries "turning communist would mount rapidly."[28] But Eisenhower was a firm cold warrior, and once he determined a country *had* turned Communist, such as 1954 Guatemala, he sought to reverse the situation by any means feasible.

United Fruit's well-known connections within the White House, State Department, and Congress did help to create a sympathetic audience.[29] Nevertheless, government officials brought with them an outlook on world politics that was fashioned by the cold war ethos. They assumed that communism threatened the fundamental American way of life, that foreign investment was essential for this

[26] *New York Times*, 3 March 1954.

[27] Eisenhower to General Alfred Gruenther, 30 November 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary Series (hereafter DDE), "November 1954," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

[28] Eisenhower to Robinson, 4 August 1954, Whitman File, DDE, "August 1954."

[29] Among those in government with prior connections to United Fruit were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; his brother Allen who directed the CIA; Assistant Secretary Cabot and his brother Thomas Dudley Cabot, in 1951 the State Department's director of the Office of International Security Affairs; Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks; Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's special assistant for national security affairs; and United Nations representative Henry Cabot Lodge. Shortly after leaving the government in 1954, former CIA Director and Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith became a United Fruit director.

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way of life so any threat to this investment was concomitantly a threat to the national interest, and that any threat to the national interest was necessarily the result of Communist activity and a threat to national security.[30]

By such logic, in spite of Eisenhower's distinction between nationalism and communism, Communists became scapegoats for virtually any program or policy that opposed United States interests. These interests incorporated strategic, political, and of course economic considerations. As Willard Barber, Truman's deputy assistant secretary of state for American republic affairs put it in 1949, combining ideological and material factors, Communist influences were those "alien to American ideals and which have affected Guatemala as a place for investment of capital."[31] Even more specifically, less than two weeks before Castillo Armas's invasion of Guatemala, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in a televised press statement, explained to the American public the relationship between economic interests and national security. The expropriations were symptomatic of a greater danger. Dulles remarked: "If the United Fruit matter were settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain just as it is today as far as the presence of communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned. That is the problem, not United Fruit."[32]

## The Sequence of Intervention

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact date of the decision to intervene in Guatemala. Circumstances indicate that it came sometime in the middle of 1953, before the second expropriation of United Fruit property. At this time John Doherty replaced two former FBI operatives, Collins Almon and Birch O'Neill, as CIA station chief in Guatemala. Also during this period several envoys of Nicaragua's dictator Anastasio Somoza along with United Fruit's Corcoran contacted ex-CIA chief and current Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. They told Smith that the Communist danger in Guatemala had reached such proportions that certain neighboring nations, particularly Nicaragua and Honduras, were ready to act. These countries lacked sufficient resources by themselves and needed the help of the United States.[33]

Another suggestion that this was the time of the decision is that in August 1953 Carlos Castillo Armas and Ydigoras Fuentes met in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, to sign a "gentleman's pact" promising to cooperate to overthrow Arbenz. Castillo Armas informed Ydigoras Fuentes that he had received assurances of American support, a claim supported by a letter he wrote to

[30] Martin Needler, *The United States and the Latin American Revolution* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 79.

[31] Willard F. Barber to N. Leonard Jarvis, 25 August 1949, NA FW814.00B/3-1549.

[32] John Foster Dulles, news conference transcript, 8 June 1954, in United States Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 1310.

[33] Interview with E. Howard Hunt, Miami, Fla., 6 December 1977; Braden interview.

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Somoza in September saying, "I have been informed by our friends here that the government of the North, recognizing the impossibility of finding another solution to the grave problem of my country, has taken the decision to permit us to develop our plans."[34] Since Castillo Armas's plans required U.S. assistance, it is clear that the Eisenhower administration intended to do more than just look the other way.

A final indication as to the timing of the decision to intervene is that during the spring and summer of 1953 the Eisenhower administration began to look for a suitable ambassador to Guatemala who could coordinate State Department and CIA operations. Rudolph Schoenfeld, a career diplomat with some experience with Communist matters—he had been the American representative to Poland's government-in-exile during World War II and then became minister to Rumania—had succeeded Patterson, but the Guatemalan assignment required a less conventional individual. Eisenhower's close aide, C.D. Jackson, the head of the Psychological Strategy Board, met with CIA Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Frank Wisner by himself and with Undersecretary Bedell Smith to discuss the candidacy of Whiting Willauer. Willauer had distinguished himself as an active opponent of communism while serving as General C.L. Chennault's right-hand man with the Flying Tigers in China. But Willauer was a Republican, and the administration wanted a Democrat who could take the blame should the project fail. Thus during Congress's August recess the White House decided on John E. Peurifoy, who while ambassador to Greece had earned the reputation of a plain-speaking, dynamic diplomat who could actively work to combat Communist influences. Peurifoy was also closely identified with the chief architect of Truman's foreign policy, Dean Acheson.[35]

Whatever the precise date, the White House gave the CIA permission to develop a plan. It is impossible to determine how many officials knew of the decision, because the national security machinery was designed to assure security. The CIA's Richard Bissell asserted positively, however, that "there is no possible doubt that this operation was approved at the level of the secretary of state, the assistant secretary, and the president."[36] This assertion supports Allen Dulles's response, in a 1965 television interview, to those who charged that the CIA acted independently: "At no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved by the highest level."[37] The telephone

[34] Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes with Mario Rosenthal, *My War with Communism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 50.

[35] Entries for 3 April, 15 April, and 2 May 1953, *Time File*, "Log 1953 (1)" (hereafter Jackson Log), Papers of C.D. Jackson, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Jackson Log, "1953 (2)," 18 July 1953; James C. Hagerty for Robinson McIlvaine, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, memorandum, 8 October 1954, Official File (OF) 8F, "Peurifoy," Eisenhower Papers; Flora Lewis, "Ambassador Extraordinary: John Peurifoy," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 July 1954, p. 9.

[36] Interview with Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Farmington, Conn., 1 November 1977.

[37] NBC News, "The Science of Spying," transcript, 4 May 1965.

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conversations between the two Dulles brothers before and during the coup testify to the CIA director's veracity.[38]

Given the code name PBSUCCESS ("slug" in CIA jargon), the operation was begun. The CIA established a field headquarters at Opa Locka, Florida, near Miami. Estimates place the project's cost between $5 and $7 million, and it involved some 100 Americans as well as many mercenaries recruited from Guatemala and the surrounding Central American nations. For the first time a CIA organization was set up as an autonomous unit, distinct from one of the agency's regional divisions. The reasons are self-evident. The operation was of such magnitude that it would have been extremely confusing and inefficient to have the same desk officers handling other assignments simultaneously with those of Guatemala. PBSUCCESS received its own communications facilities, financial officers, support people, cover agents, and special powers to requisition confidential funds.[39]

Virtually all of the CIA's chief officials played important roles. At the top was Allen Dulles. Bissell, Dulles's special assistant during the Guatemalan operation and deputy director of plans for the later attempt to oust Castro, states that Dulles "was closer to the Guatemala operation than he was to the Bay of Pigs."[40] Wisner, the deputy director of plans in 1954, was directly in charge of preparations, and he received significant support from Tracy Barnes, another top assistant. In the field the major figures were Colonel J.C. King, who as head of the Western Hemisphere Division played only a paternal role; Al Haney, the "field commander"; and E. Howard Hunt, the chief of political action.

Under the instructions of Bedell Smith, a team of American diplomats aided the CIA. Peurifoy served as team leader, communicating constantly with the agency. Messages which originated in Washington were coordinated with the State Department and transmitted over the CIA channel to the agency's station in Guatemala. Once received, for security reasons, they were hand-carried or verbally conveyed by agents to the ambassador, who would subsequently contact the other members of the team: Willauer, who did become the ambassador to Honduras, Ambassador Robert Hill in Costa Rica, and Thomas Whelan, the American minister to Nicaragua.[41]

Shortly before the operation took place Peurifoy returned to Washington to finalize the plans. He apparently learned that preparations were almost complete, for when asked about the prospects for Arbenz's regime he quipped, "We are making out our Fourth of July reception list, and we are not including any of the present administration."[42] Two days after Arbenz's resignation Peurifoy

[38] See, telephone conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, 7 April 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1952–1959, Telephone Conversation Series, "Telephone Memos (Excepting To and From White House) March 1954 to April 30, 1954 (1)," Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.

[39] Bissell interview; Hunt interview.

[40] Bissell interview.

[41] Hunt interview, and Ross and Wise, *Invisible Government*, pp. 167–68.

[42] Quoted in "Guatemala: The New Junta," *Time*, 12 July 1954, p. 38.

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flippantly lamented, "People are complaining that I was forty-five minutes off schedule."[43]

Since the CIA guidelines ruled out a *direct* United States armed intervention, the initial assignment for the well-organized task force was to select a Guatemalan leader.[44] Among the native conservative opposition, many regarded Ydigoras Fuentes as the rightful heir to the presidency. The ultimate selection, however, rested with the CIA, whose experts assessed Ydigoras Fuentes as too reactionary and likely to incur the hostility of both the international community and the majority of the Guatemalan people. They further considered his physical resemblance to a Spanish noble a distinct liability. E. Howard Hunt, who participated in the final decision, recalled: "These were the little things we had to take into consideration. You don't rally a country made up of mestizos with a Spanish don."[45]

The first alternative was a civilian, Juan Cordova Cerna. Not only an implacable foe of Arbenz and a prominent coffee grower, Cordova Cerna had also been a legal adviser for the United Fruit Company. But he lacked the necessary military experience and, besides, at that time was undergoing treatment in New Orleans for throat cancer. The CIA thus decided upon the forty-year-old Castillo Armas.

A graduate of both the Escuela Politécnica, Guatemala's West Point, and the United States Army Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Castillo Armas was something of a folk hero. Wounded in a 1950 anti-Arevalo uprising, he was believed dead and taken off for burial. Only a fortuitous moan changed his destination to a hospital. Sentenced to prison after his recovery, he dramatically escaped on 11 June 1951 by tunneling to freedom. Subsequently, Castillo Armas traveled throughout Central America, contacting other conspirators, including Ydigoras Fuentes and Cordova Cerna. His military background, honest reputation, folk-hero image, and Mayan appearance made him a good choice to lead the invasion. By June 1954, he confidently asserted that he would "return very shortly" to his homeland.[46]

The American government furnished Castillo Armas with all the requisites for the invasion. He received money and an "army," among whose ranks were many mercenaries recruited from the area. Edward Bernays notes in his memoirs that Evelyn Irons, an American reporter, hired a donkey and visited the training camp. She witnessed many soldiers "receiving wads of dollar bills passed out by men who were unmistakably American."[47] Shipments of rifles and other small arms, machine guns, and ammunition found their way to rebel

[43] Quoted in Lewis, "Ambassador Extraordinary," p. 9.

[44] Richard M. Bissell, Jr., "Oral History," Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

[45] Hunt interview.

[46] Quoted in *HAR* 7 (July 1954): 11–12, *New York Times*, 16 June 1954.

[47] Edward Bernays, *Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of a Public Relations Counsel* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 771.

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centers in Honduras and Nicaragua, one of which was located on a personal estate of Somoza. By June 1954, two months after the United States had concluded military agreements with both countries, the *New York Times*, although never explicitly implicating the American government in the plot, reported: "Militarily the United States is doing its utmost to draw a circle around this spot of Communist infection. . . . The charter aircraft business at Toncontin [Honduras] boomed so that it was virtually impossible to hire a private plane."[48]

Several obsolete American bombers also landed at the airstrip. Once the invasion began, Castillo Armas lost two of these planes and asked the United States government for replacements. In his only acknowledgment of U.S. involvement, Eisenhower described in his memoirs a meeting in the Oval Office, attended by the Dulles brothers, Bedell Smith, and new Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland. Holland opposed sending the additional planes but the others favored the request. The president asked Allen Dulles for his estimate of the situation. Dulles replied that Castillo Armas's chances were about 20 percent with the planes, and about zero without them. Eisenhower ordered that the planes be replaced.[49] This is the only aspect of the operation to which Eisenhower admitted. It is also one of the few evidences of disagreement among the policymakers.[50]

Ironically, in the context of the operation most of these military preparations amounted to little more than a show. The primary emphasis was not to be military but psychological. One essential project involved transmitting anti-Arbenz, pro-Castillo Armas broadcasts from the surrounding areas. On 1 May 1954 a team of Guatemalan exiles trained and financed by the CIA began broadcasting from the neighboring jungle across the Guatemalan borders. The choice of this international labor-day holiday assured as wide an audience as possible. Calling itself the "Voice of Liberation," the station adopted the slogan "*Trabajo Pan y Patria*"—work, bread and country. Adopted from the black propaganda techniques of World War II, it epitomized "The Big Lie."[51] The broadcasters claimed they were operating from within Guatemala itself, even though they never set foot on its soil. Well camouflaged and free from observation, the exiles would simulate a raid by government troops, only to broadcast again the next day, allegedly from a new location. In this fashion they not only urged the

[48] *New York Times*, 23 May and 19 June 1954.

[49] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 425–26.

[50] On another occasion, Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy wrote to Secretary Dulles, "I would like you to know that I believe the philosophy back of the action [the order to search Guatemala-bound ships] is wrong," and "that to resort to this action confesses the bankruptcy of our political policy vis-a-vis that country." Murphy was not opposed to forceful action, but to a violation of international law which "should give stir to the bones of Admiral von Tirpitz." Like Holland's, Murphy's objections were overruled. See Murphy to Secretary, 25 May 1954, NA 611.14/5-2554.

[51] Martin F. Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II," in *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 543–53.

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population to support a rebel invasion, but also gave potential dissidents proof of Arbenz's ineptness. The "Voice of Liberation" sounded so authentic that many foreign correspondents, including those from the *New York Times* and *Life* magazine, believed it was located within Guatemala and accepted it as *the* source of information.[52]

The CIA also arranged for propaganda leaflets to be dropped from aircraft throughout the countryside, criticizing the present government and preparing the rural populace for the forthcoming invasion. They persuaded Guatemalan Catholic leaders to hold clandestine meetings with members of their churches. These efforts resulted in a massive volume of anti-Arbenz pastoral messages delivered each Sunday, messages that received wide publicity in the local press. Military personnel required special attention. Henry Hecksher, a German exile who later became CIA station chief in Laos, disguised himself as a European businessman in order to gain better access to high officers in the armed forces. If Guatemalan military officers could not be convinced on principles to undermine their government, bribes were offered.[53] Perhaps because of such efforts the *Hispanic American Report* wrote that prior to the invasion the CIA believed that "Arbenz would not be backed by his army in the event of an anti-communist revolution."[54]

Concurrently, the State Department launched an extensive campaign to shape public opinion. It planted news stories throughout the hemisphere.[55] In proposing an anti-Communist resolution at the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, in March 1954, Secretary Dulles, after consulting with his brother on the wording, made headlines with his opening harangue on Communist aggression and its danger to the Americas. Only an hour after the resolution passed, the secretary of state, who was not an expert on Latin America, returned to Washington, soon to be on his way to Paris and Geneva in his continuing effort to keep the French fighting in Indochina.[56]

Immediately following his opening statement Dulles introduced the United States draft proposal, "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against Communist Intervention," later termed the Declaration of Caracas. Denouncing communism as "alien intrigue and treachery," the resolution concluded by proposing that Communist domination or control of any country would justify "appropriate action in ac-

[52] Phillips, *Night Watch*, pp. 40–46.

[53] Hunt interview; see also, Susanne Jonas, "Test Case for the Hemisphere: United States Strategy in Guatemala, 1950–1974" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1974), p. 85.

[54] *HAR* 7 (August 1954): 12.

[55] United States Information Agency, "Report on Actions Taken by the U.S. Information Agency in the Guatemalan Situation," 2 August 1954, NA 714.00/8–254.

[56] Telephone conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, 25 February 1954, Dulles Papers, "Telephone Memos (Excepting To and From White House) Jan. 1, 1954–Feb. 1954 (1)"; Samuel Guy Inman, *Inter-American Conferences, 1926–1954* (Washington, D.C.: University Press, 1965), pp. 258, 265; John Moors Cabot, "Transcript of a Recorded Interview," The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.

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cordance with existing treaties."[57] "Existing treaties" referred implictly to the 1947 Rio Pact, which called for a Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States to determine acceptable measures for the common defense in the event of aggression. The State Department began to solicit support for such a meeting.[58]

Several of the Latin American delegates expressed apprehension over the possibility of a nation construing such a declaration as legitimizing intervention in the internal affairs of another state. A number of amendments were proposed to allay these fears. During the ensuing discussion Dulles and Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello engaged in a vitriolic debate. Toriello, like Dulles an accomplished speaker, drew loud applause when he condemned the resolution as "merely a pretext for the United States intervening in our internal affairs" and accused the Eisenhower administration of returning to "Big Stick" diplomacy, of projecting McCarthyism worldwide, and of seeking to use the Communist issue to suppress Latin American desires for economic independence.[59]

In spite of the positive vocal reaction to Toriello's speech, the resolution passed by an overwhelming majority. Although this outcome satisfied the United States and certain Latin American dictatorships, it dismayed many of the other nations. Their representatives claimed that they withheld their opposition for fear that America would retaliate by cutting off economic or technological assistance. These "pangs of conscience" were so evident that *Time* and *Hispanic American Report*, two magazines that supported the U.S. position throughout the controversy, both quoted Uruguay's chief delegate as saying, "We voted for the resolution but without enthusiasm, without optimism, without joy, and without the feeling that we were contributing to the adoption of a constructive measure."[60]

Concerned that the United States might use the declaration to justify an invasion and aware that preparations were already under way (in January 1954 Arbenz revealed his acquisition of the previously mentioned correspondence between Castillo Armas and Somoza), the Guatemalan government sought to prepare itself militarily. Traditionally the United States had supplied Guatemala

[57] United States Department of State, *Tenth Inter-American Conference: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with Related Documents* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 8–9.

[58] See, for example, Record Group 59 of the National Archives Diplomatic Branch, U.S. Department of State memorandum, 3 June 1954; Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, 4 June 1954; Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, 14 June 1954; U.S. Department of State Intelligence Report, 17 June 1954, NA 714.00/6–1754; Guatemalan Group, Agenda for Wednesday, 23 June 1954; Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, 25 June 1954. (Unless noted, these documents have not yet received decimal file numbers.)

[59] Toriello repeatedly discusses his confrontation with Dulles in *La Batalla de Guatemala;* see also, Louis M. McDermott, "Guatemala, 1954: Intervention or Aggression?" *Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal* 9 (January 1972): 82.

[60] "After the Vote," *Time*, 29 March 1954, p. 32; *HAR* 7 (February 1954): 39.

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with most of its armaments, but since the late 1940s it had instituted a boycott. After the State Department continued to reject his appeals to lift the arms embargo, Arbenz looked behind the Iron Curtain for help. Anticipating, at the very least, an opportunity to embarrass the United States, Soviet leaders eagerly complied. The Skoda factory in Czechoslovakia sent some 2000 tons of small arms and light artillery pieces to the East German Baltic port of Stettin. There they were loaded onto the Swedish freighter *Alfhem*, listed on the manifest as optical glass and laboratory supplies, and cleared for Dakar, Africa. The ship sailed directly for Puerto Barrios. That Arbenz risked infuriating the United States by purchasing military equipment from behind the Iron Curtain demonstrates his belief in the desperate predicament of his regime. Moreover, if he tried to use the arms to form a peasant militia, as some postulated he intended, he ran the additional risk of alienating his regular troops, whose support he required.[61]

Before the *Alfhem* arrived in Puerto Barrios on 15 May, the CIA discovered its cargo. In Stettin an operative posing as a bird watcher spied what he thought were arms being loaded onto a ship. He wrote a seemingly innocuous letter to a French automobile parts concern in Paris, to which he substituted a microfilm dot for a period. The agent in Paris translated the microfilm message into code and transmitted it by shortwave to Washington. The key to the code was the twenty-second prayer of David in the Book of Psalms, which begins, "My God, my God, why has thou foresaken me." Decoded this meant that the shipment was en route. Allen Dulles arranged for a surreptitious inspection as the *Alfhem* passed from the Baltic to the North Sea through the Kiel Canal, which confirmed the report, as did Henry Hecksher's conversations with senior officers on Arbenz's staff. The CIA intended to intercept the *Alfhem* on its way to Guatemala, but because agents had for a while mistakenly followed another vessel, the armament-laden ship managed to reach port. When it arrived at Puerto Barrios, American officials were waiting at the docks.[62]

The *Alfhem's* arrival determined the date for Castillo Armas's invasion.[63] Washington was in an uproar. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Alexander Wiley called the shipment "part of the master plan of world Communism," and President Eisenhower claimed the quantity to exceed "any legitimate, normal requirements of the Guatemalan armed forces."[64] Allen Dulles called an emergency session of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,

[61] Department of State, memorandum of conversation (Toriello, Cabot, Fisher), 25 March 1953, NA 611.14/3-2553; William L. Krieg to Department of State, 23 November 1953, NA 714.00/11-2353; and Keith Monroe, "Guatemala, What the Reds Left Behind," *Harper's Magazine* 211 (July 1955): 60–65.

[62] See Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, "America's Secret Agents: The Mysterious Doings of the CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, 30 October 1954, pp. 19–30; Hunt interview; James C. Hagerty Diary, 20 May 1954, James C. Hagerty Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

[63] Hunt interview.

[64] Wiley quoted in *New York Times*, 19 May 1954; Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 424.

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which was composed of the heads of the army, navy, and air force intelligence networks; the intelligence officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the Atomic Energy Commission; and an FBI representative. The CIA director presented the CIA's assessment of the situation: since the shipment originated behind the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union was blatantly disregarding the Monroe Doctrine and using Guatemala to establish itself firmly and actively in the Western Hemisphere. The following day Dulles reiterated his presentation to the National Security Council.[65]

On 18 June 1954 Castillo Armas's forces crossed over the Honduran border to invade Guatemala. It would be inappropriate to claim that this force constituted an effective fighting unit capable of defeating Arbenz in combat. The so-called army entered Guatemala with only about 150 troops, most of whom had no prior military experience. The rebels settled down in the Church of the Black Christ, the country's major religious shrine, a mere six miles within the border. There they awaited the regime's collapse. The most serious military engagement leading up to the government's defeat resulted in the deaths of seventeen soldiers.[66]

Arbenz lost, in the words of Bissell, "when his nerve cracked."[67] He assumed that his previously expressed apprehensions had become a reality, that the small Army of Liberation—he never did know its actual size—was but a prelude to a much larger invasionary force. From the moment Castillo Armas set foot in Guatemala, the president believed that the months of preparation that had been going on across Guatemala's borders could only mean a large-scale effort.[68] He never doubted the outcome. Arbenz reasoned that the United States's firmness at Caracas, its response to the arms shipment, and the documented help promised Castillo Armas by the "government of the North" indicated the Eisenhower administration's willingness to go to great lengths to assure the invasion's success, perhaps even to send American troops.

Arbenz miscalculated. There never was an American plan to escalate assistance. As Allen Dulles wrote Eisenhower in the midst of the invasion, "the entire effort is . . . dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength."[69] The CIA jammed Guatemalan radio communications so that

[65] Harkness and Harkness, "Mysterious Doings," p. 20; Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1962), p. 65.

[66] Blasier, *Hovering Giant*, pp. 172–74; Ernst Halperin, "The National Liberation Movement in Latin America," MIT Center for International Studies, Report no. A/69-6 (Cambridge, Mass., June 1959), p. 54; Wise and Ross, *Invisible Government*, pp. 176–77.

[67] Bissell, "Oral History."

[68] This concern is emphatically expressed in Guatemala's official complaint to the United Nations Security Council following the Castillo Armas invasion. See "Message from the Minister of Foreign Relations of Guatemala to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations," 20 June 1954, attached to Embassy of Guatemala, 21 June 1955, NA FW714.00/6-2154.

[69] Quoted in "The situation in Guatemala as of 20 June," attached to Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the President, 20 June 1954, DDE, Administration Series, "Dulles, Allen (4)," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

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the inhabitants of Guatemala City had little or no idea as to what was really happening at the "front." Wild rumors circulated, reporting major government defeats and the imminent arrival of well-equipped divisions of rebel troops. Arbenz aggravated the situation when, in an effort to silence the "Voice of Liberation," he ordered a total blackout of the capital and other large cities. The resultant silence increased the tension by making the threat seem more real. Nor was the blackout completely effective. Many of the poorer areas received their electricity from batteries or gasoline generators and continued to receive the antigovernment transmissions. These primarily uneducated Guatemalans conveyed the news to the rest of the population. Incessant police sirens and curfew bells exacerbated the crisis atmosphere, as did the arrival of wounded soldiers and civilians, no matter how small the number. Hundreds fled the capital for the mountains, creating a scene of mass confusion. Anxiety prevailed everywhere, including within the National Palace.[70]

Within this context Castillo Armas's air force became critical. But not for its military power. Except for a few small Cessnas it consisted totally of the antiquated planes received from the United States. This was sufficient, however, to frighten the people. Later commentators referred to the planes as *sulfatos*, the Guatemalan word for laxative, due to their psychological effect on the government and general population. The airplanes circled Guatemala City, dropping anything that caused a loud noise, such as blocks of dynamite attached to hand grenades. The citadel where the *Alfhem's* munitions were stored was bombed, making an impressive explosion. In return, the only sounds coming from the government defenses were impotent machine gun bursts.[71]

The additional use of the "Voice of Liberation" effectively negated Arbenz's air force, which was always very weak. The radio station broadcasted accounts of Soviet aviators who had defected to the West with their planes. When a Guatemalan pilot did the same, CIA agents implored him to appeal publicly to his countrymen to follow suit. At first he refused, but after being plied with alcohol, he agreed to make an imaginary appeal. This was secretly recorded, cut and spliced, and played over the CIA station. The results exceeded even the CIA's expectations. Former operative David Phillips remembers the situation: "From that moment the Guatemalan air force was grounded. Arbenz, fearing his pilots would defect with their planes, did not permit the flight of a single military aircraft during the duration of the conflict."[72]

As the confusion and panic mounted, Arbenz finally considered arming the peasants and urban workers. By this time he felt he had no alternative. The prospect of this militia was the ultimate determinant in the army officers' decision to desert the revolutionary government. Not only were they, like everyone

[70] Bissell, "Oral History"; Phillips, *Night Watch*, p. 44.

[71] Halperin, "National Liberation Movement," pp. 54–55; Fedro Guillen, *Guatemala, Prologo y Epilogo de una Revolucion* [Guatemala, prologue and epilogue of a revolution] (Mexico: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1964), pp. 62–64.

[72] Phillips, *Night Watch*, pp. 43–44.

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else, convinced of imminent defeat, but also they now perceived themselves and their traditionally privileged status as about to be seriously undercut, if not completely eliminated. They demanded Arbenz's resignation. Feeling extremely isolated and frightened, the president offered no resistance. On 27 June 1954, just ten years after the revolution began, Arbenz resigned and fled into exile.[73]

## The Consequences: American and Cuban Perceptions

The ease with which Arbenz conceded defeat, the ease with which the United States succeeded, contributed to the lack of any comprehensive analysis subsequent to the event. The rapidity of the government's capitulation presented little time, or reason, for investigation. Except for a few leftist journalists, the press treated the coup as a successful anti-Communist uprising.[74] In the absence of investigative reporting, the American covert operation remained secret. Because the nature of the counterrevolution remained unquestioned—Washington emphasized that it was a patriotic native insurrection—the premise that the Arbenz administration was unpopular and dominated by Communists was assumed correct.[75] Few within the United States doubted that Guatemala had become a center of Communist subversion and a real threat to the entire hemisphere. Those Americans who followed the coup believed that the Guatemalan people recognized the Communist infiltration and rooted it out. Within a few years the victory of Castillo Armas became for the United States public a vague memory. Many even forgot the Communist issue, remembering the coup only as another "banana revolt."

Within the intelligence and national security communities, however, policymakers developed a high confidence in the United States's capacity to engineer coups. When an apparently similar situation arose in 1959 with the Fidelistas' triumph in Cuba, the White House, State Department, and CIA considered themselves well prepared. The Eisenhower administration first conceived of the operation that eventually became the Bay of Pigs, and it involved many of the individuals who participated in the Guatemalan venture. Although these veterans understood the logistical differences between Guatemala and Cuba, they perceived marked similarities. They also perceived similarities between Arbenz and Castro, both in terms of the possible dangers they represented and the methods by which they could be eliminated.[76] Since American officials con-

[73] American University, *Case Study*, pp. 11–12.

[74] See, for example, the articles by A.B. Magill in the *New York Daily Worker* throughout 1953–1954; Freda Kirchwey, "Guatemala Guinea Pig," *Nation*, 10 July 1954, pp. 21–23; and Morris Siegel, "Perspective on Guatemala," *New Republic*, 19 July 1954, pp. 10–14.

[75] The official version of the coup is detailed in U.S. Department of State, *A Case History of Communist Penetration: Guatemala* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957); and the previously cited U.S. House of Representatives, *Ninth Interim Report*.

[76] See, for example, Dulles to Eisenhower, Box 113, "re Guatemala, 1963," Allen W. Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library.

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sidered both leaders as puppetlike creatures of the monolithic Communist conspiracy, they reasoned that the strategy that had worked so perfectly in Guatemala could be to a large extent duplicated in Cuba.

This reasoning led to the evolution of a plan for Cuba based essentially on the Guatemalan strategy. The same people were used, the same operational mechanisms established, and the same blueprint mapped out. In the words of Howard Hunt, "It [the Bay of Pigs operation] was done for the same reason because we had a successful precedent. . . . We had no trouble assuming our prior roles, knowing what it was all about, knowing what we could do and how to do it."[77] Different circumstances necessitated certain tactical modifications—for example, since Guatemala was surrounded by hostile dictatorships friendly to the United States, there was no need for an amphibious landing—but the overall strategy was identical. Richard Bissell, who was central to the plan, recalls that once the attacking exiles had secured a beachhead, the CIA scenario projected "a possibly protracted period of psychological and political warfare which would lead to the modification of his [Castro's] regime," In other words, "The chance of true success—that is the chance of toppling Castro—was predicated on the assumption that faced with that kind of pressure, he would suffer the same loss of nerve [as Arbenz]."[78]

Explanations for the failure of the Bay of Pigs project tend to concentrate on the tactical weaknesses. They emphasize that since the strategy required a successful beachhead, the operation should have been turned over to the Pentagon, not left to the CIA. To be successful, tacticians theorize, the invasion needed an armed expeditionary force with special weapons and training, air support, and other military preparations.[79]

The other major explanation for the Bay of Pigs fiasco emphasizes Kennedy's decision-making apparatus. According to this school, gross tactical miscalculations resulted from a failure of advisers to examine carefully options and contingencies. This failure stemmed from the administration's belief in U.S. superiority and the desire of key policymakers to avoid internal dissension. As a consequence, Kennedy's highest subordinates unquestionably accepted the CIA's simplistic assessment and proposal. Irving L. Janis, the leading exponent of this interpretation, states his findings most clearly

> The failure of Kennedy's inner circle to detect any of the false assumptions behind the Bay of Pigs invasion can be at least partially accounted for by the group's tendency to seek concurrence at the expense of seeking information, critical appraisal, and debate. The concurrence-seeking tendency was manifested by shared illusions and other symptoms, which helped the members maintain a sense of group solidarity. Most crucial were the symptoms that contributed to complacent overconfidence in the face of vague uncertainties and explicit warnings.[80]

[77] Hunt interview.

[78] Bissell, letter to author, 1 November 1979; Bissell, "Oral History."

[79] Hunt interview; Bissel interview; Bissell letter to author; Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).

[80] Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 48–49.

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Janis is correct in positing that a faulty decision-making process contributed to the failure to oust Castro. Likewise, tactical errors undoubtedly also contributed. But neither of these explanations accounts for Castro's ability to repel the invasion. The CIA's project to overthrow Arbenz called for less force than the Bay of Pigs operation. Yet it succeeded with hardly any resistance. There were no contingency plans in either case. Had Castro been as unprepared militarily, politically, and psychologically as Arbenz he might very well have suffered the same fate. But Castro was prepared. Due to an overconfidence stemming in a substantial part from the success in Guatemala, the CIA, State Department, and White House failed to consider adequately this distinction.[81] The ease of Arbenz's overthrow "went to their heads."[82] The tactical miscalculations resulted from misperceptions, not from gross negligence.

Whereas U.S. explanations for Castillo Armas's victory were superficial, Cuban revolutionaries analyzed the coup much more comprehensively. In 1960 Castro's chief lieutenant Ernesto "Che" Guevara addressed the Latin American Youth Congress in Havana. He paid tribute to Arbenz:

> We would like to extend a special greeting to Jacabo Arbenz, president of the first Latin American country which fearlessly raised its voice against colonialism; a country which gave expression to the hopes of the peasant masses. We would also like to *express out gratitude to him*, and to the democracy which gave way, for *the example they gave us* and for the *accurate estimate they enabled us to make of the weakness which that government was unable to overcome. This allows us to go to the root of the matter* and to behead those who hold power and their lackeys at a single stroke.[83]

Guevara's speech explained to the Latin American youth, prior to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, that the Cubans understood the connection between Guatemala and Cuba, connections which Allen Dulles wrote of only in 1963. Guevara appropriately made the speech because he personified the connection. As a young, socially conscious medical student, he had come to Guatemala in February 1954. Far from the dedicated revolutionary of his later years, his major involvement in the Guatemalan revolution derived from conversations with leaders such as former President Arevalo, and he scarcely played any role in the events themselves, remaining a concerned observer. Nevertheless, like so many others, Castillo Armas's victory forced him to seek asylum in the Argentine embassy in Guatemala City and then to flee to Mexico. There Guevara encountered a small community of Latin American radicals, many of whom had studied the

[81] The tendency of policymakers to see different situations as the same, or the model a policy after a previously successful one despite substantial variables, is discussed in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 234.

[82] H.A.R. (Kim) Philby to Leonard Mosley, 10 February 1977, reproduced in Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1978), p. 491.

[83] Quoted in Richard Gott, *Rural Guerillas in Latin America* (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1973), p. 64 (emphasis added).

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coup with respect to their own native movements. Among those in Mexico was Raul Castro, who later introduced the young Guevara to his brother Fidel.[84]

In this fashion the events in Guatemala directly influenced the emergence of Guevara's political personality, introducing him to radical theory and strategy. Before the government capitulated he told his friend Hilda Gadea that if Arbenz would repudiate his regular army and retreat to the mountains with a band of armed peasants, he could continue the fight indefinitely. Soon thereafter he wrote his first political article, "I saw the Fall of Jacabo Arbenz." Unforunately the article has been lost, but according to Gadea, Guevara outlined his developing theories on guerilla warfare and revolutionary strategy. The article's final sentence read, "The struggle begins now."[85]

Although the lessons Guevara drew from his personal experience in Guatemala did not guarantee that the Cubans could prevent the Bay of Pigs invasion from succeeding some seven years later, his speech reveals that unlike its counterpart in the United States, the Castro regime scrutinized the reasons for Arbenz's overthrow. It could thus make an "accurate estimate" of the "weakness which that government was unable to overcome." To Guevara and Castro, this weakness was the Arbenz administration's failure to transcend liberal reforms. The most extreme of the reforms, the agrarian legislation, called for the redistribution and private ownership of uncultivated land. There never was a program of nationalization or communization.[86] In spite of Communist inroads, the traditional power structure remained intact. This was demonstrably evident within the army, which by failing to defend the government brought about Arbenz's resignation. Arbenz, himself a regular army officer of middle-class origin, refused, until it was too late, to arm the peasants and workers.

The Cuban administrators believed that by leaving the power structure essentially untouched, the Arbenz government failed "to go to the root of the matter." A strong case can therefore be made that Cuba's revolutionary leaders' perceptions of Arbenz's overthrow drove their policies farther to the left. This was the meaning of Guevara's 1960 speech. He, Castro, and the other Cuban radicals understood from the Guatemalan episode the paradox of reform in Latin America. Leaders in the United States such as President Eisenhower encouraged the development of Third World nations. This development necessarily entails agrarian reform. When this agrarian reform adversely affected American interests, as was the case with United Fruit in Guatemala, these same U.S. leaders interpreted the reforms as evidence of Communist ideology. They believed only Communists would oppose the notion that promoting U.S. enter-

[84] Ricardo Rojo, *My Friend Che*, trans. Julian Casart (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1968), pp. 45–47.

[85] Hilda Gadea, *Ernesto: A Memoir of Che Guevara*, trans. Carmen Molina and Walter Bradbury (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972) pp. 54–57.

[86] George Britnell, "Factors in the Economic Development of Guatemala," *American Economic Review* 43 (May 1953): 113; "Social Revolution in Guatemala," *World Today* 10 (July 1954): 279–82.

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prises and values benefited the entire world.[87] Guevara and Castro realized that this logic could lead to U.S. intervention in Cuba, as it had in Guatemala.

This judgment of the Guatemalan coup influenced the Cuban leaders to go beyond Arbenz's programs. They believed that by enacting legislation that would alter the traditional power bases and eliminate those elements that might support a counterrevolutionary movement, they would make Cuba less vulnerable to the type of operation that had toppled the Guatemalan government. The agrarian reforms of 1959 and 1962 effectively destroyed the foreign and national entrepreneurs who controlled Cuba's agricultural economy. They did not merely redistribute the uncultivated land. Furthermore, unlike Arbenz, Castro rose to power relying on an irregular militia, and once he had succeeded he immediately dismantled the remaining army with its elite leadership and organized the peasantry for any future attacks. After the United States refused his request for aid, he readily accepted help from the Soviet Union. There were mass imprisonments, executions, expulsions, and public trials. The overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala sharpened the antagonisms between Latin American nationalists and American cold warriors. Had U.S. strategists perceived this difference between Castro's and Arbenz's preparedness, and their ideological orientations, they certainly would not have miscalculated at the Bay of Pigs. Indeed, it is unlikely there would have been a Bay of Pigs.

The study of American involvement in Guatemala in 1954 is thus important not merely as a case study, but as an integral part of cold war history. It illustrates the manner in which the cold war ethos created within the Washington community an exaggerated perception of Communist subversion in Guatemala. The CIA project there had been a high-risk operation, and the ease with which it succeeded resulted largely from the nonmilitant nature of the 1944 revolution. American policymakers, rather than discerning these favorable circumstances, generalized from the particular. They concluded that a strategy based on a mixture of military threats, covert operations, and alliances with indigenous client groups could effectively thwart movements for political, economic, and social change. They underestimated the ability and motivation of these movements to resist, while increasing that ability and motivation. Misconstruing Arbenz's nationalism, liberalism, and eclectic idealism as militant communism, U.S. government leaders failed to recognize militancy where it existed. Castro, Guevara, and their allies understood that their success required this militancy. Their perception, tenaciousness, and ruthless dedication prevented a repeat of the Guatemalan coup.

[87] For more on such logic, see Jervis, *Misperception*, p. 129.

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# Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look

CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI
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"Barring the chilled, scandalized feeling that always overcomes me when I see and hear women speak in public," young Woodrow Wilson once wrote in 1884, describing a Woman's Congress meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Women in Baltimore, "I derived a good deal of whimsical delight . . . from the proceedings." The future president's amusement, however, could not overcome his antipathy for feminine orators. Commenting on one speaker, "a severely dressed person from Boston, an old maid from the straitest sect of old maid," Wilson observed that she was "a living example—and lively commentary—of what might be done by giving men's places and duties to women."[1] Surely the man who dismissed the participation of women in public affairs would have recoiled at the suggestion that one day he would write about the woman suffrage amendment: "I deem it one of the greatest honors of my life that this great event, so stoutly fought for, for so many years, should have occurred during the period of my administration."[2]

His own testimony demonstrates Wilson's political evolution concerning women. But it does not measure his contribution to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, a contribution which has not been accorded careful attention by historians of either the Progressive era or the woman suffrage movement.[3] Few presidents have been persuaded to exercise the full power of their

[1] Wilson to Ellen Louise Axson, 31 October 1884, in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 35 vols., eds. Arthur S. Link et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–), 3:389 (hereinafter cited as *PWW*).

[2] *New York Times*, 27 August 1920.

[3] Scholarly works usually present Wilson as a negative influence or a reluctant reformer. Eleanor

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office on behalf of a controversial amendment to the Constitution. Historically, most federal amendments have been carved out in Congress and in the states with little more than perfunctory attention from the presidents who held office at the time. Women who sought a suffrage amendment in the late nineteenth century, then, did not regard the president as a requisite ally. The transformation of the modern presidency, however, which had its genesis in Theodore Roosevelt's concept of the office as a "bully pulpit," gradually led suffragists to rethink their position. By 1915, awareness of the ways in which the presidency could be used convinced all suffragists that it was necessary to win the support of Woodrow Wilson. An examination of Wilson's role illustrates the crucial nature of active presidential lobbying and brings to light a significant aspect, hitherto unexplored, of the political dynamics involved in the passage of the amendment in both houses of Congress, as well as ratification by the states.

## Wilson and the New Suffragists

That Wilson held Victorian views of women and their proper place in society is not surprising. Born in Staunton, Virginia, in 1856, and reared in Augusta, Georgia, he brought with him to adulthood the culture and mores of the South. Inheriting the region's general contempt for career women, he frequently expressed his disapproval of "unsexed, masculinized females."[4] His vision of femininity reflected contemporary attitudes of northerners and southerners alike, including many women. His wife, for one, sustained him in every way. A native of Rome, Georgia, Ellen Louise Axson Wilson shared his concept of what the ideal woman should be—a homemaker, helpmate, and genial hostess. She agreed with "Woodrow" that if a woman "cannot preserve her individuality in the family . . . she simply has no individuality worth preserving."[5] When Bryn Mawr, M. Carey Thomas's newly endowed women's college, offered Wilson his first

Flexner's *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (New York: Atheneum, 1973) is the best narrative of its kind. However, Flexner fails to make use of many manuscript collections of political figures connected with the Wilson administration, including Wilson's papers. Thus she views Wilson's role as limited essentially to wooing a few Southern Democrats in the final days of the movement. David Morgan's *Suffragists and Democrats* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1972) concentrates on suffrage politics as it related to southern congressional objections to enfranchising black women, but it fails to acknowledge Wilson's accomplishments as a suffrage advocate. Anne F. Scott and Andrew M. Scott's *One Half the People: The Fight for Woman Suffrage* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Lippincott, 1975) includes six pages of documents on "The Education of Woodrow Wilson," but does not convey the level of his exertions or effectiveness. Other notable but equally incomplete studies include: Aileen Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890–1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); William L. O'Neill, *The Woman Movement* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969); and idem., *Everyone Was Brave* (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

[4] Frank Parker Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination," *Current History* 20 (July 1924): 566–67.

[5] Wilson to Ellen Axson, 1 March 1885, *PWW*, 4:316–17. For a brief biographical sketch, see Arthur S. Link, "Ellen Louise Axson Wilson," in *Notable American Women, 1607–1950*, eds. Edward

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teaching position in 1884, his bride-to-be expressed concern that he would "find it very unpleasant to serve, as it were, under a *woman*." It furthermore struck her as "absurd" and "unnatural" that he should stoop to teaching girls.[6] Nevertheless, while at Bryn Mawr Wilson launched a distinguished career as teacher and historian; by the time he had become president of Princeton University in 1902, his scholarship had established him as one of the country's leading educators. During these years Ellen had borne three daughters, all of whom doted on their father and complemented their mother's outlook. It was a close-knit, happy family. But feminine independence, much less the idea of woman suffrage, was not promoted by the household environment—the emotional and social base from which Wilson stepped into public life.[7]

Progressive reform and the New Freedom became the cornerstones of Wilson's New Jersey governorship and first presidential administration. The progress and freedom of which he and other presumably forward-looking men spoke, however, did not embrace genuine national political democracy. Wilson certainly no longer believed, as he had at the age of twenty, that universal suffrage lay "at the foundation of every evil in this country," but when he ran for president in 1912 he had not yet conceded that women deserved the right to vote.[8] And because the split in the Republican party between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft insured his election, Wilson could safely evade the issue whenever it came up. Choosing to hide behind the Democratic platform, which made no reference to suffrage, he stated that candidates for national office should remain noncommittal. Cornered by reporters in California where it was a state referendum item, in May 1911, he had said only: "Suffrage is not a national issue, so far. It is a local issue for each State to settle for itself."[9] He would maintain that position for several years.

Roosevelt's Progressive party platform, on the other hand, boasted a suffrage plank. Although Roosevelt, too, proved to be equivocal on the issue, no less a luminary than Jane Addams had seconded his nomination. With good reason the editors of many suffrage journals urged their readers to rally behind the "Red Bandana."[10] His defeat did not dampen their mood. As the campaign had emphasized the need for reform in general, the election of a progressive

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T. James and Janet W. James (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3: 626–28.

[6] Axson to Wilson, 28 November 1884, *PWW*, 3: 494–95. On the subject of the Wilson-Thomas relationship, always cordial, see Wilson to Axson, 6 December 1884, *PWW*, 3:517–18; and in *PWW*, Thomas to Wilson, 15 August 1885, 5:13–14; Wilson to Thomas, 29 August 1885, 5:15; Thomas to Wilson, 17 May 1887, 5: 505–6, and 1 August 1888, 5: 758.

[7] Two of his daughters, Eleanor Randolph Wilson McAdoo and Margaret Wilson, later would become active suffragists.

[8] Diary entry, 19 June 1876, *PWW*, 3: 143; Wilson to Witter Bynner, 20 June 1911, *PWW*, 23: 160.

[9] Stockbridge, "How Wilson Won His Nomination," pp. 566–67.

[10] See, for example, *The Woman Voter* 3 (October 1912) and *The Western Woman Voter* 2, nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 (August-November 1912).

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president of any kind could not have failed to inspire hope in suffrage circles that an end to the century-long struggle was in sight.

During the two decades before Wilson's election, the suffrage movement had met with limited success. Sustained mainly by the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), founded in 1890, suffragists had worked tirelessly in hundreds of campaigns, state by state.[11] Four Rocky Mountain states granted their women voting rights in the 1890s; after a fourteen-year dry spell, five additional trans-Mississippi states did likewise between 1910 and 1912.[12] Because the hard-fought state campaigns yielded such comparatively small gains, a new determination to seek a *federal* amendment characterized the ambition of many younger suffragists.[13] The foremost leader among this new breed was the redoubtable Alice Paul. After working with the radical English suffragettes, Emmeline, Cristobel, and Sylvia Pankhurst, Paul had returned to America in 1910. Her arrival in Washington in 1912 signaled a renaissance for federal suffragism. With some reservations, NAWSA agreed to sponser the work of Paul's newly formed Congressional Committee, and the young Quaker quickly set about organizing a massive suffrage parade.[14]

On 3 March 1913, five thousand white-robed suffragists marched up Pennsylvania Avenue, flanked by a half-million spectators. The onlookers, most of whom were in Washington to attend Wilson's inauguration, quickly forgot that he was about to arrive at Union Station. Before long, a large, hostile element of the crowd began throwing stones and cursing the demonstrators. Many policemen refused to restrain the rioters; one officer reportedly grabbed Genevieve Francis Stone, the wife of Illinois Representative Claudius U. Stone, shouting: "If my wife were where you are, I'd break her head!" The disturbance required a detachment of marines to restore order. The whole affair resulted in a congressional investigation and the subsequent dismissal of the chief of police.[15] Although many marchers suffered injuries, the attendant public sympathy served as balm for their wounds. Because of the favorable publicity, the movement gained more momentum than had been seen in a generation. Soon afterward, in March, April, and June 1913, suffrage delegations were arguing their case before the reticent Wilson. In July, the Suffrage Caravan, which originated in

[11] The woman suffrage movement had split in 1869 due to disagreement over the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Lucy Stone and Henry Ward Beecher founded the American Woman Suffrage Association, while Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony founded the National Woman Suffrage Association. The two groups merged twenty-one years later.

[12] Between 1867 and 1917, suffragists mounted some 854 various suffrage campaigns directed at state legislatures. See Kraditor, *Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement*, pp. 5-6. The states granting suffrage were Wyoming (1890), Colorado (1893), Utah (1895), Idaho (1896), Washington (1910), California (1911), and Arizona, Kansas, and Oregon (1912).

[13] Enthusiasm for the federal amendment had flagged earlier, after the death of Susan B. Anthony in 1906.

[14] Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., eds., *The History of Woman Suffrage*, 5 vols. (New York: Foster and Wells, 1881-1922), 5: 377-78 (hereinafter cited as *HWS*).

[15] See the *New York Times*, 4 March 1913.

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San Francisco and worked its way east, delivered to Congress a petition with over 200,000 signatures gathered from all parts of the country. And a new, national publication, *The Suffragist*, began circulation in November.[16]

Despite the Congressional Committee's achievements, NAWSA, skeptical of seeking a federal amendment, continued to concentrate on state referenda. Nevertheless, it sanctioned the more sensational tactics employed by Paul throughout 1913. But when her Congressional Committee forged plans to campaign against the Democrats in 1914, relations with NAWSA grew more strained. Paul's insistence on holding the "party in power" responsible for congressional diffidence conflicted with NAWSA's contention that suffrage needed all the friends that it could muster, regardless of party. At length, Paul's committee struck out on its own as a new organization—the Congressional Union—in February 1914.

The NAWSA hierarchy subsequently decided to make its own overtures toward Wilson. Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, NAWSA's president, had met with him on 8 December 1913. "I am not a free man," he responded to Shaw's request that he use his influence with Congress on behalf of suffrage. "I am not at liberty until I speak for somebody else besides myself, to urge legislation upon the Congress."[17] His statement was disingenuous. Wilson had built a reputation as an executive capable of writing into law progressive legislation in which he believed. Within the first year of his presidency, he had already achieved two major goals of his New Freedom—the Underwood Tariff Act and the Federal Reserve Act—through persistant leadership, including congressional conferences at the Capitol to insure their passage.[18] In these matters, it was not "private views" that he urged; it was the voice of the people as he interpreted it. On the controversial issue of woman suffrage, he refused to pass judgment. The president did offer one consolation: He said that the formation of a House Woman Suffrage Committee would be a good idea. Dr. Shaw left the White House pleased with this small gain.[19]

NAWSA's work during 1914 centered on referenda in the important states of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Congressional Union, meanwhile, undertook its western campaign against Democrats in the off-year elections and canvassed in nine suffrage states where a total of forty-three Democrats were running. Of the twenty-three who were defeated, the Union claimed credit in at least six races.[20] More importantly, by the spring of 1915, the Congressional Union's efforts, complemented by NAWSA's conven-

[16] Wilson Appointment Books, 17 March and 12 April 1912, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (hereinafter cited as WP, DLC); Inez Hayes Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1921), p. 41; Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, pp. 264–65.

[17] *HWS*, 5: 376.

[18] See Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 147–57, 197, and 239–40 on Wilson's leadership qualities.

[19] *HWS*, 5: 376.

[20] Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party*, p. 92.

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tional lobbying, had moved the federal amendment onto the floor of both houses of Congress for the first time.[21]

## Toward a Federal Amendment

Wilson remained unimpressed throughout 1914 and 1915 as delegations from both the Congressional Union and NAWSA continued to secure audiences with him.[22] Not until 19 October 1915 did he find himself compelled to do more than nod and speak evasively on the subject. On that date he voted in favor of woman suffrage in the special New Jersey state election.

Events in Wilson's personal life in part motivated the gesture. On 6 August 1914 Ellen had died. Her death plunged him into profound grief and despair.[23] He did not fully recover until he met Edith Bolling Galt, his "gift from Heaven," in March 1915. Their courtship soon agitated his cabinet: remarriage so soon after Ellen's death and before the election of 1916 might alienate women voters in vital western states.[24] (The Congressional Union, as a catalyst for organizing women voters, was a force to be reckoned with.) The nation looked upon the romance with warm approval, generally, but in some quarters the couple became the object of malicious gossip. In the West the impending remarriage spurred a number of indignation meetings. Undaunted, and with little prior notice, the president and Mrs. Galt formally announced their engagement on 6 October 1915. That day Wilson also told reporters: "I intend to vote for woman suffrage in New Jersey. I believe the time has come to extend the privilege and responsibility to the women of the State, but I shall vote . . . only upon my private conviction. I believe that it should be settled by the State and not by the National Government and that in no circumstance should it be made a party question."[25]

Arthur S. Link has speculated that Wilson's decision may have been based in part on a desire to overcome the indignation of women voters.[26] Wilson also had simply been overwhelmed by growing suffrage demands, as he himself had candidly suggested on October 12 to the Daughters of the American Revolution: "I know of no body of persons comparable to a body of ladies for creating an atmosphere of opinion. I have myself in part yielded to the influence of that atmosphere, for it took me a long time to observe how I was going to vote in New Jersey."[27] Though both of these explanations are instructive, Wilson had

[21] The Senate defeated the measure on 19 March 1914, 35 in favor to 34 opposed, while the House defeated it on 12 January 1915, 174 to 204.

[22] He met with suffrage delegations in February, June, and September 1914, and January, June, and August 1915, reiterating the states' rights doctrine each time (Wilson Appointment Books, WP, DLC).

[23] For details, see Link, *The New Freedom*, pp. 459-65.

[24] On Wilson's remarriage, see Link, *Wilson: Confusions and Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 1-14.

[25] *New York Times*, 7 October 1915.

[26] Link, *Confusion and Crises*, p. 12.

[27] Ibid., p. 13; *New York Times*, 12 October 1915.

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painted himself into a corner. In every previous utterance to suffragists he had consistently reiterated the states' rights doctrine. Now the New Jersey election put him to the test. Despite considerations of placating the bluenoses or responding to an atmopshere of opinion, Wilson in fact had no other choice. Not to have voted at all in New Jersey would have made him appear hypocritical; to have voted against suffrage would have made him appear reactionary.

At any rate, Wilson's concession, important though it was, had no discernible effect. The referendum lost by over 46,000 votes.[28] Moreover, the voters in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania also rejected woman suffrage. Although NAWSA lost these battles by respectable margins, the effort, time, and money required had become too costly. In a somewhat demoralized state, the members of NAWSA gathered in Washington for their annual convention in December to elect a successor to the aging Shaw. The unanimous choice was Carrie Chapman Catt, the head of the New York Suffrage Association. Within a year, the dynamic new president formulated the multifaceted "Winning Plan." It called for enfranchised states to petition Congress on behalf of a federal amendment; selective referendum campaigns; and state-by-state agitation in the South. And, auspiciously, the plan made Woodrow Wilson the focus of both suffrage factions. Paul, with the threat of electoral reprisal, intended to force him to support the amendment. Catt, with personal diplomacy, sought to educate him and enlist his support.

As the suffragists' demands increased during 1916, Wilson could make further concessions, however haltingly, in response to Catt's gentle persuasion, without giving the appearance of succumbing to Paul's pressure tactics. The Congressional Union's efforts in the elections of 1914 had impressed many politicians; in April 1916, the union reorganized itself as the National Woman's party, with the avowed purpose of acting as the balance of power in the twelve suffrage states, which controlled ninety-one electoral votes. Thus, when Catt requested that the Democrats write a suffrage plank into their national platform, Wilson readily complied.[29] He kept his pledge, although the plank was based on states' rights, and in July the Republicans followed suit. In a surprise move, however, the Republican presidential nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, ventured beyond his party's platform on August 1 with a strongly worded endorsement of the federal amendment.[30] The National Woman's party applauded Hughes's extraordinary step, and M. Carey Thomas tried to persuade NAWSA to back the candidate, also.[31] Instead, Catt urged Wilson to follow Hughes's lead. He declined, stating: "If I should change my personal attitude now I

[28] *New York Times*, 20 October 1915.

[29] *New York Times*, 15 December 1915; see also, Janice B. Roessing (vice-president of NAWSA) to Wilson, 14 April 1916, WP, DLC.

[30] *New York Times*, 2 August 1916.

[31] Thomas to Catt, 4 August 1916, Carrie Chapman Catt Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

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should seem to the country like nothing better than an angler for votes." He did agree, however, to speak at NAWSA's convention on September 8.[32]

A tumultuous ovation broke out in the theater in Atlantic City when the president, accompanied by Mrs. Wilson, stepped onto the stage and sat next to Catt and Shaw. His speech, by his own choice the last on the evening's agenda, was cautious but encouraging, as he averred: "I have not come to fight anybody, *but with somebody*. We feel the tide; we rejoice in the strength of it; and we shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of it."[33] For the first time, as many people noted, he made no reference to states' rights. After he finished, Shaw, with a touch of the dramatic, exclaimed: "We have waited *so* long, Mr. President! We have dared to hope that our release might come in your administration and that yours would be the voice to pronounce the words to bring our freedom."[34]

Wilson's abandonment of his states' rights position can be attributed in part to his desire to counteract the Hughes declaration and the potentially harmful consequences of the National Woman's party's anti-Wilson campaign in the West. Yet, Catt may have been right in interpreting his altered position as evidence of his personal conversion and commitment to suffrage.[35] Because of the combined efforts of all suffragists, suffrage advocacy had gradually acquired legitimacy within the administration. During the state referenda of 1915, for example, not only Wilson, but also his private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison had voted for suffrage; at the same time, Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law, and Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield voted for it in New York; in Pennsylvania, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson had done likewise.[36] Moreover, while the second Mrs. Wilson let be known that she did not favor woman suffrage, the president's daughter, Margaret, had become an ardent suffragist and had participated in several National Woman's party activities. On one occasion, she had asked Colonel Edward M. House, her father's closest adviser and a suffrage advocate, to use his influence to convert Wilson to the federal amendment.[37] While it is impossible to measure the depth of his conviction by the time of the Atlantic City convention, these cumulative influences within Wilson's official family cannot be dismissed.

Yet another process was at work. Wilson's reelection depended on his ability not only to win a mandate for his policies of neutrality, but also on his success in garnering the votes of former Bull Moose Progressives, independents, and

[32] Wilson to Mrs. E. P. Davis, 5 August 1916, WP, DLC.

[33] For the complete text, see Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 6 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1925), 4: 297–300.

[34] Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, *Woman Suffrage and Politics* (New York: Scribners, 1926), p. 260.

[35] Ibid.

[36] *New York Times*, 6 October 1915.

[37] Ibid., 20 October, 22 November, and 8 December 1915; the diary of E. M. House, 15 December 1915, E. M. House Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.

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agrarians who had grown disenchanted with his failure to work actively for further domestic reforms after 1914. Beginning in 1916, he championed a number of social justice measures which, for a variety of reasons, he had previously resisted. These included the Adamson eight-hour-day law, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, the Rural Credits Act, and a federal workman's compensation act. Extending the franchise as an act of social justice may be viewed as part of this larger program, although it would be a distortion to suggest that it was solely a matter of political expediency.

Regardless of motivation, Wilson made only one further public reference to states' rights—to a Woman's party delegation in January 1917. But to NAWSA he never again invoked his old excuse. During his second administration he would respond with alacrity to almost every request they made of him.

The race between Wilson and Hughes was one of the closest in American political history. Suffragists notwithstanding, the war in Europe, not women's rights, weighed most heavily on the minds of Americans as they went to the polls on November 7. With the popular campaign slogan, "He kept us out of war!" Wilson emerged triumphant, though just barely, winning 277 electoral votes to Hughes's 254. Of the twelve suffrage states, Wilson won all but Illinois and Oregon, despite the Woman's party campaign. Ironically, his narrow victory was attributed to the women's vote because of the peace issue. The *New York Times*, for instance, asserted that women in California, with thirteen electoral votes, went disproportionately for Wilson. William Allen White wrote that if women had not supported Wilson, "Kansas would have gone for Hughes." And observers in Arizona, Idaho, Utah, and Washington credited women with swinging their combined eighteen electoral votes to the Democratic column. The Democratic party was indebted to women. Without them, as the *New Republic* editorialized, "Mr. Wilson would not have been continued in the White House."[38]

## Resistance and Cooperation

When the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, Wilson emphasized America's responsibility to make the world "safe for democracy." The nation's entrance into the war and Wilson's famous phrase played into the hands of the suffragists and forwarded their cause immeasurably. The role that women played in the war effort—tending farms, working in factories, transporting freight, and performing numerous other jobs usually reserved for men—proved to be a salient part of the education of both Wilson and Congress regarding women's rights. Throughout the war, the president appealed to and praised the women of the nation for their help and patriotism. In acknowledg-

[38] *New York Times*, 10 and 12 November 1916; *Literary Digest*, 18 November 1916, pp. 1312–16; *New Republic*, 25 November 1916, pp. 86–87; see also, Link, *Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 161n; and Catt and Shuler, *Woman Suffrage and Politics*, pp. 264–65.

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ing their spectacular cooperation, he consistently stressed the term "women" as well as "men" in his wartime messages, in a conscious attempt to give them full credit.[39]

The war effort elicited varying responses from suffragists. The Woman's party refused to subordinate its activities. Angered by what they believed to be intransigence on Wilson's part, the party commenced daily picketing of the White House on 10 January 1917. The picketers at first enjoyed the silent nods of White House guards who looked upon their lonely vigil in a spirit of camaraderie. Even Wilson, on one occasion, invited the women to escape the bitter cold by joining him for tea. (They declined.) Although many people admired the picketers, others were alienated by them. When the militant suffragists unveiled "Kaiser Wilson" banners quoting the president's pronouncements on democracy—to emphasize the absence of democracy at home—they were attacked by passers-by, and arrested and imprisoned. The often hysterical atmosphere of "100 per cent Americanism" did not suffer any acts hinting of "treason." Severe treatment, however, did not blunt their determination; new recruits quickly came forward and kept the issue in the public eye.[40]

NAWSA, on the other hand, viewed the war as an opportunity to show that women, by their patriotism, deserved full enfranchisement. Shaw and Catt accepted appointments as administrators of the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense on 24 April 1917.[41] At the same time, Catt's lieutenant, Helen Hamilton Gardener, began assiduously cultivating friendships on Capitol Hill and in the White House. Gardener's powers of persuasion and tact made her an invaluable liaison, and her admirers soon included Wilson himself. Writing to the president on 10 May 1917, Gardener asked him to assure Representative Edward W. Pou (D-N.C.), chairman of the House Rules Committee and an opponent of the cause, that he, Wilson, favored the creation of a House Committee on Woman Suffrage. Wilson wrote to Pou on May 14 that he heartily approved "in this matter of very considerable consequence." Congressional resistance proved to be so formidable, though, that Gardener again appealed for help. A word from the president to Representatives Carter Glass (D-Va.) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.), in particular, she believed, would help stem the opposition. Wilson interceded on June 13, and Heflin yielded: "After reading your letter several times, and thinking over the situation, I have concluded to follow your suggestion."[42]

The House debated the issue for four months. During this time, the idea of making suffrage a war emergency measure emerged as a critical factor in the

[39] See, for example, Baker and Dodd, *Public Papers*, 5: 263.

[40] For a day-by-day account of the pickets, see Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party*, pp. 193–291.

[41] Newton D. Baker to Catt, 24 April 1917, Newton D. Baker Papers, DLC.

[42] Gardener to Wilson, 10 May 1917; Wilson to Gardener, 14 May 1917; Wilson to Pou, 14 May 1917; Gardener to Wilson, 10 June 1917; Wilson to Heflin, 13 June, and Heflin to Wilson, 30 June 1917, all in WP, DLC.

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pursuit of the amendment. By previous arrangement, Congress had agreed to forego any matter not considered by the administration as a war measure. Woman suffrage was not on the list. Gardener had told Wilson, who was responsible for drawing up the list, that NAWSA "refrained from forcing the issue" because of his overwhelming task of war administration.[43] The picketers, however, provoked an incident that compelled Wilson to think about including suffrage. On July 14, police arrested several picketers, including Alison Turnbull Hopkins, the wife of J.A.H. Hopkins, the chairman of the New Jersey Progressive party. Both recently had been White House dinner guests. Meeting with Mr. Hopkins on July 18, Wilson asked for advice. Hopkins said that the solution "lay in the immediate passage of the Susan B. Anthony amendment." They then discussed the practicability of treating suffrage as a war emergency measure.[44] Two months later, on September 24, the House Woman Suffrage Committee was established; waving Wilson's letter of May 14 overhead, Chairman Pou announced that the House would take up suffrage as soon as "all current emergency war measures have been disposed of."[45] Thus, Wilson's response to the pickets had greatly enhanced the prospects of the amendment.

Yet the Woman's party seemed to draw Wilson and NAWSA into closer cooperation throughout the summer.[46] With the approach of the New York referendum in November, Catt directed Gardener to obtain Wilson's aid in repairing the damage which she believed the picketers generally had done to the cause.[47] Eager for the state to set an example, Wilson twice conveyed strong endorsements to the people of New York shortly before the election. He enjoined them not to use the pickets as an excuse to reject suffrage and praised "the spirit and capacity and vision of the women of the United States."[48] The amendment passed. To celebrate the victory, Wilson arranged a reception in December for Catt and Shaw, hosted by his daughter, Eleanor Wilson McAdoo.[49] Thus, by year's end, Catt's "Winning Plan" had yielded a bountiful harvest.

In the eighteen months between January 1918 and June 1919, the House and Senate voted on the federal amendment on five occasions. The roll calls in each instance were extremely close; a single congressman or senator could determine the outcome. For this reason Wilson's role took on greater importance. During this period, he made scores of personal and written appeals to members of Congress and also petitioned the Senate three times on the matter. His lobbying efforts were necessary, if only to bring some of his own party members into line.

[43] Gardener to Wilson, 19 July 1917, WP, DLC.

[44] *New York Times*, 19 and 20 July and 9 September 1917.

[45] Ibid., 25 September 1917.

[46] Wilson Appointment Books, 19 July, 8 and 20 August 1917, WP, DLC.

[47] Catt to Gardener, 11 October 1917, and especially Catt to Alice Paul, 24 May 1917, copies in the Ray Stannard Baker Papers, DLC.

[48] Wilson to Catt, 13 October 1917, WP, DLC; NAWSA Press Release, copy in Ray Stannard Baker Papers, DLC; Baker and Dodd, *Public Papers*, 5: 109.

[49] *HWS*, 5: 515.

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Many Southern Democrats, such as John Sharp Williams (D–Miss.), refused to support suffrage because they did not want to enfranchise black women.[50]

Two days before the House vote on the amendment, Representative Jouett Shouse (D–Kan.), a member of the Democratic National Committee fearful that Republicans would seize upon the issue, implored Wilson to curb the opposition of recalcitrant Southern Democrats "for the sake of the party."[51] The next day, January 9, Wilson invited Representatives John E. Raker (D–Cal.) and Edward T. Taylor (D–Colo.) and a committee of ten of their colleagues to the White House. Nine of the congressmen had been present for the previous House vote in January 1915, and six of the nine had voted against the woman suffrage measure.[52] Several of them had not yet decided how they would vote, and they entered the Oval Office looking for advice. In a surprise move, Wilson publicly acknowledged that he could "frankly and earnestly" advise them to vote for the federal amendment "as an act of right and justice."[53] Suddenly, the suffrage amendment, which only days before had been viewed as having dim prospects for adoption, became a certainty in Washington circles. Some observers estimated as high as a fifteen-vote margin of safety.[54] When the votes were counted the following day, January 10, the amendment had passed, 274 to 136—exactly the necessary two-thirds majority. Significantly, all twelve of the Democratic congressmen who had talked to Wilson voted in favor of passage.[55] Several publications, including the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, editorialized that the victory was due to Wilson's last-minute endorsement. At any rate, suffrage had reached a major turning point.[56]

The bill then went on to the Senate where it faced stiffer opposition. In May, the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee submitted a list of six Democratic holdouts they believed the president might be able to persuade. He reported that he had spoken to each of them to no avail, but would try again.[57] To Senator Josiah O. Wolcott (D–Del.) he wrote: "I am writing this letter on my own typewriter (notwithstanding a lame hand). . . . I am deeply

[50] Williams made many attempts to divorce black women from voting rights. He suggested the amendment read: "The right of white citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex" (U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 19 March 1914, p. 5104).

[51] Shouse to Wilson, 8 January 1918, WP, DLC.

[52] See U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., 7–23 January 1915, pp. 1483–1485; Wilson Appointment Books, 9 January 1918, WP, DLC; *Washington Post*, 10 January 1918.

[53] Press Release, 9 January 1918, and Wilson to Baker, 9 January 1918, WP, DLC.

[54] For example, see the *New York Times*, 10 January 1918; the New York *World*, 10 January 1918; the *Washington Post*, 10 January 1918.

[55] U.S., Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., 3 December 1917 to 19 January 1918, p. 810.

[56] *New York Times*, 11 January 1918; *Washington Post*, 11 January 1918; New York *World*, 11 January 1918; *The Independent*, 2 February 1918; "Woman Suffrage Crosses Its Jordan," *Literary Digest*, 19 January 1918, p. 15.

[57] Elizabeth Bass to Wilson, 20 May 1918; Wilson to Bass, 22 May 1918, WP, DLC.

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anxious — the issues are so tremendous! They are so tremendous as to justify the ardent appeal for your support."[58] To the intractable Senator Christie Benet (D-S.C.) he appealed four times in writing and at least once in person.[59] To Senator John K. Shields (D-Tenn.) Wilson wrote: "Not a little of the faith which the rest of the world will repose in our sincere adherence to democratic principles, will depend upon the action which the Senate takes in this now critically important matter." When Shields continued to resist, Wilson pressed further, declaring that the amendment was an "essential psychological element in the conduct of the war."[60] On 7 June 1918, he served notice on the entire Senate via a published letter to Catt:

> The full and sincere democratic reconstruction of the world . . . will not have been completely or adequately attained until women are admitted to the suffrage. The services of women during this supreme crisis of the world's history have been of the most signal usefulness and distinction. The war could not have been fought without them, nor its sacrifices endured. It is high time that some part of our debt of gratitude to them should be acknowledged and paid, and the only acknowledgement they ask is their admission to the suffrage. Can we justly refuse it?[61]

When, upon the death of Senator Ollie M. James (D-Ky.), Wilson asked Governor Augustus O. Stanley to appoint a prosuffrage replacement, the governor complied. On learning, shortly before the scheduled vote, that Senator Robert L. Owen (D-Okla.) was about to leave Washington on an extended trip, Wilson persuaded the prosuffrage senator to postpone his departure until after the roll call.[62] Last but not least, Wilson continued to meet with Catt and various senators in order to coordinate their activities as the date of the vote drew near.[63]

On Sunday, September 29, two days before the vote, Catt wrote to the president another letter in "sheer desperation."[64] According to her tally they were still two votes short. She asked if he could make one more public statement to appear in the newspapers before the reckoning. Earlier that morning, Secretary

[58] Wilson to Wolcott, 9 May 1918, Wilson Collection, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. (hereinafter WC, NJP).

[59] Wilson to Benet, 22 May 1918, copy in WC, NJP; also 18, 26, and 27 September 1918, WP, DLC; Wilson Appointment Books, 23 September 1918, WP, DLC.

[60] Wilson to Shields, 20 and 26 June 1918, WP, DLC.

[61] Wilson to Catt, 7 June 1918, WP, DLC.

[62] Wilson to Stanley, 30 August 1918 (Stanley appointed himself), and Wilson to Owen, 19 September 1918, WP, DLC.

[63] Wilson met with Senators John F. Shafroth (D-Colo.), Joseph E. Ransdell (D-La.), Joseph T. Robinson (D-Ark.), Henry F. Hollis (D-N.H.), supporters of the amendment, on June 24; with Catt and Bass on June 13 and September 16; with Governor Richard I. Manning (D-S.C.) on September 23, and with Senator Martin (D-Va.) on 25 September 1918 (Wilson Appointment Books, WP, DLC). He also wrote again, on September 27, to Senators Shields, Benet, Overman, Martin, and Wolcott. See also Wilson to Leon S. Haas of the Louisiana State Senate, 4 June 1918, and Wilson to Senator David Baird (D-N.J.), 31 July 1918, WP, DLC

[64] Catt to Wilson, 29 September 1918, WP, DLC.

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McAdoo had invaded Wilson's customary Sunday retreat to make an equally "desperate" plea. He suggested that Wilson address the Senate the next day. When Wilson questioned whether the Senate might resent such unprecedented action, McAdoo pointed out that, even if the extraordinary step failed to convince two more senators, public opinion would be so stirred that additional pro-suffrage senators would be elected in November, thus insuring the amendment's passage by the new Congress.[65] McAdoo's idea was not without merit. Then too, Catt's letter was in hand. Her impassioned review of the splendid work of women during the war also contained the warning that "if the Amendment fails, it will take the heart out of thousands of women, and it will be no solace to tell them that 'it is coming.' It will arouse in them a just suspicion that men and women are not co-workers for world freedom, but that women are regarded as mere servitors with no interest or rightful voice in the outcome."[66]

Wilson gave the Senate thirty minutes' notice before driving up to Capitol Hill on Monday, 30 September 1918. He was accompanied by all but one member of his cabinet.[67] In his short, eloquent speech, he restated his belief that the adoption of the amendment was "clearly necessary to the successful prosecution of the war and the successful realization of the objects for which this war is being fought." He concluded with a final request: "The executive tasks of this war rest upon me. I ask that you lighten them and place in my hands instruments, spiritual instruments, which I do not possess, which I sorely need, and which I have daily to apologize for not being able to employ."[68]

For all his effort, Wilson was barely out of the Senate chamber when Senator Oscar W. Underwood (D-Ala.) rose to speak against the amendment. The Senate rejected woman suffrage the next day, in spite of Wilson, 62 to 34—two votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority.[69]

## The Final Vote

The Armistice, signed on 11 November 1918, brought an end to the world war. From that point on, Wilson's time was almost entirely occupied with world politics. Before leaving the country for the Paris Peace Conference, however, at Catt's behest he again urged Congress to pass the suffrage amendment in his Annual Message on December 2.[70] The new Sixty-sixth Congress would not take up the matter until the following spring. By May, suffrage forces expected the House to repass the amendment overwhelmingly; in the Senate, where the roll call was scheduled for June 4, they were still one vote short.[71] The key to vic-

[65] William Gibbs McAdoo, *Crowded Years* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, 1931), pp. 496–98.
[66] Catt to Wilson, 29 September 1918, WP, DLC.
[67] Secretary of State Robert Lansing (and his wife) opposed woman suffrage.
[68] *New York Times*, 1 October 1918; Baker and Dodd, *Public Papers*, 5: 264–67.
[69] Peck, *Catt*, p. 297.
[70] Catt to Wilson, 26 November 1918; Wilson's Annual Message, 2 December 1918, WP, DLC.
[71] For an analysis of this Congress, see Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, pp. 319–28.

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tory, in Alice Paul's judgment, lay in the hands of three newly elected and as yet uncommitted senators. One of them was William J. Harris (D-Ga.), a personal friend of Wilson's. Late in April, Paul had sent her congressional liaison to discuss with prosuffrage Democrats, including Tumulty (Wilson's secretary), the possibility of getting the president to use his influence with Harris, who was then vacationing in Italy.[72] Tumulty cabled Wilson about the urgency of the situation on May 2. Wilson thereupon summoned the senator, who arrived in Paris on May 6. After conferring with Wilson, Harris immediately sent word that he would return to the United States and cast the decisive vote in favor of woman suffrage. Six days later, with the outcome now seemingly assured, a second "uncommitted" senator, Henry W. Keyes (R-N.H.), announced that he would also vote in the affirmative.[73] On May 20, Wilson cabled another message to Congress: "Through out all the world this long delayed extension of suffrage is looked for. I, for one, covet for our country the distinction of being among the first to act in this great reform."[74] One final senator, Frederick Hale (R-Maine), shifted his vote to the prosuffrage column, and on June 4, with little debate, the Senate passed the amendment, 56 to 25. Speaker Frederick H. Gillett (R-Mass.) and Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall signed the joint resolution later that afternoon.[75]

During the fifteen months of work for ratification that followed, Wilson was preoccupied with international treaty negotiations, debates with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a strenuous western campaign on behalf of the League of Nations—all of which helped to bring about his physical breakdown. He suffered a stroke on 2 October 1919, which left his left side paralyzed. While convalescing, Wilson sent messages to the legislatures of Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, Delaware, and North Carolina urging them to ratify the amendment, as well as personal notes to all the governors of all the southern states.[76]

By the summer of 1920, the ratification process had stalled. In June, the amendment was one state short of the required thirty-six. The Tennessee legislature, which was out of session, had not responded to the appeals of the Woman's party and NAWSA for reconvention. "Our only hope lies in Washington," wired a Catt lieutenant. "In Tennessee all swear by Woodrow Wilson. If he will but speak, Tennessee must yield." Wilson telegraphed Governor Albert H. Roberts, imploring him to call a special session of the legislatures. His influence prevailed.[77] The legislature met and engaged in heated debate for

[72] Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party*, pp. 415-16.

[73] Tumulty to Wilson, 2 May 1919; Cary T. Grayson to Tumulty, 5 May 1919; Wilson to Tumulty, 6 May 1919, Joseph P. Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. See also *New York Times*, 10 and 16 May 1919.

[74] Baker and Dodd, *Public Papers*, 5: 494.

[75] *New York Times*, 23 May and 5 June 1919.

[76] *New York Times*, 26 February, 3 March, 19 May, and 3, 24, and 26 June 1920.

[77] Wilson to Roberts, 24 June and 19 August and Roberts to Wilson, 25 June and 19 August 1920, WP, DLC; see also, *HWS*, 6: 617-25.

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several days. On August 18, by one vote, Tennessee became the thirty-sixth state to ratify the Susan B. Anthony amendment. On 26 August 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby signed the proclamation alone in his office, bringing to an end the historic crusade which had begun nearly 100 years before.[78]

## Conclusion

Although women suffragists fully realized the importance of presidential support for their movement, historians have limited their assessment of Wilson's role primarily to his early resistance to suffrage. In an attempt to broaden and reevaluate that historical interpretation, this article has focused on two specific questions that together provide a new perspective on the politics of the Nineteenth Amendment.

First, there is the question of Wilson's motivation. Why did he so vigorously promote the amendment after opposing it for so long? Wilson was, in most cases, an astute politician. In both New Jersey and Washington, he demonstrated a great capacity to read his constituency and articulate the issues accordingly. In the New Jersey referendum of 1915, he voted for suffrage because he could not reasonably have done otherwise. Facing a tough reelection campaign in 1916, if he indeed did swing over to the federal amendment at that point—and it is not at all clear that he did—it was surely in keeping with his second burst of progressivism, designed in part to woo the Roosevelt loyalists and others over to the Democratic party. Then too, his uncompromising speech before the Senate in September 1918, though obviously an act of sincerity, nevertheless was aimed at obstinate Democrats as the mid-term elections loomed ahead.

But this is an incomplete explanation. It does not account for his numerous efforts at other times. Like most politicians, Wilson was capable of transforming political necessity into personal advocacy. Although in 1913 he was clearly encumbered by paternalistic proscriptions regarding the role of women in society, the women of the country, through a gradual process of education and political pressure, were able to disabuse him of at least some of those encumbrances. After 1916, he habitually described the suffrage amendment as "a very wise act of public policy and also an act of fairness," and sometimes lamented to suffrage delegations that there were some men who "illustrated the fact that they could not learn."[79] It should also be noted that throughout his career—from the Graduate College controversy at Princeton to the crusade for the League of Nations—Wilson, an unreconstructed, romantic moralizer, had a predilection to work for particular measures, once he had become convinced of their desirability, with the zeal of a missionary. To him, woman suffrage was not simply a measure to establish equal voting rights; once the United States entered the war

[78] *New York Times*, 19 and 27 August 1920.
[79] Wilson to Pou, 14 May 1917; remarks to suffragists, 3 October 1918, WP, DLC.

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it became an issue upon which nothing less than "the full and sincere democratic reconstruction of the world" depended. Practically all of his speeches and writings on suffrage, especially after April 1917, clearly suggest the presence of such Wilsonian fervor. The question of motivation, thus, has a tandem answer, as Wilson himself once proposed, commending the amendment to the governor of Alabama in 1919: "My judgment is based on the highest considerations of both justice and expediency."[80]

Second, did Wilson's efforts make a difference? Both the National Woman's party and NAWSA understood well the politics of getting the amendment passed. Both organizations were prepossessed with obtaining his support as quickly as possible, although each employed widely divergent tactics in so doing. Once converted to federal suffragism, Wilson's exertions were manifold. From 1914 through 1920, he held some fifty interviews with various suffrage delegations and consulted with members of Congress at least eighty times, often on his own initiative. In addition to addressing the Senate on three occasions, he urged at least fifteen state legislatures to take action on state amendments. Letters to senators and congressmen, too numerous to cite in their entirety, number over 100. And perhaps most importantly, he secured the decisive votes in the House in 1918, the decisive vote in the Senate in 1919, and the decisive state vote during the ratification process in 1920.[81]

Wilson was an active supporter of woman suffrage for a little over three years. The Constitution was changed because of the work of groups such as NAWSA and the Woman's party, as well as the work of thousands of women over the span of more than two generations. Yet it cannot be denied that Wilson's role was pivotal. As Alice Paul told reporters shortly after his first public endorsement of the federal amendment in January 1918, "It is difficult to express our gratification at the President's stand. We knew that it, and perhaps it alone, would ensure our success. It means to us only one thing—victory."[82]*

[80] Wilson to Thomas E. Kilby, 12 July 1919, Kilby Official Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Ala., copy in WC, NJP.

[81] For a further assessment of Wilson, see Catt to Josephus Daniels, 28 February 1924, Josephus Daniels Papers, DLC; Gardener to Baker, 14 April 1925, Ray Stannard Baker Papers, DLC; Gardener to Baker, 11 June 1925, copy in the Edith Bolling Wilson Papers, DLC; and Maud Wood Park to Inez Haynes Irwin, memorandum (c. 1920), NAWSA Papers, DLC.

[82] *New York Times*, 10 January 1918.

* The authors are grateful for criticisms and comments made by Professors Arthur S. Link and Nancy J. Weiss of Princeton University, Professor Anne Firor Scott of Duke University, and Janet Wilson James of Boston College.

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# Book Reviews

The Progressive Presidents: Roosevelt, Wilson, Roosevelt, Johnson *by John Morton Blum. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1980. 221 pp. $11.95.*

The creativity of liberalism in politics, government, and policy is in a dry spell. Liberal reform depends for its success upon the capacity of capitalism to increase wealth. Liberal governments seek an uneasy union in the conduct of foreign policy between international morality and balance of power. Liberal politicians search for executive authority to act, but within constraints set by responsiveness to legislatures and open publicity.

John Morton Blum points out that the present ambiguities of liberalism are not new. He affirms the value of the tradition despite its inherent ambiguities and compares four "progressive" presidents in these terms: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson.

The first Roosevelt sued the Northern Securities Company as a means of challenging the Supreme Court and asserting executive authority in behalf of reform. The Hepburn Act, which strengthened the Interstate Commerce Commission, like his antitrust policies, was the achievement of half a loaf. Roosevelt believed in administrative law that would use expert knowledge in decision making. He brought able men, such as Gifford Pinchot, Elihu Root, and Henry Stimson, into government in behalf of this principle. Even though the reforms achieved were modest, however, the question of how to reconcile government by an elite with popular politics was never faced.

In managing foreign policy Theodore Roosevelt felt accountable to no one. His confidence in Manifest Destiny permitted him to act unilaterally in Panama and elsewhere and thereby to reveal potential abuses in executive power. He left unsolved the question of the limits of presidential power.

Wilson achieved considerable domestic reform but the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Trade Commission were structural rather than social reforms. He believed that men of talent should govern—"Princeton in the nation's service" (p. 76)—but uneasily combined this principle with the creation of a ragtag Democratic coalition.

He believed in the special virtue and mission of America in the world. This led him to



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use force in Mexico to "sponsor 'constitutional liberty' " (p. 83) and to enter the European war with the false promise of achieving universal peace. His failure brought the eclipse of liberalism and the presidency.

FDR wished to save capitalism but there was a tension between reform and recovery in the New Deal. Reform measures frightened business and delayed the investment required for recovery. The absence of Keynesian theory at first, and then the later failure to use it, prevented the deficit spending that might have stimulated recovery. Progressive taxation, a reform measure, impeded recovery. Social-security payroll taxes cut purchasing power.

The search for total victory in war violated liberty at home, as with the Japanese, and relief agencies and economic planning were abolished. A war on behalf of liberal principles injured liberalism at home.

Johnson's Great Society grew out of Roosevelt's economic bill of rights of 1944. But, the "experts" knew less than they thought about the problems they addressed or the capacities of government to deal with them. Johnson inherited the liberal universalism of the cold war and stretched constitutional power to its limits. A single case was fallaciously seen in universal terms, a legacy of Wilson, and power was misused, a legacy of Theodore Roosevelt. The result was the end of reform, Nixon's election, and the eclipse of liberalism.

Blum affirms the great achievements of gradualist reform. Gradualism is not due to liberal weakness but to conservative strength. We have learned of the need to seek accountability for foreign-policy decisions. But, despite the ambiguities of liberalism, he concludes that it has "provided a vibrant direction that . . . raised the quality of national life" (p. 209).

One wishes that he had asked whether liberalism has a future. Is it a spent tradition in a capitalism in crisis and a world of "garrison states"?

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Truman's Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman *by Harold F. Gosnell. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 656 pp. $35.00.*

In earlier books Harold Gosnell addressed himself to aspects of political leadership in the careers of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In this book he undertakes to analyze the leadership and political career of Harry S. Truman. He is thus in pursuit of two goals: to write a political biography as promised by the book's subtitle, and to analyze presidential leadership—which is what the preface projects. The twin objectives would, on the face, appear to be closely related, but there are differences and they affect the outcome.

This is a big book but it may well be both too big and too little. As a biography it faces, of course, the problem of selectivity. What should be included, what omitted? Should one, for example, be concerned because the index lacks entries for Francisco Franco, Myron Taylor, Latin America, and Spain? (Coincidence or not, these are also topics omitted in the Truman *Memoirs*.) Or should one question, in the light of their respective

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contributions to the Truman administration, the fact that Harold Smith rates more space than James E. Webb? Is the famous letter to music critic Paul Hume equal in importance with the furor over the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea?

Obviously, these are choices that are properly the author's. To raise them as questions is merely to suggest what is any biographer's problem: What in the subject's life was really important? In Gosnell's case, the solution to this problem is confounded by his other purpose, that is, to illuminate and to explain the nature of Truman's leadership.

Because the book is both a political biography and a study in leadership, its organization must have posed considerable problems for the author. He resolved them by two devices: in effect the leadership study aspects are the outer frame, with particular attention given to them in the first and last chapter; within this frame a first part dealing with the prepresidential years is largely chronologically arranged; two other parts, each devoted to one presidential term, ostensibly also follow the calendar but are really broken down by topics. This has the disadvantage of sometimes separating occurrences which may have had an impact on each other. It can also lead to repetitions and contradictions: did or did not Truman give his approval to a critical sentence in Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of September 1946 (pp. 308 and 343)?

Gosnell is not enamored of the revisionist historians, but neither is he uncritical of Truman. His assessment of the thirty-third president is that "Truman was a tribune of the people, plain speaking, direct, courageous, and personally incorruptible. He rose above his questionable early political backing to carve for himself a place among the presidential near greats" (p. 566). Among the character traits that contributed to Truman's success, Gosnell lists loyalty, optimism, physical endurance, a good sense of humor, and physical and moral courage. Hardly anyone would argue with this list, although this reader was rather appalled by a sentence which, after having been introduced to the psychologists' term "oral optimism," tells us that "remnants of Truman's oral tendencies were to be found in his fondness for good food, for drinking, and for talking and smiling" (p. 542).

There is no pretense that this is a definitive biography. But as a one-volume treatment it provides a rather remarkably detailed account of its subject. The dual nature of the book —political biography and study in leadership—may distract some readers and please others. Certainly Gosnell has added significantly to the literature on Truman.

The editors must be faulted not only for placing the footnotes at the end—this may well be a futile plaint by now—but also for failing to catch occasional slips such as placing West Virginia and Maryland *north* of the Mason-Dixon line (p. 318).

FRANCIS H. HELLER
*University of Kansas*

The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy *by Robert C. Johansen. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 517 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $6.95.*

The two major parts of this book are linked by nothing less than an attempt to redefine the American national interest. The first part argues that the international system that

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emerged from the Peace of Westphalia, a system based on territorial boundaries and the decentralized authority of independent states, has been made anachronistic by nuclear arms, technology, and the growing awareness of human rights. The "realist" historians and political scientists who have so shaped Western thinking about international relations have been living in the twentieth century, but thinking in the seventeenth.

Robert Johansen, a former professor at Manchester College and now president of the Institute of World Order, offers an alternative vision of the national interest. Called "global humanism," it glides across national boundaries and is as concerned with the bottom as with the top of the class structure. It sees profit-based corporations and the military-industrial complex as its primary enemies, as well as the policymakers whose worldview is defined by their involvement in these two groups. Realization of this vision, Johansen argues, must come from a changed consciousness on the part of the elites (one reason he has written this book), and from a "global populist movement" in which masses become aware and politically active.

This kind of vision is not new, although the thoroughness with which Johansen destroys the logic of the "realist" view of the national interest is decidedly noteworthy. What is new is the way the author uses four case studies as evidence for his argument. These studies—on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, U.S. foreign aid to India, American human-rights policies in Chile, and U.S. policy for international control of marine pollution—are detailed, scholarly examinations that build until they become an unrelieved assault on the pretensions and suicidal shortsightedness of Washington officials. The case studies are worth reading for their own sake; one can imagine the kind of class discussion these indictments might generate. At points the case is too loaded. When U.S. foreign-aid policies are condemned because they aimed at both the improvement of American wealth and "the perpetuation of a grossly unjust structure of wealth that kept [the recipients] in poverty" (p. 143), the evidence presented does not allow such a sweeping conclusion. The superb analysis of Kissinger's destruction of the Allende regime strangely does not take adequate account of the Petras and Morley thesis in *The United States and Chile* and overlooks Kissinger's own writings on revolutions—writings that answer Johansen's query why the national security adviser so feared Allende yet worked out closer ties with the two Communist giants.

This volume sometimes protests too much, and its more abstract parts are repetitive. But the piling up of detail, including a number of charts, is part of Johansen's determination to redefine the national interest sensibly and logically. He does so with four case studies that by themselves make this book provocative and important.

WALTER LAFEBER
*Cornell University*

International Energy Policy *edited by Robert M. Lawrence and Martin O. Heisler. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 218 pp. $22.95.*

The objective of these ten loosely connected essays is to alert readers to a broad range of potential American responses to current energy problems. Exploitative relations have

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been intentionally omitted as "inappropriate for this book" (p. xii). Also omitted is a serious discussion of an extended reliance on coal—unfortunate in light of last summer's decision at the Venice Summit.

Jack N. Barkenbus contends in his introductory essay, "Energy Interdependence—Today and Tomorrow," that the goal, at least for the United States, should be an "asymptotic," largely nuclear and solar future that will allow national energy autarchy. But that goal cannot be achieved until the international system has passed through a thirty- to seventy-year transition in which the effects of unequal dependencies on fossil fuels come to be replaced, or at least dominated, by the asymmetries of technology, human expertise, and access to capital. The examination of these dependency relationships is one of the essay's strengths. Unfortunately Barkenbus's analysis underplays political asymmetries by underemphasizing the differential abilities of governments to make linkages across issue areas, to garner information, and to convene and dominate international conferences.

Henry R. Nau's chapter, "The Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy in Energy: From Alliance Politics to Politics-as-Usual," rightly places energy policy at the nexus of foreign and domestic politics. The essay almost exclusively deals with oil, despite the slightly misleading title. Nau's thesis is that the United States has had a foreign energy policy even though it has been unable to sort out the domestic consequences. It would be interesting to see if Nau could sustain his argument in discussing coal, much less nuclear energy. (Gregory A. Raymond and Richard A. Skinner's chapter on nuclear energy does not address this issue; indeed their essay skirts many interesting questions about their subject.) Moreover, Nau's analysis suggests another, perhaps as important, variable: maybe the focus on domestic versus foreign policy influences needs to be shifted to crisis versus noncrisis issues as policy determinants. Incorporating the crisis-noncrisis dichotomy would enlighten the vignettes included, might explain the coal and nuclear issues, and perhaps shed some much-needed light on Nau's concluding question: Are even foreign-policy reasons sufficient to build and maintain a domestic consensus in energy, especially if the economic costs are so high?

Edward J. Williams's chapter is a good historical account of Mexican hydrocarbon policy, although it evidences the dangers of addressing immediate events in a book format. Wonder's chapter on Canadian-American natural-gas policy is also a useful background account; his presentation of American internal politics, however, lacks the sophistication of his analysis of Canadian politics.

Kenneth Paul Erickson's essay raises an important question: Is energy consumption necessarily a function of economic output such that the reduction of the United States's energy consumption will inevitably draw down America's economic output and standard of living? He tries to answer this question by comparing data from nine major capitalist industrial nations, a curious method of inquiry. While the interesting data teach the reader much about how countries have coped with their energy dilemmas, there are too many differences among the countries to answer convincingly his question.

The book concludes with four case studies. The most unexpected is Jerome D. Davis and Ib Faurby's discussion of Danish offshore policy. In a somewhat wordy essay, the authors persuasively present a number of "parochial elements" that explain why the Danish government has refrained from influencing and maximizing the development of

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offshore energy resources. In another essay, William Anderson asks, but does not definitively answer, why Soviet energy policy is more successful than the American policy. Daniel M. Ogden's chapter on the development of electric energy in the People's Republic of China adequately covers an oft overlooked aspect of that country's energy policies, whereas E. Spencer Wellhofer repeats some of the findings of the Erickson piece without trying to be half as ambitious.

Although it is unfortunate that none of the essays builds on the others and that the book fails to culminate in a concluding essay, many of the chapters provide useful theoretical and empirical grist awaiting further refinement. It is hoped that later works will more effectively integrate economic (supply, demand, and price) and political phenomena. Only then can we systematically evaluate alternative policy options.

MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER
*Michigan State University*

The Rise and Fall of the Shah *by Amin Saikal. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 299 pp. $14.50.*

Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran *by William H. Forbis. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980. 305 pp. $15.95.*

The recent welter of books and articles about the Shah and Iran in large part have been hasty potboilers or polemics against the sins of the Shah. It is therefore a relief to read the volume by Amin Saikal, the Afghan political scientist who spent five years of study and research in its preparation. Carefully documented and containing a large, well-chosen bibliography, the volume shows an excellent knowledge of published and unpublished materials and a good acquaintance with the country and many of its people. Only the title appears to have been chosen to fit in with popular interest in the Shah and gives little foretaste of the contents of the excellent volume to follow.

The thoughtful scholarship by no means indicates that the author fails to have his personal thesis. He contends that despite his achievements, the Shah had goals and policies that were full of inherent contradictions and their own weaknesses in objectives (p. xi). The volume nevertheless centers on the relations between Iran and the United States and dwells on their political repercussions. It pays not much more than lip service to the ways in which those objectives were carried out and to their economic effects.

Part one explores the Shah and his regime between dependence and power and traces that part of the story in the historical-political context of the rise of the Pahlavis, beginning with Reza Shah, first of the Pahlavi line and father of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Part two is devoted to the emergence of Iran as a regional power and the Shah's attempts to transform it into a major pro-Western state with ambition for status as a world power. This section notably reflects the chief thrust of the whole volume, the Shah's dependence on the United States first for survival and later for help in trying to achieve his aim to secure world importance as a modern state.

The author's all but complete involvement with American-Iranian relationships leads to his neglect of other important activities of the Shah on the domestic front. These too

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played an important part in his downfall. For instance, chapter 3, "The White Revolution," devotes only four-and-one-half pages to that "revolution" and what it involved, then turns to a somewhat more extended treatment of its political consequences but fails to discuss its economic results with any thoroughness. Finally, in the same chapter, the author takes a sudden jump to the problems of a national independent foreign policy and the changed position of that foreign policy itself. For all their importance, these were not integral parts of the White Revolution or the "Revolution of the Shah and the People" as the Shah preferred to have it called.

The enlightening chapter on "The Emergence of Iran as an Oil Power" is the best in the book. Even in it, however, the American role in oil developments is given too much emphasis as compared with that of Britain and to a lesser extent of other countries. The British part is treated only historically, although the British continued to hold a 40 percent interest in the consortium until the time of the oil takeover by Iran itself.

Little shrift is given the Shah's industrialization program in which he had such faith and which he expected to provide exports in place of oil and gas when their resources gave out. Industry was what he expected to lay the foundations for his country to become a modern western-type state. With vast funds at his disposal after the completion of the oil agreements of 1974, the Shah became dizzy with his industrial and military plans and initiated many overambitious and at least a few foolish industrial projects, to say nothing of his military upbuilding. The deleterious effects of these expenditures on his policies and on his own image at home must be considered among the important reasons for his fall.

The Shah's woeful neglect of agriculture in his development plans also bore heavy responsibility. Although Iran had once been an exporter of food, under the Shah it became a large importer. Agricultural plans became concerned with organizational problems such as the formation of farm cooperatives and farm corporations and the starting of agrobusinesses. All of these programs caused the neglect of small and medium-sized farmers, of their production, and of their low incomes, while the land-reform program continued to languish, and thousands of disgruntled people migrated to the cities in the hope of a better life, which materialized for few of them.

All of these problems of too rapid and overreaching industrial development and too neglected an agriculture must always be emphasized in discussions of the fall of the Shah. They combined with constantly growing inflation to widen the gap between rich and poor and helped pave the way for the Shah's fall. The story needs a more detailed discussion in its relationship to the Shah's debacle, but perhaps it awaits telling in a separate study. The author of *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* was primarily interested in the political story to which he has made so fine a contribution.

His volume, nevertheless, contains various instances of oversimplification, as, for example, its discussion of the relationship of Abol Hassan Ebtehaj to the Plan Organization and to the industries existing at the time of the Second Plan. Ebtehaj was Iran's brilliant planning innovator and director of the Second Plan Organization until his resignation. The author indicates that the self-seeking local entrepreneurial groups had much more influence over the organization than they had. Ebtehaj was opposed to their influence, but he was equally opposed to the self-seeking of the various government ministries and their competition with each other and with the Plan Organization. Most important, Ebtehaj's

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odium was directed to all corruption wherever found, even among those close to the Shah.

In contradistinction to Saikal's study, the *Fall of the Peacock Throne* by William Forbis makes little attempt at scholarship, but, as the title indicates, is a journalist's telling of the dramatic story of Iran from the days of Cyrus and Darius up to and including the early part of the present unfinished revolution. Covering discussions of history, economic problems, religion, education, the Persian and Arabic languages and alphabets, the people and the Iranian way of life (including food and cooking, clothing, and the veil), the volume is a kind of miscellaneous collection. It is a fascinating presentation for the tyro rather than the research scholar, but it is done so much more ably than many such volumes which attempt too much that even a reader well acquainted with Iran finds it hard to put down. The material is well and fairly presented. The portrayal of the personalities of the Shah and the Empress are particularly fair and well done.

Save for some purple passages, the volume is generally well written. The author, however, has the unfortunate habit of "slinging names" to make sure that the reader understands the importance of various people he met and his personal conversations with them. As might have been expected in a volume of such large compass and one obviously written under time pressure for completion, there are some mistakes. The most egregious is the statement that Abol Hassen Ebtehaj died in 1978. In the summer of 1980 he and his family were living in exile.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY
*New York*

Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations *by Abraham H. Miller. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 134 pp. $16.00.*

This study emerged from a year that the author spent at the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. It reflects the concerns of that institute with containing terrorist incidents. The focus is on hostage-and-barricade problems. There is no attention given to the motivation of terrorists except as it impacts upon their resolve. The author tries to distinguish between terrorism as a type of armed struggle and terrorism as one tactic in a panoply of means for waging armed struggle. This means that little attention is given to governmental terrorism. We are told in four separate chapters that terrorism is the weapon of the weak.

The book is best read as a series of individual essays. It has no unifying theoretical framework. The chapters address, respectively, terrorism as a type of warfare, lessons for negotiations drawn from the police experience, problems of psychological transference from captors to captives, the role of "special weapons and tactics" (SWAT) teams in negotiations and assaults, the impact of media coverage of incidents, and some suggestions for antiterrorism public policy.

The chapters vary greatly. That on the media is particularly brief and shallow. It leads to "conclusions" such as: "If a capricious, callous, and unthinking media becomes so wrapped up in its pursuit of sensational copy that it will violate the public trust, it will

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become vulnerable to public clamor for censorship" (p. 119). In another chapter the basic dilemma that the author finds in preparation of SWAT teams is whether or not they should do the negotiating. In general, Miller is supportive of the current attempts of law-enforcement agencies to develop antiterrorist capabilities, even though they now have only common felons to pursue.

Miller develops no sustained discussion of "the actual application of hostage and barricade methods" as promised in the introduction (p. 11). A great deal of attention is accorded the Hanafi incident in Washington, D.C.; I found this to be the most useful part of the book, although the "lessons" that can be derived are quite limited. He also acknowledges the prevalent view of Israelis that the contemporary emphasis upon psychological techniques is wholly impotent against politically motivated, well-trained terrorists (p. 35). Still, the thrust of the essays is to extol the efficacy of negotiating skill, particularly as practiced by the New York Police Department against the despondent, the insane, and the criminal.

Miller is familiar with a worldwide variety of recent incidents. He resorts freely to anecdotal use of them. Notably underemphasized, however, are references to political terrorists with a large mass base, such as the Italian Red Brigades, the Turkish National Salvation Party, Brazilian death squads, and the like. The casual use of anecdotal evidence is bothersome, for it tempts the reader to find counterexamples, which is not difficult. Miller refers to the CIA's data set ITERATE, but only to report occasional marginals. On occasion the anecdotal style leads to ridiculous claims: Miller calls the Hanafi incident "the first political hostage situation in the United States" (p. 17).

It is difficult to identify the audience for whom this book was intended. Experts will find the material unexciting and the arguments familiar. The generalist will want to know more about the individual incidents cited by the author. The policymaker will find that the final chapter on policy covers too much ground too briefly.

JAMES P. BENNETT
*University of Pennsylvania*

Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age *edited by Laurence Martin. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 233 pp. $18.50.*

The problem reviewing a collection of articles is that the contents are typically disparate in quality while the whole lacks focus and is insufficiently integrated. Of course this problem is worse for readers, particularly students. How nice, then, to find a collection where the articles are uniformly thorough, penetrating, and well written; where they overlap just enough while sticking persistently to a central subject. This book offers a rewarding review for the specialist, but will be particularly valuable in undergraduate and graduate courses. It should be widely used and a paperback version is a necessity.

The articles are carefully crafted explications of strategic thought since 1945, plus related developments, on the following: the continuing utility of military force in world politics (Laurence Martin); economic aspects of security affairs (Louis-Francois Duchene); aspects of threat perception in the intelligence process (Klaus Knorr); limited

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war—from subconventional to nuclear (Robert Osgood); the evolution of strategic forces and targeting (Henry Rowen); management of international crises (Coral Bell); and disarmament and arms control (John Garnett).

Summarizing each is impossible; instead we can use the book's recurring themes as an overview of existing theory on national and global security. This is the view the book reflects and presents for our reaction: Military strength is a fact of life, provides the essential underpinning of the international system, and remains a key state resource for managing external relations. Arms are not becoming irrelevant and will not go away; management via arms control, not elimination through disarmament, is called for. The management of international politics, moreover, occurs through the combined effects of states' military capabilities, a set of conventions for handling crises, limited arms control, and various mechanisms for coordinating economic interchanges. Only the last has experienced significant strain and major adaptation in recent years.

These management capabilities are not guaranteed to work. Governments experience significant failures in threat perception; economic coordination is problematic; there are limits on the acceptance and utility of crisis conventions; deterrence postures have flaws; and there are severe limits to effective arms control.

Flexibility is the major virtue. The West needs flexible military capabilities for limited wars and less-than-war situations and multiple options for use of strategic nuclear forces. Intellectual flexibility is a key to better threat perception. Crisis management, economic coordination, and arms control benefit from avoiding rigidities. But there are numerous, persistent obstacles to achieving flexibility. There are intellectual barriers. There are often economic costs, such as for conventional forces. There are bureaucratically derived inflexibilities. Often there are political problems. Thus we subscribe to policies necessitating flexibility and intellectually appreciate our needs here, yet frequently fail to sustain the capacity for it.

Fundamentally, not much is really new in international politics since 1945, compared with earlier eras. Military capabilities remain relevant. Economic factors are not more important now, just more visible. Threat-perception problems are a regular failure of the history of statecraft. The conventions for crisis management, and the nature of today's crisis managers, are not much different from those of the pre-1914 era. The basic intellectual framework for arms control and disarmament was elucidated well before 1945.

In short, this is a book reviewing theoretical analysis of a relatively unchanging international system. Thus the analysis itself is relatively static as well. There is little new here, and no expectation of significant shifts anytime soon in the basic nature of international politics. The book reflects the dominant patterns in our current way of viewing security matters, and does so in excellent fashion. Its flaws, if any, are to be found in the general perspective which it so successfully presents.

PATRICK M. MORGAN
*Washington State University*

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Europe Without Defense? Forty-Eight Hours That Could Change the Face of the World *by General Robert Close. New York, Pergamon Press, 1979. 278 pp. $19.50.*

Historians of World War II describe Winston S. Churchill as a "voice in the wilderness" awakening the West to the "Gathering Storm." Today the mounting volume of well-publicized and best-selling books on the grim prospect of World War III suggests that the 1980s may be overpopulated with prophets of doom, each painting the world in more alarming colors.

General Close, who is chairman of the Commission for National Defense in Brussels, prophesies a "no-notice" surprise invasion by superior Warsaw Pact forces capable of overrunning Germany east of the Rhine within forty-eight hours. His scenario, while concentrating on non-nuclear warfare, is more alarming because it is more comprehensible than the seering thermonuclear destruction depicted in the best-selling *World War III.* The West's military deterrent has been destroyed, Close argues, by Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity combined with the expansion of its postwar conventional military superiority. Curiously, the generals and admirals and American senators who have joined to rally the West to greatly expanded defense efforts do not agree on the nature of the threat or the response. *World War III* sounded the alarm for a build-up of strategic nuclear forces; *Europe Without Defense?* proposes a greatly magnified initiative within NATO to standardize conventional arms, accelerate mobilization, advance combat units forward, and create a "popular deterrent" organized in a large-scale European antitank militia. Eventually, Close believes, Europe must create its own independent deterrent, a view which scarcely seems compatible with the clarion call for American leadership.

Indeed, the growing literature on the need for increased military preparedness, however effective in the short run, suffers in the long run from serious intellectual flaws and deficiencies. It assumes a categorical answer to the question "what is the nature of the threat" with a minimum of foreign-policy analysis, an error to which the best minds at the American war colleges or at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London have not fallen prey. Its crusading fervor contrasts with the calm and reasoned military estimates of soldier-statesmen such as Marshall, Eisenhower, and Goodpaster. It dismisses out of hand or remains largely ignorant of important writings on Soviet intentions by analysts such as Bohlen and Kennan. (Military capacity for Close is the only measure of Soviet intentions.) It builds on straw men: Secretary Kissinger will be surprised to learn that détente assumed "the absence of confrontation, and the elimination of potential conflict" (p. xiii). It looks at one side of the ledger in reciting Soviet political successes, noting Soviet "penetration in Africa, by its skillful policy" (p. 31), while excluding the long list of Soviet failures, including explusion from Egypt, Guinea, and Ghana. In a word, it argues the lawyer's case without seeking the scholar's truth; it is advocacy not analysis.

One reason the West is so gravely threatened as it moves into the 1980s is the tragic divorce of political and military analysis. Close and his colleagues have much to tell us about the military problem; *Europe Without Defense?* merits study by everyone concerned with the military balance of power between East and West in the heart of Europe. No one can question the professionalism of the discussion of military trends from 1945 to

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the present (chap. 2), but military professionalism is combined with a disturbing amateurism in politics and diplomacy.

Our wisest political observers would quarrel with Close's equating of Hitler's conquest of Europe with the present Soviet threat. Any simple-minded equation of nazism and communism underestimates the greater hazards inherent in the political and ideological challenge of Soviet imperialism and communism; it also overlooks the differences between a World War II imperialist that marched across Europe a few months after coming to power and a postwar adversary that three-and-a-half decades later has not crossed into Western Europe. The military mind explains lagging defense commitments by condemning European politicians who yield to the temptation of "short term electoral gains" (p. 229). It passes over the profound differences between an exclusively military response to the threat and a diplomatic response embraced by millions of Europeans who believe their security has been enhanced by the Brandt-Schmidt policies of *Ostpolitik*. It never addresses the question "military power for what?" (Has Close ever heard of the linkage of power and diplomacy?) Its concept of the threat is that "Soviet strategy was clearly defined by Lenin; it proposes to dominate the world and to ensure final triumph over all other ideological systems" (p. 233).

Nevertheless, General Close is correct in pointing to a military problem in Europe: "In the last ten years or so, Canada has reduced its forces in Germany by fifty percent; Belgium has reduced its combat brigades by a third"; and others have curtailed the period of military service (p. 230). He is also right about the high price of disunity in the West: "an incalculable waste of tens of billions of dollars [with the] military effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces . . . far below the standard the American and European allies should expect from the more than $130 billion per year that we spend together" (p. 139). Europe's defense is crippled by the unnecessary duplication of national weapons systems with logistical support a nightmare requiring cooperation among "fourteen national defense ministries for thirty-nine armed services" (p. 139). Europe and North America have a combined gross national product "289 percent greater than that of the Warsaw Pact" and larger budgets for general purpose forces (p. 140). A European collective military effort is required, but the obstacles remain "Gaullism," national sovereignty, and, in Close's view, "the preponderant position of the United States and their wholly understandable aversion to a voluntary limitation of their share of the European armaments market" (p. 141).

Europe's future, whatever the military threat, depends on its political evolution, which neither massive infusions of American money and weapons nor larger European defense budgets by themselves can solve. Whether he knows it or not, Close needs allies who are political architects with vision and political power. Europe's defense is political as much as it is military. President Truman understood this when he called for the Marshall Plan to reinforce the Truman Doctrine and NATO. Security in the 1980s is too important to leave to the generals.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
*University of Virginia*

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Making Foreign Economic Policy *by I.M. Destler. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 244 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

This study of policymaking by the United States government has two objectives. One is to describe and analyze the roles played by individuals and various governmental and private organizations in the always complex and frequently conflictual processes of formulating American foreign economic policy in the issue areas of food and trade. In terms of food policy, a chapter presents a brief overview of the sometimes erratic and contradictory record of the Nixon and Ford administrations as they attempted to manage four often competing congeries interested in either farm, domestic economic, foreign, or global welfare and development policy. Each of these not always cohesive policy "communities" is further identified according to its goals, governmental and private organizational support, concerns, the questions it raises, and the instruments available to serve its objectives.

Destler uses this typology in presenting detailed analyses of the following: The 1972 Soviet wheat purchases; the 1973 embargo of soybean exports; the 1974–75 expansion of overseas food and assistance; the 1975 formulation of an international grain reserve proposal; and, to complete the circle, the 1974–75 Soviet grain purchases. His work demonstrates that government policymakers usually failed to coordinate, manage, and balance the inevitable pluralism of interests reflected by the existence and activities of food-policy communities. A partial exception to incoherent and unbalanced policymaking occurred when the United States sold grain to the Soviet Union in 1974–75. Here farm, economic, and foreign-policy concerns received appropriate attention, even though subsequent angry reactions of farmers and attendant political costs suggest that achievement of balanced international food policies will remain problematical.

Unlike the food-policy area, Destler finds that trade-policy concerns are not organized into fairly discrete policy communities. Yet, differing trade concerns and policy values, which engender policymaking conflicts, do exist and are expressed within the U.S. government. These interests center on industrial, domestic economic, and foreign policies and on trade politics (protectionism versus free trade). For a specific trade issue, the author sets forth a legislative history of the Nixon administration's 1973 Trade Act proposal, which President Ford signed into law in January 1975. Given such handicaps as Watergate and congressional resentment about Nixon's impoundment of funds, Destler concludes that the executive branch was quite effective in achieving a liberal trade act. Its relative success, particularly in satisfying foreign-policy concerns, is attributed to many factors including, most importantly, sophisticated lobbying by the special trade representative's office.

Drawing upon his policy issue studies and other sources, Destler's second objective is to determine whether organizational changes should be recommended for the improvement of U.S. foreign economic policymaking. Should there be, for instance, a governmental institution to aggregate and represent the plethora of values, groups, and organizations concerned with international economic affairs? Because of the impossibility of drawing a precise boundary between domestic and international economic problems and diffusion of influence and responsibility regarding economic affairs within the government, the author argues that centralization is neither feasible nor desirable. But, after assessing pre-

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vious efforts to institutionalize coordination of international economic policymaking, he recommends formation of a small coordinating staff attached to a presidential assistant who oversees economic, not foreign, policymaking. This staff would serve as a broker working to insure that important viewpoints are heard and that domestic-international tradeoffs are recognized as the executive branch formulates economic policy.

Destler has accomplished a tautly reasoned, extremely informative, and thought-provoking study of American foreign economic policymaking. While descriptively limited to particular international food and trade issues, it deserves the attention of anyone interested in the United States's capacity to develop policies that successfully address the domestic-international economic problems currently pressing upon it.

HIBBERT R. ROBERTS
*Illinois State University*

The Endangered Sector *by Waldemar A. Nielson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1979. 279 pp. $14.95.*

Nielson's book serves the cause of the nonprofit sector in American society. He reminds us, and we need reminding, that in its expansiveness, depth, and social significance, the nonprofit sector of the United States is unique in the world. But neither its place nor its future is certain. There is an unknown risk associated with actions that undermine its creditability or jeopardize its strengths. Unknown because we have such an inadequate grasp of its function in the society. It is of more than passing irony that as other industrial nations, especially Japan and West Germany, are expanding their nonprofit sectors, and in some instances consciously imitating the United States, Nielson is forced to the conclusion that for all their scope and depth the U.S. nonprofits are in a sorry state.

His book is a litany of difficulties facing the "Third Sector," most of them attributable to the U.S. government. He claims that there has been government intrusion into the consequent politicization of the arts; government harassment of social-action groups; government command and control policy in American health; and government-defined priorities in higher education. Science and research is the one arena in which government is not the explicit villain. Here, however, the enemy may be popular sentiment: "the fundamental vulnerability of science in the American pluralistic system may lie in its relationship to the general population" (p. 101).

In the many confrontations between nonprofits and the government, as recounted by Nielson, the government wins because it is organized. In repeated contests over policy, priorities, and program directions, "the powerful and consolidated position of the Administration is pitted in most instances against the divided and disheveled ranks of the nonprofits. The government position therefore normally prevails." Not only does the government prevail, it is "heavy-handed" and is "often negligent of, or detrimental to, the interests of the Third Sector" (p. 198).

Nielson does not probe very deeply into the interrelationships among institutions in American society, interrelationships which are necessarily more complex and nuanced than his analysis suggests. And it is because his analysis is so undifferentiated, pitting the

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good nonprofits against the bad government, that his recommendations make such little headway. His argument about what to do is largely couched in the phraseology of "on the one hand" but then "on the other." Ambivalence stalks his recommendations, as in the following: "The underlying problems are rather those of balance and degree within a context of collaboration . . . or preserving essential elements of independence within interdependence and mutual dependence" (p. 48). Specially this appears to mean that science should be autonomous, but democratically accountable; that the arts should preserve quality standards, but be widely accessible; that social-action groups should successfully promote their causes, such as racial justice or consumer protection, but not so successfully that their causes are "taken over by the government" and thereby producing the death of the social-action sector "as much from its victories as from its defeats" (p. 179). (I guess, but am not sure, that the NAACP should have argued the *Brown* case, but not vigorously enough to win it.) Nielson gives many pages to the selfish and narrow actions of the private-sector American Medical Association and lauds its defeat as contributing to "a more equitable health system." He then complains that the health system has too much "bureaucratization and governmentalization."

Nielson is consistently antistatist, but ambivalent about democracy. He favors pluralism and popular control, but not if science is subjected to too much accountability or the arts to too much egalitarianism or health to too much private authority or education to too many social priorities. He concludes, "The unlimited and indiscriminate assumptions of the old liberalism about government role and responsibility, and flat rejection of such assumptions by the old conservatism, has lost all meaning" (p. 251). To replace the now meaningless debate, the author suggests new combinations of "responsible government and private initiative." These new combinations are not specified.

But if Nielson has failed to clarify the deeper sources of the problem or the necessary next steps, he has reminded us that the nonprofit sector has no permanent place in our society. Those who believe in its social significance, among whose number I would include many in the government and in the profit sector, would do well to step lively in giving the nonprofit sector both analytic and strategic attention.

KENNETH PREWITT
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Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1979 *by Raymond D. Gastil. Boston, Mass., and New York, G. K. Hall & Co. and Freedom House, 1979. 371 pp. $20.00.*

Are human rights such as those embodied in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 1948 a western plant too frail to survive in eastern and southern climes? The relativists think so. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab write in their contributions to their edited book, *Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives*, that the Universal Declaration is a Western construct, its notion of rights of the autonomous individual incompatible with the communalism of non-Western cultures and with non-Western ideologies and priorities of development. Universalists, on the other hand, concede setbacks and re-

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gional differences but reaffirm along with Louis Henkin's lucid treatise, *The Rights of Man Today*, a hopeful future for human rights. They cite recent worldwide recognition of human rights in principle and the growing body of positive law of human rights.

In the Freedom House book under review, a yearbook in its second year, Raymond Gastil sets out what may be called a universalist position, but only in a limited and utilitarian sense. Gastil defends the universality of political freedoms against relativists by differentiating between universalist "civilization" bearing ideas of human rights as democratic freedoms and particularist "cultures" of nations, to which democratic freedoms must adjust (pp. 75–82). Gastil thus makes a major, even if controversial, contribution to the debate over human rights.

His is a universalism in a limited sense of laissez-faire liberalism and political majoritarianism. In part 2, "Freedom, Equality and Culture," Gastil expresses opposition to state intervention against majority will in the name of minority social and economic rights. "Majority rule, that is, egalitarian government, implies that the interests of minorities, even poor minorities, may at times be ignored" (p. 73). Minorities, Gastil argues, have rights to autonomy, against state intervention, but no inherent socioeconomic rights that take priority over majority rule and political rights and liberties. Call this new conservatism or laissez-faire liberalism, it reflects the priorities of the author and of Freedom House in their active approach to human rights.

Gastil's utilitarian view of human rights emerges in part 1, "The Survey in 1980." It includes the Freedom House survey of freedom in the world, the eighth since 1972. Its centerpiece is a table ranking independent countries as to political rights and civil liberties, each on a scale of one (most) to seven (least), and as to overall political freedom: free, partly free, and not free. Policy is where the utility of this survey comes in for Gastil. It is to help America carry out a policy of aid to democratic and democratically leaning friends and to remind Western critics of democracies—critics who demoralize their citizens and whose attacks nourish "the propaganda of those who truly hold their people in chains"—how much worse things are elsewhere (p. 3). Moreover, in Gastil's view, the survey illustrates, given the fate of unfree countries such as the Shah's Iran, that political freedom must accompany economic development and that we must not think such freedom will either grow automatically out of economic growth or possibly be bypassed, lest we face more calamitous political collapses detrimental to the West.

Just 35 percent of the world's people live in free countries, the survey reports, but freedom is gaining. Indeed nonsurvey data point this way too. On the other hand, Tanzania is less free today than it was upon achieving independence in 1961. Still, it is surprising to see Tanzania listed in the survey at the low level of six in political rights and civil liberties, along with countries of mass torture and rampant terror like Uruguay. A table on "Estimated Levels of Political Terror (pp. 38–39) has been added in response to criticism. But aside from problems with that table, being separate, it leaves the vital issue of state terrorism outside of the appraisal of freedom or peripheral to it in the way that countries with very different forms of unfreedom, such as Haiti, Tanzania, and Uruguay, get lumped together in the freedom survey. Part 4, "Country Summaries," provides insufficiently accurate evidence to justify such comparisons of disparately unfree countries.

Part 3 of the yearbook contains the proceedings of a Freedom House conference on "Supporting Liberalization in the Soviet Union." Bohdan Bociurkiw's paper on religious

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dissent provides a solid, valuable introduction to Christian (though not Jewish or Moslem) dissent and points to the broad roots of that dissent among otherwise inaudible ordinary Soviet people. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone singles out aspects of nationalism in the Communist establishments of the Soviet union republics. Much of the rest of the writing for the conference is less valuable because it is either less specific or impressionistic.

A consensus emerges among the participants about the desirability of using available lines of communication to bring about liberalization. Freedom House convoked the conference, in fact, partly out of fear of an undeviating Soviet drive for world domination, in the belief that only democratization would curb that drive. If only imperialism were that simply understood or averted! Some readers may question Freedom House's priorities for Soviet-American relations and human-rights advocacy. At least a sense of disagreement is recorded, as valuable food for thought, over such questions as whether *samizdat* (the massive circulation of unofficial oppositional publications) or a liberal segment of the ruling elite are significant politically, whether Brezhnev's era can be characterized as one of continuing revolution, whether supporting nationality aspirations from abroad might release an illiberal backlash or trigger a dangerous instability, and whether the Soviet Union does relentlessly pursue a goal of world domination. There is also disagreement as to whether the Soviet Union can hope to attain such a goal and, should it try, which groups should be targets of foreign broadcasts aimed at the USSR.

All qualifications notwithstanding, this book's strong parts and its representation of a particular, utilitarian, policy-oriented current in human-rights advocacy makes it an important addition to any basic library on human rights.

PETER H. JUVILER
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Aggressive Political Participation *by Edward N. Muller. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979. 305 pp. $17.50.*

Judging from the titles appearing in American politics in the last two decades, the vagaries of political participation would seem to have been rather thoroughly mined. In this book, however, Edward Muller adds still another important dimension by exploring a theory of aggressive political participation with data from an extensive survey of West Germans. Although even nontraditional participation has never failed to receive scholarly attention, Muller's work is sufficiently different to stake out at least four major improvements in our understanding of this form of participation.

Most obvious is the more precise focus of study. Previous work has dealt in large measure with either dramatic behaviors observed at the macro level or with the roots of individual aggressiveness. *Aggressive Political Participation* keys in on a phenomenon widely experienced in industrial societies but one which is neither manifested in the overthrow of a regime nor uniformly evidenced in mass publics. Rather, Muller is concerned with action "that is illegal, has political significance by virtue of disrupting the normal functioning of government, and involves group activity on the part of non-elites" (p. 37). Since

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governments are increasingly plagued by hostile "citizen" politics, Muller's focus is both novel and significant. Moreover, its substantive aspects are equally appealing. One is its attention to context. Scholars have also noted the importance of environmental influences, but few have been as systematic in sampling and comparing specific political effects of living in rural, urban, or university communities. Muller identifies predominant social norms about aggressive behavior in each community type, and his analysis indicates that the distinction makes a difference. While we would expect rural residents to frown upon aggressive behavior, the gap between university areas and both urban and rural sites is sizeable, leading us to temper generalizations about protest with some differentiation between calculated aggressive behavior and the more spontaneous disruptions usually associated with urban unrest. Awareness of community norms, ability to weigh the effect of sanctions against the perceived utility of the act, and attitude about the act itself are all necessary components in the explanation of this type of behavior, and Muller's construction of the aggressive participation (APP) equation incorporates each.

The meticulous treatment of concepts correctly indicates that the study is methodologically intricate. The instrument and its measures are unusually well refined, and the ten behaviors indicating APP are each referenced by the respondent's approval, past engagement, potential engagement, and perception of the approval of his peers. The overall index weights behaviors according to their social-disapproval rating, locates them on a scale of aggressive participation, and produces four zones of activity: inactivity, low civil disobedience, high civil disobedience, and violence. The fullness of this range is repeated in other variables central to the theory, and its 60 percent success rate in explaining variation in APP is but one reward derived from building such valid measures.

The most important contribution of this study, however, is theoretical (despite a potentially dissuasive presentation of regression displays). Muller argues that aggressive political participation is a function of the sum of beneficial consequences of the act, of utility to the individual, of normative justification for the act, of social facilitation, and of motivation to comply with social norms. This degree of inclusiveness is itself unusual in this area of research, and the impressive ability to predict behaviors—particularly in the inactive and low civil disobedience and higher zones—indicates the utility of undertaking the task. Moreover, Muller considers alternative explanations of APP by testing variables measuring possible frustration-deprivation sources of aggression: objective deprivation, perceived "just deserts" frustration, and system nonresponsiveness. Despite the theoretical appeal of deprivation theory, Muller concludes that it cannot be supported empirically.

Finally, a chapter is devoted to the important if unglamorous subject of "Left-out Variables." Muller again entertains the possibility that other variables may account for variation in APP and finds that personal control and personal and political resources are unrelated to aggressive participation. Only dissatisfaction with specific governmental policy is at all closely related to APP, but even this variable is similar to the "normative justification" term included in the Muller Expectancy-Value-Norms theory and should not be considered a major addition to its utility.

Despite its impressive addition to the theory and method of political participation, *Aggressive Political Participation* is not likely to leave the mark of some earlier benchmark studies. Its careful and advanced method limits it to a much narrower audience than that which reflected upon *The American Voter* or *Participation in America*. In addition,

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Muller's interpretations of his own results are often disappointingly brief in comparison to his more elaborate introduction to the issues as discussed in the works of others. Finally, the potentially provocative subject of the theory's utility to scholars and governments avoids some of the questions about how sentiments that contribute to aggressive citizen action might also be manipulated by governments in troubled times. A more extensive discussion of these very important empirical findings might well extend to this study the recognition its craftsmanship deserves.

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Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel *by Evan M. Wilson. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1979. 244 pp. $14.95.*

The account of American involvement in the creation of Israel continues to fascinate scholars and diplomats. Memoirs and diaries of American presidents and statesmen, such as Truman, Hull, Acheson, and Forrestal, have shed subjective light on the basic issues, while scholarly studies have focused upon Roosevelt's and Truman's role in the political and diplomatic struggle for Jewish statehood. Evidently, in this struggle, the State Department, and specifically Near East Division (NE)—mostly staffed by Arabists—was the center of an active opposition to the Zionist aim of creating a Jewish state in the whole or in part of Palestine. A scholarly treatment of NE's particular point of view would therefore be a welcome addition to the already large number of books on this fascinating subject.

For students of Israel's emergence and of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Wilson's book has been awaited with particular anticipation since the author had served on the Palestine desk of NE during most of the period of 1942–48. After having concluded thirty years of distinguished service in Washington and in the Middle East, Wilson has undertaken an ambitious task aimed at writing "a definitive interpretation of our Palestine policy" (p. xi). Lamentably, despite commendable and diligent research, the author has only been partially successful in his undertaking. For instead of concentrating upon his personal account as well as upon presenting and interpreting the specific view of the Arabists (to which Wilson belonged), the author has mainly chosen to go over familiar terrain dealing with already known developments. Furthermore, his selection of documents in the appendices is inexplicable. Instead of rehashing Herzl's *Judenstaat* and the Balfour Declaration, one would expect the inclusion of pertinent documents for the crucial period of 1945–58, such as Henderson's memo (pp. 117–21). Documents covering this period are sadly missing.

The most valuable part of the book is the epilogue, wherein, especially in the section "Where We Went Wrong," the author has compiled a catalog of a "number of events that we in NE did not anticipate" (p. 156). But the problem of the Arabists was not rooted in their fallibility in anticipating future developments which would affect Jewish yearning for sovereignty (such as the Holocaust), but rather with their *weltanschauung* regarding the Middle East, Arabs and Jews, and America's attitude toward Arab and Jewish national aspirations.

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What were indeed the Arabists' major assumptions that presumably underlined their *weltanschauung*? They can be summarized as follows: first, that the Palestine problem was the crux in the Middle East and its outcome would determine America's relations with the entire Arab and Moslem world; second, that American advocacy of partition would result in a major American military involvement imposed upon hostile Arabs; third, that partition would not be just "unworkable," but also immoral and contrary to fundamental American conceptions of government (pp. 117–21); fourth, because of the nefarious influence of domestic politics, both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman chose to disregard the sound policy lines advocated by the Arabists of NE, with the result that "our relations with the entire Arab world have never recovered from the events of 1947–48, when we sided with the Jews against the Arabs" (p. 154). All these assumptions were proven to be untenable. Moreover, they had already been demolished by Truman's White House staff, headed by Clark Clifford.

But strangely, the Arabists shut their eyes to the fact that the crux of the Middle East was not the Palestine problem, but rather the painful encounter of traditional Islamic-Arab society with modernity and Western values. It was this encounter and the inherent violent instability of the Arab religious, social, and political fabric—and not the creation of Israel—that militated against the American aim of achieving stability in the Middle East as well as American-Arab amity.

Furthermore, the Arabists—despite their service in Palestine and contacts with Zionist leaders—completely misunderstood the dynamic nature of Zionism, its deeply rooted yearning for sovereignty in Palestine, and its potential military power. In his 1946 "Impressions of Palestine" Wilson demonstrates his indeed remarkable insight in this regard (pp. 79–87). Unfortunately, this sporadic insight, as Wilson relates, was not acquired by other members of NE, nor did it affect the State Department's policy recommendations (p. 84).

Had even Wilson addressed himself to a systematic description and elucidation of the psychological and social sources of NE's consistent misreading of the Middle East and the Palestine problem as well as its implications for State Department policy, he could have indeed made a major contribution toward a better understanding of American involvement in the creation of Israel.

ZVI GANIN
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Gandhi: A Memoir *by William L. Shirer. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979. 255 pp. $12.95.*

Shirer's book is appropriately titled: as a memoir of Gandhi, it is superb. With vivid style and clear insight, Shirer conveys not only key aspects of his relationship with Gandhi, but also its enduring influence on his life. His story is set at one of the high peaks of Indian nationalist politics, the civil disobedience movement of 1930–31, when Gandhi's resistance to British imperial rule had swept the country. Students of political movements today may find in this example a classic case of how a charismatic leader using a method of

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direct action hit upon an ideal issue (the salt tax) and with precision timing masterfully orchestrated a near perfect act of resistance to political authority. Movements are rarely so majestically mobilized, and Shirer had the supreme good fortune of being there and gaining access to Gandhi.

Gandhi had actually assumed leadership of the national movement in 1919, but not until early 1930 did his dramatic "salt march" awaken the world to the fact that a novel political phenomenon had emerged in the East. From Chicago, the *Tribune* dispatched a twenty-six-year-old reporter, William Shirer, to cover "the Indian revolution." Shirer came with little experience as a foreign correspondent and less knowledge of India. Yet, Pyarelal Nayar, who was Gandhi's personal secretary then, and is now his foremost biographer, remembers that of the several Western journalists around Gandhi, "Shirer alone seemed to be imbued with a spirit of dedication." Gandhi characteristically spotted this quality, and as soon as they met in February 1931, knew that Shirer could be trusted. The subsequent span of their personal relationship was so brief (February–October, 1931) that one may doubt its depth. But Gandhi had an unusual capacity to forge intimate bonds of friendship, especially when he sensed in the other person an authentic ability to empathize with the Indian struggle. Moreover, Gandhi fully appreciated the political value of sympathetic foreign journalists for propagating his cause abroad, especially in America. His relationship with Shirer thus proved highly beneficial to both parties. Shirer was adept at getting his releases prominently placed in the *Tribune*, and, thanks to advocates like him, sympathy for Gandhi's movement did spread in the United States.

From Shirer's memoir, the dominant impression that emerges of Gandhi concerns the striking consistency between his private and public behavior. In both realms, he was a genuine Mahatma, a "great soul." Shirer had the opportunity in 1931 to observe Gandhi, publicly and privately, in two very different situations: in India, as a mass leader of the Congress organization, striving to maintain the momentum of the movement; and in London, as the sole representative of the Congress at the Round Table Conference, struggling in vain to negotiate terms of India's independence. In these contrasting contexts, Gandhi's style of politics differed, depending on his audience. Yet, the striking fact is how little the substance of the person or message changed under the pressure of political power. Shirer marvels "at Gandhi's unflagging energy, his capacity for work, his grasp of detail, his skill in drafting the wording of resolutions and in explaining to the delegates what was important, his hold over them and over his inner circle of advisers and indeed over the masses" (p. 132). These capacities rested with those personal qualities that Shirer valued most: the ability to create a sense of intimacy, even in large gatherings, so that individuals came away from meeting Gandhi with the conviction that he had spoken directly to their innermost needs and concerns; the lack of pettiness, egomania, and addiction to power endemic to political leaders; the unfailing abundance of good humor and sensitivity to the aspirations of the powerless. The strength of Gandhi's political appeal, then, came from his personal attainments, from values of humility, selflessness, and integrity. Out of the consistency with which he realized these in his personal life grew his political achievement, his method of *satyagraha* ("truth-force"). The demonstration of this method of active resistance to British authority "taught us all that there was a greater power in life than force. . . . That power lay in the spirit, in Truth and love, in non-violent action" (p. 245).

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The bulk of Shirer's book consists of remembrances of Gandhi from his eyewitness accounts. If Shirer had stopped with this, the book would be a nearly flawless testimonial to Gandhi's achievement. Unfortunately, Shirer tries to move beyond his role as an eyewitness to that of a historian, and here he is decidedly deficient. For example, he describes the first phase of the civil-disobedience campaign, which occurred from March to May, 1930, three months before Shirer arrived in India. On the salt march, Shirer says, Gandhi was accompanied by "men and women" (p. 91), whereas Gandhi in fact not only refused to include women but took pains to explain why. It is repeatedly stated that the distance of the march was 200 miles (pp. 91, 94, 95), while it was actually 241 miles. The lack of a factual grasp of the event leads to major errors of interpretation. That is, Shirer imagines parallels between the salt march and "the journey of Jesus to Jerusalem," asserting that on the salt march "there was much reading of the New Testament along the way. To add to the comparison someone in the party picked up a donkey to follow in the wake of Gandhi" (p. 95). From interviews with those who accompanied Gandhi on the march, and from the abundant material available on it, we know that there was neither much reading of Jesus nor any sign of a donkey. Mistakes like these tend to take us far from the historical figure of Gandhi because he was supremely conscious of his own Hindu tradition and possessed an uncanny intuitive skill with symbols. Nowhere was this skill more in evidence than on the salt march, yet we hardly find it in Shirer's account.

Shirer confesses that he found Gandhi's "tremendous hold on the Indian masses" inexplicable, a "mysterious" quality, the "riddle of communication" that perhaps "we will never understand" (p. 75). One reason for the mystery is that Shirer remains too much preoccupied with Gandhi's resemblance to Christ (pp. 17, 95, 201, 224, 238, 244–5) and not nearly serious enough in exploring Gandhi's roots in the Hindu tradition. Gandhi's power came largely from his understanding of his tradition, of the religious and cultural values of India and how these were perceived by the masses. A close study of Gandhi's long and laborious rise to national leadership does not end in mystery. It reveals clearly a determined and gifted individual gradually coming to terms with his tradition in the face of colonial humiliation, and then, with a burst of creativity, forging from his self-discoveries a method of political action. The occurrence is improbable and the achievement rare, but it is not enigmatic or inexplicable.

At its best, though, this memoir provides readers with an illuminating series of snapshots of Gandhi in 1931, and so it constitutes a valuable, welcome contribution to the many albums of retrospectives that today form a compelling collage of perhaps this century's most exemplary political leader.

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The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory *by Alvin W. Gouldner. New York, Seabury Press, 1980. 397 pp. $17.50.*

The complicated pathways of Gouldner's thought are hard to predict. Only last year, in his *The Future of the Intellectual and the Rise of the New Class*, he seemed to have completely broken with the Marxian tradition and to have confined it to the "dustbin of history," but in this book his ideas move again, as they have so often, within a broadly defined Marxian orbit. This book is a lucidly argued and elegantly presented discussion of Marxist theory from within. It is a superb addition to the literature on the subject.

While many commentators on Marx, as well as many of those who consider themselves his disciples, have argued that Marx's theory was based on the scientific discovery of the laws of motion of (capitalist) society, and while others have argued to the contrary that such a positivistic interpretation does not do justice to a thinker who was, so they argue, steeped in a *voluntaristic* as well as a *critical* tradition, Gouldner contends that Marx's theory was indeed both *positivistic* and *voluntaristic. Positivism* and *voluntarism* stand side by side in the Marxian corpus and define its contradictory character. It behooves the analyst to recognize and analyze these parallel strains rather than to paper them over.

Gouldner argues that the positivistic interpretation was largely upheld by the theorists of the Second International and by the dominant tendency in pre-World War I German Social Democracy, while critical Marxism dominated in Russia and the Third World but also among so diverse Western thinkers as Horkheimer, Gramsci, Lukacs, and Korsch. The diversity of theorists here grouped together as critical Marxists gives one pause. Is there really much in common between the thought of Mao or Castro and the highly sophisticated critical interpretations that have come from the pens of Lukacs or the Frankfort school? They all agree on a rejection of purely economic interpretations and tend, as I have argued a while ago, to be voluntaristic, but major differences between them are also pronounced.

Rather than relying on currently fashionable binary classifications, Gouldner might have been advised to classify his "critical Marxists" into two subgroupings: intellectuals in relatively underdeveloped parts of the world were moved to a voluntaristic interpretation by the backwardness of societies in which the working class was weak, and industrialization little advanced. Here, for people in a hurry, voluntarism rather than waiting for later stages of development seemed indicated. In contrast, critical Marxists in the highly developed parts of the world were attracted to a voluntarism that was largely rooted in a revulsion from the cultural deprivations, the bureaucratized life-styles, and the lack of human spontaneity in the world of modernity. In this interpretation, despite many similarities, the Russian and Third World Marxists wished to reach modernity as quickly as possible, even if this meant a violation of the Marxian deterministic stages of history, while the Western critical Marxists reacted with romantic fervor against the effects of modernity.

Such disagreements aside, I admire much in this book. A life-long immersion in Marxian texts enables Gouldner to read them with a sophistication which blinds him neither to their many anomalies and contradictions nor to their enduring significance. Taking a leaf from Thomas Kuhn, Gouldner argues that Marxist theory, after its initial stages of growth, hardened into paradigmatic forms and attempted to deal with major anomalies, such as the relatively autonomous role of the state and the Asiatic Mode of Production,

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by dogmatic and premature closure. What emerges as a central paradox at this point, in addition, is the fact that reliance on the proletariat as the central historical actor proved difficult since that actor, now "crippled and debilitated," has become "an agent not altogether reliable."

This excellent book belongs on the shelf of all those, within or without the fold, to whom Marxian thought continues to be worthy of close scrutiny.

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Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications *by Oran R. Young. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 172 pp. $12.95.*

As he indicates at the beginning, the author undertakes two tasks: the demonstration that the international system achieves a reasonable degree of compliance with its rules despite its lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms comparable to those employed by governments, and the development of a theoretical analysis of the general problem of compliance. These tasks are related, but Young has produced a curiously disjointed book. After an introductory chapter and one analyzing the factors that typically enter into calculations about adhering to or violating rules, he presents a chapter on "Compliance in the International System" and two case studies of the effectiveness of treaties as regulators of the behavior of states. He then reverts to the problem of compliance in general, repeating much of the introductory material, and ends with chapters on the calculations by public authorities about the utility of investing resources in efforts to promote compliance and on the problem of undesirable side effects of such efforts. The three chapters dealing with the international system are made to appear as an interruption of the flow of the work. Thus, Young has assembled a book with two introductions, no conclusion, and a long digression in the middle.

This criticism aside, the tasks to which the author addresses himself are worth doing, and he does them well. He contributes usefully to the blurring of the customarily exaggerated contrast between the states of law and order in the governed domestic system and the anarchical international system. He accepts with too little reservation, however, the notion that the former system deals with individual subjects and the latter with collective ones. The problem of coping with corporate actors arises in both systems, and the institutions of government produce no magic that makes this problem easy to solve.

Political science has long been shockingly neglectful of the problem of law enforcement. Governments obviously have many other functions, and more glamorous ones, than enforcing the law and protecting citizens against crime, but these are the most basic of the tasks of government—and a political science that is too pompous to concern itself with them is in danger of becoming irrelevant to the real world. Hence, Young's concentration on the problem of compliance deserves applause. His formalistic style is something of a handicap—he seems to accept the admonition, "Let's call a spade a manual excavation system"—and he has by no means exhausted the subject. But he has

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provided a push that ought to set in motion a major effort by political scientists to understand the problems of making rules stick, both within and among national states.

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The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies *by Roger Benjamin. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1980. 148 pp. $15.00.*

The thesis of this little volume is that the rich countries are moving into what is described as "post industrialization," and that this is going to require certain political changes. These changes are not spelled out very clearly, but they involve such things as greater decentralization, local autonomy, spontaneous participation in political affairs by local neighborhood interest groups, and so on. The book seems to have arisen out of the author's dissatisfaction with the more conventional approach to comparative research in political systems, with its lack of adequate dynamic political theory. A corollary of the main thesis is that most industrial societies involve an ever larger amount of collective goods, which are never defined exactly but fall somewhere between the traditional public goods, which everybody shares, and private goods, from which everybody but the owner can be excluded. Collective goods, of course, also include bads, such as pollution and destruction of neighborhood communities by highways or urban renewal. This is an important concept, and one wishes the author spelled it out a little more precisely.

Each chapter of the book is almost an essay in itself, some of them one suspects written for different occasions. The book does not hang together very well as a whole. A statistical essay, chapter 4, tries to demonstrate by fairly sophisticated methods that there is a distinction between postindustrial and industrial societies. I am not sure that this really established anything but that some societies are richer than others. The author places a good deal of stress on the rise of the service industries in postindustrial societies outside of government. The evidence for this is a little shaky and certainly not spectacular. The whole problem of the taxonomy of societies on the scale from poverty to riches is indeed a difficult one. The author is worried about it, but certainly does not solve it. There is an interesting essay, chapter 8, that illustrates Benjamin's general thesis using a study of local government in postindustrial Britain to criticize the recent changes and suggest that they were inspired mainly by a desire for some sort of tidiness on the part of those in authority. The policy of increasing the size of local governments certainly had very little to do with the empirical evidence presented, which suggested there were virtually no economies of scale in local government. The whole volume indeed is a useful antidote to those political scientists who want to tidy things up. Indeed, this reviewer would have been tempted to subtitle the book: "The Virtues of Political Untidiness."

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the book is the absence of any solid dynamic social theory. There is virtually no mention of the problem of exhaustible resources, which is surely critical in any general theory of development. The role of knowledge, materials, and energy is hinted at but not really worked out. The interrelated patterns of political,

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economic, social, and moral development are not clearly distinguished. The roles of threat, exchange, and integrative structures are not clearly laid out. The contribution of evolutionary theory is not really developed. One gets the feeling that the whole work is a plea for the development of some kind of theoretical structure which the author has not yet achieved.

Nevertheless, the book has some interesting ideas. It is at least a step towards an ecological theory of politics and a challenge to the unexamined assumptions of a good deal of current political thought. It is clearly written for the specialist and not for the general public, which is rather unfortunate, as a little more attention to the needs of the less sophisticated reader would have produced a much more interesting volume and one with a much wider appeal. One is left at the end with a rather unsatisfied feeling that a great many interesting questions have been raised, but very few of them have been answered, which is perhaps symptomatic of the present state of political thinking.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
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Development and Diffusion of the Nuclear Power Reactor: A Comparative Analysis *by Peter deLeon. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979. 325 pp. $17.50.*

Organization theorists, scholars of public administration, and policy analysts interested in technology assessment and the interplay of politics, economics, and technology will find in Peter deLeon's book a rare cross-national study of the development of nuclear energy technology in six different nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada, and France). DeLeon attempts, with only partial success, to tie his six case studies together by reference to his broader purpose of testing an analytic framework for cross-national comparison of the development and diffusion of complex government-sponsored technologies for civilian use. He views each nation's experiences with nuclear reactors within the context of three developmental periods or stages (development, demonstration, and dissemination) during which different coalitions of organizational actors and differing objectives predominate. DeLeon's use of Graham Allison's notion of conceptualizing decisions as organizational outputs leads him to conclude that "the development and dissemination of nuclear power reactors was less a case of a developing technology and more of interorganizational conflict" (p. 225).

Extensive involvement by the central government in the initial development of nuclear reactors was a crucial factor in every nation sampled except West Germany (the only nation in deLeon's sample to develop nuclear energy without a concomitant weapons program), where the central government's role was less important than that of private industry. West Germany also turned its late start in developing nuclear power to its advantage by drawing upon the base of knowledge and experience accumulated by others. Rather than using its own unenriched uranium to fuel its own indigenous reactor designs, as did other nations, West Germany chose to rely on imports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology from the United States. The lobbying role of nuclear scien-

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tists in the developmental stage was greatest in the United States and France, while the motivating factors of the desire to regain national prestige and the perceived need for nuclear power as an additional energy source seemed most prominent in France and Britain. France and Britain, however, locked themselves into choosing a single-reactor technology which later proved technically and economically inefficient, leaving them at a disadvantage compared with most of the other nations, which had increased their options by the more deliberative strategy of first developing multiple-reactor technologies and then choosing the best of several reactor types. During the demonstration period, the six nations under study displayed a general transition toward a lesser role for government subsidies and an increased role for reactor manufacturers and electric utilities. This transition continued until the dissemination stage when each nation chose to accept or reject its developed reactor. (France eventually chose to accept the American and West German light-water reactor design in the face of continuing economic and technical problems with its own gas-graphite reactor.)

DeLeon is appropriately modest in evaluating the success of his analytic framework, acknowledging its shortcomings in light of the limited sample and the measurement difficulties with some of his cross-national indicators. The framework does, however, permit him to avoid the limitations of a single-case, case-study approach, as is used in most other analyses of national nuclear-energy policies, and is useful as a heuristic device in organizing disparate data into categories that are, for the most part, clearly understandable if not always novel or particularly enlightening. Like most books that are adapted from doctoral dissertations, deLeon's work is sometimes marred by repetitious and somewhat turgid prose, but on the whole the book is a well-documented and rigorous comparative analysis that does begin to fill a gap in the literature of policy analysis and technology assessment.

JAMES R. TEMPLES
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The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System *by Frank J. Donner. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 554 pp. $17.95.*

Having collected as a private attorney materials relating to government surveillance of political dissent since the 1940s, in 1971 Frank Donner became director of the American Civil Liberties Union Project on Political Surveillance to devote full-time to this research. This study is the product of that intensive research effort. Its chief virtue is the comprehensiveness of its chronological scope, dating from the World War I period, and of its focus, ranging from federal intelligence agencies to congressional antisubversive committees, local police "Red Squads," and private investigative agencies and interest groups. Donner traces the evolution of the FBI's involvement in domestic political intelligence, the bureau's unhesitating resort to illegal investigative techniques and programs, FBI Director Hoover's role, and the FBI's covert relationship with like-minded associates in the news media, the Congress, and private organizations.

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Although focusing principally on FBI surveillance, Donner also chronicles the surveillance activities of other intelligence agencies—the CIA, military intelligence, and the IRS—and their relationship with the White House culminating in the Nixon administration's decisions to create the White House Plumbers, to authorize the Huston Plan, and to abuse the grand jury system to amass information and attempt to immobilize dissidents. Donner does not, however, focus exclusively on the executive branch. He also explores how congressional countersubversive committees and leading congressmen (the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Richard Nixon, James Eastland, Larry McDonald, and John Ashbrook); local police "Red Squads"; and private detective agencies, political organizations (the National Labor party, the John Birch Society), and private interest groups (the American Legion, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Legion of Justice, the Secret Army Organization) have sought to purify American society, often by vigilante methods, of liberal-radical dissent. *The Age of Surveillance* includes a fascinating account of the current coordinated efforts of Congressman Larry McDonald and countersubversive activists John Rees and Herbert Romerstein.

*The Age of Surveillance* is not simply a descriptive account of abuses of power, politically motivated investigations, and disdain for the law. In a long theoretical chapter, Donner analyzes the nature and origins of the American "political intelligence system." Unlike other scholars, Donner rejects the interpretation that the recently highlighted abuses were the byproducts of the cold war and McCarthyite politics. Rather, he emphasizes the purposive and rational character of American countersubversion—a nativistic mentality and commitment to the preservation of the economic and social system. The persistence and duration of these efforts to delimit political debate were the combined product of the rational needs and nativistic fears of American conservatives and of the liberals' preference for procedural due process "palliatives," penchant for anticommunism, and subservience to the corporate sector.

This is an arresting and controversial thesis. Yet, there is an abstract quality to Donner's analysis. Donner minimizes not only the distinctiveness of recent responses (the Red Scare of 1919–20 was a public effort and was predicated on specific laws, while the more abusive surveillance programs of the cold war years were covertly conducted in knowing violation of federal laws) and the recent needs and ability of the intelligence agencies to avert public discovery (whether through "Do Not File" systems, classification of relevant documents, or the complicity of key congressional leaders), but also the role of particular presidents (Richard Nixon, after all, was in a class by himself). Nonetheless, Donner's thesis cannot be discounted and his thoughtful, impressively researched and analyzed book should command the interest of scholars—particularly at a time when the Congress is formulating legislative charters for the intelligence agencies.

ATHAN THEOHARIS
*Marquette University*

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Mass Media and American Politics *by Doris A. Graber. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980. 304 pp. $6.95.*

Participants in the political process—reporters and officials—often have had a better sense of how the media influence policy than have political scientists. This study is aimed at a significant vacuum in political science literature: the place of the media in American politics. It is the right topic at the right time. Graber covers a broad range of subjects with three focal points: the mass media and their place in the public and private sectors; the media and their impact on individual attitudes and perceptions; and media coverage of governmental institutions and political situations.

It is an important book whose imperfections reflect the problems of the literature that it seeks to summarize. Although most textbooks are derivative, a book on the mass media in American politics cannot depend on a literature that is itself incomplete. Graber adds to the media literature with her original content analysis of the coverage of the 1976 presidential elections by twenty newspapers and the three networks, but her work, found in the chapter on elections in the television age, reflects the existing emphasis in the literature on presidential elections to the exclusion of media treatment of congressional, gubernatorial, and local contests.

While we receive a thorough survey of the literature and a great deal of information on a broad range of topics touching on the mass media, one gets little sense of the variety of the parts of the media and how they mesh together. Graber emphasizes television and newspapers with almost no information on the wire services, news magazines, and radio. We receive little background on the manner in which the media evolved into the major actor that it is today or how the participants in the political system relate to the media and to each other through the media. While she deals quite well with most of the individual media topics she treats, Graber is not as successful in examining the relationships between partners in the political system. The discussion of presidential manipulation of the media, for example, fails to give us a sense of the limits of the tactics used by the White House (pp. 202–4). She uses the example of President Nixon touring the Middle East and the Soviet Union during the Watergate scandal to illustrate the point of the president releasing news or making it in order to distract public attention. The fact was that the tactic was of little use to Nixon; he was out of the White House within six weeks.

There are some significant factual problems that need to be resolved in the next edition of the book. Graber's assertion that the "Gallup and Harris polls found high confidence in television and newspapers in less than 20 percent of the public" (p. 143) is not borne out by the raw figures. In 1979, for example, the Harris poll has 37 percent of the public having "a great deal of confidence" in television news and 28 percent having the same level of confidence in the press. In her section on the development of news councils as one of the new trends in the media, Graber speaks in detail of the Twentieth Century Fund proposal for the establishment of a news council without telling readers that the council has been in existence since 1973. As of July, 1980, it has rendered 186 decisions involving media accuracy and fairness. There are other errors as well such as an imprecise description of the facts of *New York Times* v. *Sullivan* (p. 110).

Doris Graber and Congressional Quarterly are to be credited for recognizing the need

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for a book on the media's impact on American political life. Her book is a first step in the direction of building a literature on a most significant new actor in our political system.

MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR
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Nuclear Power and Legal Advocacy: The Environmentalists and the Courts *by Constance Ewing Cook. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 155 pp. $17.95.*

The development of a national energy policy has raised some of the most visible and controversial issues in American politics in the last few years. Certainly, among the most prominent of those issues is the role of nuclear power in America's energy future, in particular, the licensing procedures for, and the location of, nuclear-power plants. This rather slim volume seeks to explain the role of the courts in resolving some of those issues, with special emphasis on the case of the Midland nuclear-power plant in Michigan.

For a book with just over 100 pages of text, the range of topics covered is impressive. Cook places the study in the context of the literature on interest groups in the policymaking process, the use of legal advocacy as an interest-group strategy, and the impact of protracted judicial processes on public policy. Three particular concerns are addressed: the comparative power and capabilities of the antinuclear environmental groups and of the nuclear-power industry organizational characteristics and resources such as funds, leadership, expertise, and political and legal skills); the political strategy chosen by each interest group, and how that choice reflects its relationship with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and the role of the judiciary in the nuclear-power controversy. These issues are examined in nine chapters, four of which concern the Midland case. The other chapters deal with nuclear power in the larger context of the politics and economics of energy; the comparative analysis of the groups involved; the organization, powers, and procedures of the NRC; the major judicial opinions in nuclear-power litigation in the 1970s; and a restatement of the major findings on the role of legal advocacy in nuclear-power development. Most of these chapters are quite brief, ranging from four-and-one-half to sixteen pages.

Cook finds that antinuclear activists benefited from the "dedication and political skill" of their leadership, the "full utilization of potential group resources," and especially the groups' commitment to the use of legal advocacy as a political tactic. These groups took advantage of the statutory provisions creating a complex and laborious regulatory process for the licensing of nuclear-power plants. Numerous access points have been created for public intervention and for appeals within the NRC and in the courts. The result has often been lengthy delays. Of special interest is Cook's conclusion that it was not the courts' rulings per se that mattered (most of them upheld the NRC's favorable treatment of the industry), but the ability of opposition groups to delay the proceedings long enough to cause financial instability in the industry and abandonment of plans for construction. For that reason Cook considers the use of such legal advocacy to be a "natural political strategy" for the public-interest groups seeking to make nuclear plants pro-

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hibitively expensive. This strategy, she says, has been a major factor in the decline of the nuclear-power industry in the last few years. The outlook for its use in the future is much less certain, given the changing legal environment and the altered regulatory process following the accident at Three Mile Island.

The issues analyzed in this book are clearly important, and it will doubtless be of interest to a variety of readers. With its case study of the Midland plant and the activities of the antinuclear environmental groups there, and its well-written and clear description of often confusing regulatory and judicial procedures, the book should be useful as a supplementary text in courses dealing with energy and environmental politics. Regrettably, its high price makes this use of the volume improbable, at least as a required text.

The contribution of the book to the scholarly literature is more difficult to appraise. Its coverage of many issues is not sufficiently detailed or backed up by a wide enough range of data to satisfy specialists in the fields of environmental politics or, I suspect, judicial politics. In addition to whatever limitations are inherent in a case study, reliance on the public record (for example, legal briefs, court opinions, newspapers, newsletters) for summaries of the key events may pose a few problems of interpretation. Nevertheless, Cook handles the available material judiciously and does not present the study for more than it is: an introduction to interest groups and judicial activity on the nuclear-power issue; an insightful review of a particular case in Michigan; and an interpretation and assessment of the tactics and power of antinuclear activists in the courts during the 1970s.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT
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The Rewards of Public Service: Compensating Top Federal Officials *edited by Robert W. Hartman and Arnold R. Weber. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 238 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

How does and how should the federal government determine the salaries of the 2,500 people who are its members of Congress, its judges, and its top political executives? The answers matter, for they affect the recruitment and retention of able officials at these levels and at top civil-service levels as well.

The "how" question has two distinct aspects, both of them addressed in this collection of papers stemming from a conference sponsored by the Brookings Institution. The first concerns the governmental procedures for altering salaries, inherently political because the public thinks officials are already overpaid. The second concerns the methodology for determining appropriate rates of pay, which involves economic analysis of elite labor markets and reckoning of psychic and other rewards of public service.

The Federal Salary Act of 1967 seemed to answer the procedural problem. Quadrennially the president, advised by a temporary Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries, would submit a salary schedule to Congress. This would automatically go into effect unless within thirty days either house voted to disapprove it or Congress enacted an alternative schedule. This worked in 1969 and 1977. But in 1974 the Senate voted disapproval, so an eight-year hiatus occurred, making the 1977 raises appear extra-

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ordinary to the citizenry. The outcry led Congress to amend the act to require roll-call votes in both houses for approval of the president's 1981 and subsequent proposed pay rates.

Salary adjustments, the editors of this book sensibly urge, should occur annually or biennially, so that salaries lag less behind inflation and the raises shock the public less. The quadrennial commission, if retained, should be tenured for the full quadrennium, so that the meagerness of research and deliberation on officials' compensation and its consequences can be remedied.

The strongest recommendation is for breaking the linkage forged by custom between congressional salaries and executive and judicial salaries. Of the latter, only pay rates of the president, vice-president, cabinet members, and Supreme Court justices are higher than those of congressmen. The most politically sensitive salaries thus depress those that must compete with what the private sector offers.

The procedures for altering salaries are considered in three essays. Louis Fisher traces congressmen's skittish adjustments of their own salaries from 1789 to 1976. Roger H. Davidson gives a superb analysis of the politics of compensation. And Robert W. Hartman reveals how the pay of top career civil servants is both depressed and compressed (the top three grades all get the same pay) by a triple linkage—to the pay scales of all the white-collar employees below them; to the pay of the lowest (or, in some cases, next to lowest) political executives above them, which sets the ceiling for careerists' actual pay; and, finally, to the political executives' own linkage to congressional pay. The loss of able "permanent" top administrators and professionals through resignation and early retirement is a lamentable result of these linkages.

Two essays concern the methodology for determining appropriate salaries for officials. In a curious but substantial paper, Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, University of Chicago economists, pursue many of the right questions for an economic analysis, but often find the concepts or the data inadequate in the governmental setting. Some fantasies are explored at length, and a technical exercise seeking to relate mayors' salaries to their productivity should have been omitted. Wesley R. Liebtag of IBM flatly rejects attempts to arrive at federal officials' salaries by comparison with salaries paid in private industry, a view that moves us back to square one. James C. Kirby's paper on conflict-of-interest regulations is irrelevant to current compensation issues.

This valuable collection on a neglected subject should put starch in the 1980 quadrennial commission. It might even embolden Congress to vote salaries in 1981 that assure recruitment and retention of able judges and executives, even if constituent pressures preclude higher pay for members of Congress.

JAMES W. FESLER
*Yale University*

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Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969–1976 *by Marvin C. Feuerwerger. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1979. 235 pp. $23.95.*

The stated purpose of this book is to explore the role of Congress and the motives underlying the behavior of individual congressmen in judging annual administration foreign-assistance recommendations. The book is a modest attempt to tackle the immodest and complicated issue of foreign aid, which must rank as one of the most misunderstood of all foreign-policy issues. Despite its modest approach and limited data base, the author succeeds in conveying valuable insights into congressional motivations and institutional constraints. He does so by riveting attention on U.S.-Israeli aid policy with special emphasis on the House of Representatives and the beliefs of members of the pro-Israeli House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Since the book is mostly a study of congressional behavior rather than of foreign aid or U.S. Middle East policy, it should be of particular interest to students of Congress. Its unique contribution lies with the evidence it provides to counter two standard generalizations about Congress: namely, that Congress is a secondary actor in foreign-policy making and that it attacks foreign-aid requests much the way a child wields a hammer—an occasion to do much harm while deriving little more than therapeutic satisfaction. Although Feuerwerger acknowledges the veracity of this conventional wisdom, his study concludes that Congress is a primary actor in shaping U.S. foreign-aid policy and that, despite habitual slashing of administration requests, it regularly initiates, even increases, aid levels for the state of Israel. Because Israel has been the "deviant" or exceptional case in U.S. aid policy, it provides a useful base for testing competing hypotheses about how and why Congress and congressmen act on foreign-assistance legislation.

At the outset, Feuerwerger presents evidence that shows that in fiscal years 1970 through 1977 Congress cut administration requests by an average 25 percent while simultaneously elevating programs for Israel by nearly 9 percent. In effect, assistance to Israel has been far more popular than foreign aid in general. Based on interviews with members of Congress, the author surmises that Israeli aid actually carries its own coattail effects. Proposals for large Israeli military aid, for example, appear to motivate some hesitant members to shift their votes in favor of controversial legislative issues such as the integrated aid package itself or higher defense spending. This influence on aid policy contrasts sharply with the limited sway Congress has on arms sales and diplomatic issues in the Middle East, issues where the executive branch has staked out its claim for preeminence.

Feuerwerger explains that support for Israeli aid is rarely contentious because administration requests and congressional authorizations take place in a favorable environment of support for a strong and vigilant Israel. This favorable climate is anchored in a widespread admiration for the Israeli character and society. These beliefs and feelings are nurtured by the activities of an effective network of pro-Israeli interest groups, a supportive mass media, public sympathy to Jewish suffering, and a recognition that the Jewish vote counts. Fear of electoral punishment factors into voting behavior, but stronger influences emanate from the belief that Israel is a stable, democratic, and reliable ally swimming in a sea of regional turmoil and hostility. The interview data also suggest that interest groups

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can play a potent role in determining U.S. aid policy—still another exception to the prevailing wisdom extant in the relevant literature.

This study would be even more valuable had the author lengthened the time frame to include a Democratic administration and broadened the scope to both chambers of Congress. It would be improved, too, had it explored the relation between U.S. aid to Israel and U.S. aid policy in general. Israel is not only the largest recipient of U.S. aid, the aid itself is earmarked and provided at concessionary rates, with a partial grant basis and favorble payback terms. All this vitiates the ability of the United States to assist others since the aid process operates under a preordained dollar ceiling limit. A discussion of the numerous licensing, co-production, subcontracting, and other economic contacts would add to the foreign-aid analysis. Each economic link expands the level of U.S.-Israeli interdependence and thereby makes it more difficult for congressmen to cast negative votes against Israel.

The author speculates that future support for Israel is firm, although one would expect some erosion as United States and allied dependence on Middle East crude oil increases. It may be that a policy like the one toward Taiwan will evolve over time, but judging from this study, any executive initiative will almost surely encounter stiff resistance in Congress. This issue bears close watching as an indicator of the direction of U.S. foreign policy in the next decade and of the part future Congresses will play in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

ANDREW K. SEMMEL
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Money in Congressional Elections *by Gary C. Jacobson. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 251 pp. $15.00.*

Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws *edited by Michael J. Malbin. Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. 384 pp. Cloth, $15.25; paper, $8.25.*

The 1970s will be viewed historically as a decade of political reform, and campaign reform constitutes one of its major components. The impact of campaign-finance reform on electoral competition and outcomes, political parties, interest groups, and policy outcomes has been hotly debated both before and after passage of reform legislation. This debate will likely continue. But the disclosure requirement of the legislation provides a new source of data that will enhance the possibility of examining the impact of money on election processes and perhaps on other facets of the political system as well.

Of these two books, the Jacobson volume is narrower in its focus. It seeks primarily to examine the relationship between the amount of money spent and the winning of congressional elections.

The Malbin volume examines the impact of campaign-finance reform on interest-group activities, particularly in the electoral arena, on campaign strategy, and on political par-

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ties. An additional section compares campaign financing in the United States with that of other countries. The product of a conference, this volume includes papers presented by candidates, officeholders, and practitioners working with interest groups, political action committees, and political parties, as well as by political scientists and journalists.

Jacobson's findings are fascinating. He finds, for instance, that congressional incumbents of both parties have done increasingly better over time; that election outcomes are affected more strongly by what challengers spend than by what incumbents spend; that Republican expenditures have greater effect on election outcomes than do Democratic expenditures; and that the more incumbents spend the worse they do. Through use of simultaneous equations and regression techniques, Jacobson examines very carefully the relationships between spending and winning. The results are compelling and shed considerable light on the relationship between campaign financing and the outcome of electoral contests.

Political scientists interested in the functions of democratic elections will also find the Malbin volume useful and interesting. The presentations in the book do not provide the detailed empirical verification of the findings as in Jacobson, but they do provide many insightful observations. One of the more interesting is the potential impact of the reform on strengthening the party system. Papers by Richard B. Cheney, Xandra Kayden, and Ruth S. Jones all indicate that the importance of central party machinery in directing campaigns and maintaining a party presence has increased because of the reporting requirements of the law. Much of the publication examines the growth in number and activity of political action committees (PACs) and the relationship of this growth to the reform legislation. This discussion is less satisfactory than other parts of the book because a large part of it consists of presentations by persons associated with the groups. The discussion nevertheless raises several interesting questions, including the extent to which the growth of PACs is related to the finance-reform legislation, the impact of PAC activities, and the value of increased PAC activities. Political scientists will find this volume more useful for the insights it contains and the suggestions for further research than in the conclusions reached in the conference.

There are several important areas that both volumes neglect. Neither deals effectively with the impact of campaign-reform legislation upon public policy. Admittedly, tracing this relationship would be complex and difficult. A second area on which neither volume focuses is the specific motivations of those who contribute money to political campaigns, although Jacobson does provide useful insight into the reasons why most citizens choose *not* to contribute. A third area of potential importance is the timing of contributions. Richard B. Cheney suggests that most PACs do not contribute early, particularly in a race in which there is an open seat. Start-up money is very important. Candidates who can raise such money, either from others or from their own financial resources, have a great advantage over their potential opponents. It is probable that early contributors may exercise undue influence on determining who will become the viable candidates. Finally, neither study examines the allocation of campaign money. Intelligent allocation of available money may be as important in determining electoral outcomes as the amount of available money.

It is still too early to examine the full impact of legislation on campaign-finance reform

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at the national level. Both volumes indicate that this legislation has had a comprehensive impact; often its effects have been unintended, and often it has failed to achieve the goals originally posited by its advocates.

DELMER D. DUNN
*University of Georgia*

The Private World of Congress *by Rochelle Jones and Peter Woll. New York, The Free Press, 1979. 264 pp. $14.95.*

This book presents an insider's view of congressional politics. It emphasizes the role that personal drives for power and status within the institution play in determining congressional behavior, structure, and outcomes, and it brings a variety of concrete examples to bear to illustrate and support the authors' claims. The book thus provides a useful corrective to a current and very popular strand of analysis that treats members essentially as electoral politicians, absorbed in, if not dominated by, reelection stratagems and constituent service. It also identifies and highlights some important aspects of congressional life which not infrequently are slighted or ignored in the general academic literature on Congress. Important policy outcomes are substantially affected by the personal power stakes of key participants. Ambitious members do approach their jobs as entrepreneurs, seeking to use legislative proposals, committee positions, and staff to build, protect, and enhance their internal influence and reputations. Structural forms are molded and conflict over them fueled by personal power and status considerations.

Nonetheless, the book has defects as well as virtues. Ironically enough, aside from some surprising factual errors, especially in the first chapter, these defects are largely the obverse of its virtues. In presenting the case for the primacy and impact of power goals, insights supported by brief case studies define and constitute the analysis. If it is true that dedication to empirical rigor can lead to caricature rather than reality, however, it is also true that insight backed solely by illustrative examples leads to argument, not the cumulation of knowledge. Equally important, in a basic sense the authors commit the same mistakes as those analysts they most criticize. To be sure, they recognize the existence of personal goals other than internal power, for example, reelection and policy. They deny, however, that these goals have much influence or impact both by emphasizing the primacy of power goals and by arguing that no necessary or inherent conflicts exist between these goals and power goals. As a result, they too end by reducing motivation to a single factor and by seeking to explain all facets of congressional politics in terms of this factor.

Such an approach errs in two basic regards. First, it is doubtful that any single-factor theory of motivation will suffice. As Richard Fenno has recognized, what we need are approaches that encompass a variety of goals and define the conditions of their influence and the dynamics of their interaction. This has always been necessary, but it is even more essential today. The rising rates of retirement in the House suggest that the very desire to serve per se can no longer be assumed, but rather must be examined. Yet, inquiry into the

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basic inducements-contributions balance of congressional service, to use Barnard's term, is beyond the reach of any single-factor theory.

Second, it is doubtful that congressional behavior, structure, or outcomes can be adequately explained simply in terms of individual motivations. This is not to deny that the states of member goals affect their contexts of operation and behavior within them. But it is equally true that their contexts shape the states, manifestations, and impacts of these goals. For example, the Congress of O'Neill and Byrd is a very different place than the Congress of Cannon and Aldrich, and the current mix and consequences of member goals are significantly affected by the differences that exist. Similarly, despite their claims, the contrasts the authors' draw between leadership behavior and outcomes in the modern House and Senate cannot be explained primarily in terms of power drives. Rather, explanation of these contrasts requires far more attention to differences in context than to similarities in goals. In short, then, motivation is important, but it must be part of a more general analysis that acknowledges and integrates other basic external and internal variables, such as party strength, work-load pressure, organizational configuration, and linkages to the executive. Indeed, member goals reduce to rather ghostlike entities when considered apart from context, and approaches that do not take account of this fact can easily result more in tautology than in understanding.

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The Politics of Policy Implementation *by Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood. New York, St. Martin's Press. 1980. 201 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $6.95.*

About seven years have passed since Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, in their book entitled *Implementation*, presumptuously announced the "discovery" of policy implementation. This announcement was, no doubt, greeted with skepticism by scholars of public administration, who thought they had been studying policy implementation in one form or another since the turn of the century. What distinguishes the current interest in implementation from the traditional concerns of public administration? What increment of knowledge is added by research on policy implementation? What is the practical advantage of sorting the subject out for special attention? What special body of knowledge or theory is required for understanding and solving implementation problems? None of these difficult questions has been satisfactorily answered by the accumulated literature on implementation. Now that the literature has grown to an impressive volume, textbooks like the present one are beginning to appear. One would hope that these textbooks, in addition to reviewing the literature, would probe the basic intellectual questions raised by the growth of policy implementation as a field of study. Failing to engage these questions, implementation research will go the way of other short-lived academic specialties, to be displaced by the next academic vogue.

Judged in these terms, Nakamura and Smallwood have made a modest contribution.

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They contrast the "classical model" of administration with recent implementation research. They discuss the role of leadership in policy implementation. And they develop a simple framework for understanding implementation that focuses on linkages between policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Implicitly, if not explicitly, they raise the connection between current research on implementation and earlier work in administration and political science. Balanced against these assets are some serious liabilities. Their treatment of the implementation literature is expository rather than analytical; the authors quote and digest rather than synthesize and analyze. Their framework is more useful in displaying the literature than it is in exposing and solving practical problems of implementation. They state implementation problems from the point of view of presidents, cabinet officers, and agency heads, rather than from the perspective of mid- and lower-level administrators, for whom the problems are most chronic and immediate. On balance their book is a serviceable review of literature, but hardly an analytic tour de force. It generally reinforces the notion that implementation is a subject in search of a knowledge base.

The authors are cryptic about their intended audience, saying they would like to be read by "students," "practitioners of policymaking and evaluation," and "policymakers" (p. vii). In fact, the effective audience is much narrower. The book was an outgrowth of an undergraduate political science seminar at Dartmouth, where both authors teach. Its origins do much to explain its content and its potential uses. The authors take the political scientist's view of the subject matter, rather than the policy analyst's or the public administrator's. Their discussion is couched in broad conceptual and historical terms, rather than in the tangible and immediate terms of problem solving and decision making. For this reason, the book has limited utility for graduate-level courses in policy analysis and administration, but has some potential for advanced undergraduate or introductory graduate courses in public policy. Students looking for practical advice about how to frame implementation problems for analysis and how to formulate alternative implementation strategies will be disappointed. Students looking for a readable summary of the subject and a straightforward set of ideas for understanding implementation will find the book useful.

From the point of view of serious scholars of implementation, the most disappointing feature of the book is its tendency to treat as self-evident what should be treated as problematical. The authors cull and sort the literature without seriously challenging its rationale and utility, leaving unanswered the important question of what we have actually gained by sorting out implementation for special attention.

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Community Power and Political Theory: A Further Look at Problems of Evidence and Inference, Second, Enlarged Edition *by Nelson W. Polsby. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 245 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $5.95.*

In 1963, nearly two decades ago, the first edition of this book was published. At the time, many in the academic community, including this reviewer, praised the book for its contributions in setting forth the theoretical framework and methodological considerations which were guiding the then newly emerging pluralist or group-theory school. Pluralist studies had provided a set of findings about the distribution of power in American localities as well as the nation at large that were widely divergent from those associated with studies of elitist politics. Polsby compared the two schools, using as his criteria the canons of science, and concluded that the pluralist paradigm was preferable and that its findings more accurately described local politics.

This second edition includes the entire first edition (with only very minor changes) and six new chapters (a little less than half of the book) that are intended to address the criticisms of the pluralist school that have emerged in the intervening years. These years have been marked by wide, but far from unanimous, acceptance of the group-theory approach and conclusions. Polsby's format in these new chapters is the same as in the original edition; namely, to apply the criteria of the scientific method in evaluating the literature critical of pluralist findings. His goal in this edition is to persuade his readers that a commitment to a scientific approach requires one to accept pluralist conclusions; that critics are relying upon "religious experiences" for their beliefs rather than a "commitment to the establishment of 'scientific' knowledge" (p. 234).

The core of the controversy between Polsby and pluralist critics appears to be over, in Polsby's words, "the proper uses of theory and theorizing in social science" (p. 233). Polsby's position is that the most essential characteristic of good scientific theory is validity; that there should be demonstrated agreement between the theory and the data. Many pluralist critics, including this reviewer, believe that accuracy or validity is only one of the characteristics of good theory; that there are other requirements of *equal* import (for example, broadness of scope, logical consistency). This does not mean that social scientists can base their theory choice on mere personal preference; it does mean that there are a number of scientifically legitimate reasons for selecting a particular theoretical approach. As a result of these divergent positions, Polsby believes social scientists can achieve a theoretical consensus, a unified "theory of community power" (p. 138). The latter has been provided by the pluralist paradigm, and research in this area should have been directed "toward the resolution of empirical problems about the shape and scope of power in American communities" (p. ix). Pluralist critics, on the other hand, believe that there are a number of scientifically acceptable theoretical approaches to the study of community power; that social scientists are going to disagree on the application of the criteria for acceptable theory or on the tradeoffs between these criteria. Conflicting theoretical approaches addressed to the same social phenomena constitute the normal state of the scientific enterprise.

These differences are reflected in Polsby's defense of the pluralist framework for studying community power and his response to criticisms of the approach. Pluralists use a deci-

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sional framework which Polsby defends as providing the most accurate way for ascertaining the distribution of power. Pluralist critics, on the other hand, have focused their attack on the narrow scope of the decisional approach. They contend that decision making is merely the final stage of a highly complex process which begins with the larger social system; that structural and contextual parameters act to limit the types of issues considered by local officials. Unfortunately, Polsby focuses on the methodological difficulties involved with this more holistic approach rather than addressing its theoretical claims; he never responds to the position that both structural and decisional approaches are appropriate for studying community power, with the former seeking explanations of greater generality while the latter provides more accurate, albeit limited, findings.

It is unfortunate that Polsby views the conflict between pluralists and their critics as one between scholars committed to verification of their theories and scholars unconcerned with the requirements of science. Instead, the controversy involves different positions with respect to the role of theory in the scientific enterprise. Political scientists might possibly achieve a better understanding of community power if scholars as talented as Polsby would work on the difficult empirical problems involved with the more holistic approaches. As the discipline stands now, political scientists are in the unfortunate position where the empiricists work with frameworks of limited scope while ideologues all too often dominate the addressing of the potentially more theoretically relevant questions. The impact of this second edition of *Community Power and Political Theory* will be to further this polarization.

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Old Folks at Home *by Alvin Rabushka and Bruce Jacobs. New York, The Free Press, 1980. 202 pp. $10.95.*

The authors have some interesting data to report, but they have tried to tie an enormous ideological tail to a modest empirical body. The result is a misleading picture of the facts, leading to a shrill polemic against a variety of familiar targets. The views of experts and bureaucrats are contrasted unfavorably with the situation of the people under study—elderly homeowners. But the experts under attack—public officials, social workers, and social planners—are seldom identified or cited. And the subjects of the study are not as representative of the elderly population as the authors want us to believe.

The heart of the book is a report on the opinions of a sample of homeowners aged sixty or over. The sample design was carefully drawn to represent urban and rural homeowners in all regions of the country. But there are two flaws. One is the inclusion of the sixty to sixty-five age group, a decision not fully explained. While sixty-five is certainly an arbitrary line, the sample studied in this book includes substantial numbers of able-bodied and working people, which distorts many of the findings.

The second, more serious flaw is the omission of those who rent, who number four for every ten homeowners aged sixty-five or more. Homeowners therefore do not constitute the "vast majority" of the elderly. Except for their report on the rural elderly of

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Orangeburg County, South Carolina, the dimension of race is scarcely discussed, though nonwhite elderly are systematically disadvantaged in comparison to whites. The book's policy recommendations deal wholly with the more advantaged white majority.

The authors distinguish what the homeowners think about their housing and their situation from what the experts report. The authors report that "the vast majority of elderly are financially, medically, physically, and mentally fit" (p. 59). They take issue with health status findings of the National Center for Health Statistics in this way: "If well-being is a state of mind, then the vast majority of elderly are sound" (p. 10). They report that their sample generally are "better housed than they have ever been before" (p. 78) and predict that homeowning elderly will increase during the rest of the century (p. 136). But one could argue that this may be the last generation of large numbers of homeowning elderly; barriers to home acquisition are increasing for this generation of working adults, two-adult families are a falling share of total families, and other disincentives to ownership are strong. The book shows a declining proportion of total housing units with significant structural or equipment defects (p. 93), which reflects the younger average age of housing since 1960. But they fail to point out that almost 70 percent of homeowners over sixty-five live in houses built before 1939, where defects are most concentrated. Their method of budget analysis, which yields the finding that the elderly will not find it more difficult to meet their housing costs, assumes that they spend all of their assets over their lives and, presumably, do not intend to leave anything to their children. Their finding that repairs pose no major problems for owners would appear to lean heavily on the physical capabilities of the younger group in their sample.

There is merit in the argument that the recipients of any social policy ought to be asked what they think, what they need, and how they view what is provided. Many of the specific recommendations, such as the reverse mortgage, the elimination of capital-gains taxes on home sales by older people, the elimination of mandatory retirement, and the conversion of the tax exemption for the elderly into a tax credit, are sensible. But the authors appear to care less about these measures than about discrediting the views and influence of "experts" whose goal is allegedly to impose "some socially desirable level, that of middle-class America" and to frame policies that appeal "to administrators or social workers" (p. 130). Social expenditures are too costly and must be cut back; they are too general and must be targeted on the few who need help; they should take greater account of the views of clients and pay less attention to the do-gooders. The data are simply too limited and flawed to support what is at root an ideological tract masquerading as serious research.

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The Collapse of Welfare Reform: Political Institutions, Policy, and the Poor in Canada and the United States *by Christopher Leman. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980. 292 pp. $19.95.*

This volume is of interest for several reasons. It sheds light on Canadian federalism just when federal-provincial relations are under intensive review. It provides scholars with a valuable detailed chronicle and documentation of public (social) assistance reform efforts in both the United States and Canada during the 1970s. It makes an effort at comparative social-policy research, seeking to account for the similarities and differences behind the reform failures in two countries which share many characteristics and interact. Comparative studies are essential if there is to be an accumulation of societal learning in social policy.

Leman's thesis is that political structures account for the major differences in the process in the two countries. He sees Canadian federalism as encouraging a "deductive" policy mode: "federal-provincial negotiation, party discipline and ministerial prerogative in administration . . . leaves little room for lobbying and change from outside" (p. 135). Although the president of the United States may offer a coherent and comprehensive package, it is readily counteracted by the many opportunities available to the committees in the Congress, the special interest groups, and the federal bureaucracy to block or change it. This "inductive" style promotes spastic change and reform where the Canadian policy mode may be more gradual and less dramatic. In the instance of the negative income-tax proposals of the 1970s, the result in the United States was stalemate because there was no basic agreement on the reform goals. The Canadian deductive dialogue was throttled by a federal-provincial confrontation on financing and delivery despite agreement on reform—and no important pressure groups had access to the process, so there could be no rescue.

Clearly, Leman does describe real Canadian-U.S. differences in political structure, and he does tell an interesting story. He does not, however, do more than illustrate his thesis. A convincing argument would require either more policy cases (how does he account for the easy passage of the U.S. earned-income tax credit or comprehensive food stamps and Supplemental Security Income [SSI] reform) or more countries (why are the United States and Canada among the few countries that give social assistance such an important place in their income-transfer strategies?). In the present instance, one does not need the specific instance (failed welfare reform) to tell how Canada and the United States are different in political structure, and there is no clear proof that structure is the key variable in these two well-documented and interesting cases.

Leman himself actually offers other themes: poverty is defined and viewed differently; the racial variable is more important in the United States; the countries have very different sizes; party politics are quite different; the bureaucracies function in different ways; there are major cultural differences; the respectives shoes pinched in different ways in the early 1970s, and so on. One could arrange these variables differently than Leman does, and nothing in a two-case analysis of relatively similar countries shows him to be either right or wrong.

These remarks are intended to locate the work, not to detract from it. It should be read

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by students of income maintenance and of federalism—and the comparative work should continue.

ALFRED J. KAHN
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Propaganda in War, 1939–1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany *by Michael Balfour. Boston, Mass., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. 520 pp. $37.50.*

Propaganda is an indispensable dimension of warfare. It seeks on the one hand to sway the enemy public and on the other to sustain the domestic morale of the home public from which it emanates. Although war propaganda had its precursors, not least the efforts during the French Revolution and World War I, the propaganda efforts of World War II were unprecedented in terms of organizational arrangements, in the exploitation of new media devices (radio and movies), and in the assumed importance of propaganda's contribution to the war effort. In the propaganda war, the British and the Germans were the most active, their apparatus the most complicated, and their goals more nearly those of propaganda than of sheer misrepresentation as has often characterized the Soviet approach. It is this activity that Michael Balfour, who held a middle-level position in the British Ministry of Information for part of World War II, now surveys in his impressively documented, if disappointingly uneven, study.

Balfour seeks to provide a context for the wartime efforts by first reviewing how London and Berlin regarded propaganda during the interwar years. Both capitals, he writes, concluded that the propaganda efforts of the Great War had been successful and could be an important adjunct to military activity. And in the Nazi case, the role of propaganda in the march to power convinced many Germans (and others) of its potential utility in peace and war, not least, of course, Joseph Goebbels who served as Reichminister for Propaganda. Despite the book's title, its central focus is on the German effort and upon the German approach to propaganda during the war. In this analysis, Goebbels's relationships with Otto Dietrich, the Nazi party press chief, are a constant theme, especially their bureaucratic struggles and their differences, after 1941, over the portrayal of news of defeats. Goebbels is shown as a figure increasingly remote from Hitler, his apparatus increasingly less important in the war effort. At the same time Balfour reveals a shrewd, sardonic Goebbels, well aware of the nuances and limitations of propaganda. Moreover, the Reichminister emerges as a realist, one who knew that successful propaganda could not always ignore facts, could not be continually deceptive, and could not promote too much, too prematurely. To convey these impressions Balfour employs an episodic, event-by-event technique, that often leaves the reader with a fragmented sense of the book's purpose and coherence. These episodes summarize press and propaganda coverage of an event, with a recounting of the bureaucratic debate over how to handle certain situations, such as the Normandy invasion and unconditional surrender.

The analysis of the British side is less extensive. The structure of the Ministry of Infor-

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mation (MOI) is described, but its central figures are less sharply drawn. Also, he offers fewer episodic accounts of British coverage of various events, though those of the blitzkrieg and V-1 and V-2 raids stand out. What emerges is a portrait of the MOI as peripheral to the British war effort. Of course, with Churchill as cheerleader and, after December 1941, the Americans as an ally, the task for London—however long the road—was much easier.

Balfour's study—in part autobiographical reflections and in part massively documented research—is more a catalog of information and an edition of selected propaganda extracts than sustained analysis. His attempt to define the nature of propaganda is disappointingly confusing. Nor does he explore in any detail the importance of the new media devices upon the propaganda effort. Nonetheless, he reminds us that propaganda is not mere misrepresentation, that it must contain some measure of truth to be effective, and that it usually serves the double purpose of sustaining the home front while seeking to intimidate the enemy. Of the value of British and German efforts during World War II Balfour is skeptical. He does not believe that either side's propaganda had any appreciable impact upon the war's military outcome.

But his concluding comments are worth pondering: long-term propaganda campaigns during a war may have a steady and cumulative effect, not least upon the shaping of the peace; and propaganda directed at the enemy's armed forces may be the most important target for short-range, tactical activity. The Vietnamese experience, for both France and the United States, lends relevance to Balfour's observations. His study, even if incomplete and fragmented, is a valuable contribution to understanding one of the most discussed (and exaggerated) dimensions of modern warfare.

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The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis *by Ali A. Mazrui. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980. 142 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $5.95.*

"I believe," declares Ali Mazrui, "in *counterpenetrating* the citadels of power in the West. . . . Intellectually this is partly achieved when teachers from the Third World begin to teach and influence young westerners the way western teachers have for long sought to mold the minds of young Africans and Asians" (p. 69). In delivering the 1979 Reith lectures for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), reprinted in this volume, Mazrui launches an audacious counterpenetrating commando raid against a number of the entrenched assumptions about Africa widely held in the West.

The thrust and sally of his attack upon the citadel of our convictions is vintage Mazrui. Exquisitely decorated paradoxes float before us like butterflies, and outlandish provocations sting like bees. The mingled wit and wisdom which mark many of the abundant writings of this prolific writer emerge in particularly clear focus in this slender volume. Mazrui is a most urbane and engaging spearhead for the counterpenetrating Third World fifth column.

Mazrui used the forum offered by BBC for a wide-ranging *tour d'horizon* of con-

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temporary Africa and its place in the world. Paradox has always been the keystone to Mazrui's discourse. In these lectures, Mazrui elevates the paradox to full methodological status, placing it alongside the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. The paradox, like the dialectic, is a view of reality as the unity of opposites (p. 3).

Six paradoxes are unearthed to frame the wide-ranging commentary in this volume. Africa, we have recently learned, is the cradle of mankind, the first habitat of our species, yet the last continent to be made truly habitable. Race, religion, and ethnicity as categories of social identity have largely been imported from without, but in Africa have formed a crucifix of humiliation. African cultures are not naturally proximate to those of the West, yet, far more than Asia, Africa has been affected and afflicted by a massive imposition of Western cultural values. Africa is well endowed by providence with natural resources, yet remains the poorest of the inhabited continents. In continental terms, Africa is large, yet its sovereign political units are exceptionally small and fragmented. Africa is the most central of continents by geographical situation, yet politically it is the most peripheral. The fabric of the lectures is an embroidery upon these paradoxical themes.

Illustrative of the tantalizing assertions that fill his lectures are the widely quoted observations on the semiological impact of conventional Western cartography. The Mercator form of map projection makes North America appear to be one-and-one-half times the size of Africa, whereas in reality Africa is three-and-one-half times larger. The northern lands invariably lie at the top of maps, while the Southern Hemisphere is placed at the bottom—a graphical representation of the political and economic reality imposed by the Western industrial world.

While few would quarrel with Mazrui's cartographic ruminations, many of his observations are more controversial. Western investment may be midwife of revolution in South Africa, by accelerating the creation of social conditions that will bring about the overthrow of the apartheid system (pp. 38–39). A South African nuclear weapon may be a long-term benefit to Africa, because it will be quite useless in containing domestic insurrection and a potent asset for the postrevolutionary black regime. More generally, nuclear proliferation in Africa and the Third World is claimed to be an asset for world peace as "a necessary first step towards getting the North to agree to total and *universal* denuclearization in the military field" (p. 130).

Beyond controversy, the analytical power of the paradox has its limits. It yields the sparkling insight, the illuminating metaphor, but not the connecting tissue that joins these insights into a system. In this sense, the paradox is not truly a reborn form of the dialectic. Yet that is not to dismiss its value in the hands of a master such as Mazrui. Frequently provocative, occasionally irritating, always stimulating, Mazrui as prophet of counterpenetration ably fulfills the mission of thoughtful reflection upon the African condition—and our own.

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Economic Growth and Employment in China *by Thomas G. Rawski. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 194 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $4.95.*

China's leadership and press have recently been stressing the mistakes and failures of that country's economic policy over the past thirty years. In contrast, Thomas Rawski's book concludes that "China has made long strides toward full employment during the past two decades," its record in this regard comparing favorably with those of other large and densely populated poor countries (p. 126).

The book is a revision of a study carried out for the World Bank in 1977. Its object is to describe and evaluate China's policies regarding employment and to assess quantitatively their degree of success. Worldwide concern with problems of employment, migration, and accompanying distributional and "basic needs" issues makes advisable the incorporation of the Chinese experience into the general fund of knowledge. Rawski's book is a major achievement in this respect.

After an initial chapter summarizing findings and methodological issues, Rawski maps in chapter 2 the quantitative dimensions of China's labor force and employment. There is a careful comparison here of competing estimates of China's total population size, although the one chosen as most persuasive turns out to be well above the subsequently released official figure (958 million for the end of 1978). A definitive resolution of this question must await the census scheduled for next year. Rawski here also corrects the widespread impression that rigorous control of population movement has brought urban growth to a halt, showing that China's urban population probably grew by two-thirds or more between 1958 and 1975, to reach almost 19 percent of total population (p. 26).

Rawski estimates total labor-force growth for this period at 148.5 million persons (Table 2–7). How has such an enormous increment in job seekers been absorbed? Chapter 3 analyzes industrial employment and finds that, despite rapid increases, this sector could absorb only 11 to 17 percent of the total increment, a result due in part to "a strong upward trend in labor productivity" in industry caused by a continuous process of capital deepening (p. 44).

In China, therefore, as in other populous, low-income countries, industry's share of total output has grown much faster than its share of the labor force. Accordingly, agriculture must absorb most of the increment in labor supply, a process taken up in chapter 4. Here it is demonstrated that "China's farm sector has succeeded in absorbing nearly 100 million new workers, amounting to an increase of nearly 40 percent in the labor force, with no significant addition to cultivated acreage" (p. 71). Although output per labor year increased, however, output per labor *day* declined in reflection of diminishing returns to a fixed supply of land. (The author also argues that "total factor productivity in agriculture" fell for the same reason, but this argument rests on theoretical quicksand.)

Rawski gives considerable credit for agriculture's success in absorbing labor to institutional factors, especially the farm collectives and the integration of industrial inputs into agriculture so as "to complement rather than compete with rural labor" (p. 90). He argues convincingly that, despite the existence of alternative policies that might have used somewhat more labor in nonagricultural sectors, "no industrial strategy could have spared China's farm sector from the task of absorbing nearly 100 million new workers

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during 1957–75 or from the consequent downward trend in average and marginal labor productivity" (p. 129). The question for the future is whether China can achieve some combination of faster growth of both agricultural output and nonagricultural employment, so as to halt the erosion in productivity. This issue is discussed in the final chapter.

Recent Chinese accounts have revealed the existence of a major unemployment problem, although this may in large part be a recent result of the massive return home of formerly "rusticated" urban youth. The creation of over 7 million jobs in 1979, many of them frankly temporary posts in service and repair teams (the socialist analogue of the "informal" sector), indicates the seriousness with which the government regards the problem, but also the apparent absence in current circumstances of a permanent solution to it. Rawski's book may underestimate the current dimensions of unemployment, but is clearly the best discussion of the forces underlying it.

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The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil *by Sylvia Ann Hewlett. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1980. 243 pp. $15.00.*

This study addresses the issue of why Brazilian development has required poverty and repression. Essentially, the argument is that premodern Brazilian socioeconomic structures and the absence of radical political change prior to rapid industrialization ensured that development would be designed by an elite. The outcome was a market shaped by demand for "sophisticated" consumer goods which could only be met by the multinationals that came and stayed and dominated the economy. The result of these historical and contemporary factors was a rigidly unequal income structure presided over by a repressive state.

This study would be useful in teaching an introductory course on development in Latin America: it provides a schematic history of economic development and government policy; provides a synopsis of the various theoretical approaches; and summarizes a large number of useful facts about the multinationals, government behavior, and income patterns. At the level of analysis the discussion is uneven and ad hoc—reflecting a contradictory position. The author adopts a normative, moralizing, critical posture toward the state, multinationals, and stabilization policies, yet the set of analytical categories and the institutional framework that informs the study and produces the outcomes are described as historically necessary. The historicist determination provides no social agency for change. Moreover, the study argues from a complex cumulative multicausal approach and then falls back on crude economic determinism: "The basic framework of modern industrialization strategies has been incompatible with greatly enhanced social welfare for the mass of the people" (p. 82). Fortunately, in the text an effort is made to examine the mediating role of class structures and the state intervening between productive processes and income configurations. The study synthesizes a great deal of the existing literature and moves toward a general theory, but one that relies heavily on the distinction between late and early industrializing countries, to account for differences between class rigidities,

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income inequalities, and political freedom. At the level of the international economy, the author's sectoral analysis breaks down—lacking a coherent notion of imperialism, Hewlett discusses large-scale flows of capital, U.S. state intervention, and collaborative behavior by the military as a discrete set of "factors." Likewise, while rejecting the Marxist conception of the state in promoting, subsidizing, and protecting multinational capital, she improvises a "corporatist" view that fails to deal with long-term, large-scale processes of capitalist transformations—which are detailed in chapter 7 (on the multinationals).

The study is one-dimensional and lacks any sensibility to the contradictory developments that emerge from these autocratic, multinational capitalist approaches to development: workers are arbitrarily dubbed aristocrats and "co-opted"; slum dwellers are confined to clientelist politics; peasants are ignorant, poverty stricken, and powerless. Hewlett's only hope apparently are enlighted technocrats. History and empirical experience have blown away these static conceptions: massive trade-union struggles occur throughout the industrial belts of Brazil; and as Nicaragua and Iran clearly demonstrate, it is clearly in the fastest developing, autocratic, modernizing states that the social contradictions become most explosive.

Finally, I have to reject Hewlett's notion that the choice is development or freedom—capitalist exploitation or Stalinist welfarism. In both East and West, there have been and continue to be mass popular movements that seek socialism and freedom. Repressive development is not the inevitable outcome of economic imperatives or historical determinations but rather a consequence of the class struggles that produce the sociopolitical leadership and programs which, in turn, produce the dilemmas: the basic flaw in the "cruel dilemmas of development" is its unwillingness to deepen its class analysis of development.

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Mexico's Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment *by Roderic A. Camp. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1980. 259 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $12.50.*

In what is described as the "analytical companion" to Camp's earlier *Mexican Political Biographies*, the author attempts to treat the complex relationship between higher education and political recruitment in Mexico. Using three data sources—a biographical data bank of men and women holding public office from 1935 to 1976; an educational data bank composed of political leaders graduating from the National University between 1911 and 1955; and personal interviews and correspondence with such persons—the study makes careful assertions regarding the nature of family connections, socioeconomic status, political achievement, and university affiliation. The author asserts that the National University is the primary channel to possible political recruitment, a conclusion also reached by Peter Smith in his recent volume *Labyrinths of Power*. Camp also concludes that the base from which future political leaders are selected has not become "universalistic" over time and that the system has gradually "closed to the average Mexican" (p. 6). Naturally, such closure has to do with social class, related ability to afford univer-

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sity education, increasing centralization of the regime, and personal connections crucial to entry into the elite structure of Mexican authoritarian politics.

In providing the reader with an impressive array of data bearing on his assertions, and in persuading the interested student of Latin American politics that university education —particularly in the National University—is crucial to the personal connections and institutional recruitment processes of the national state, the author is quite persuasive. For those two qualities the book is welcomed as an addition to the still thin literature explaining the arcane mechanisms of the Mexican political system.

Camp's book is disappointing in two respects: he does not manage to take the reader beyond some rather tired clichés about the Mexican political system; and his categories describing the realm of political influence are inadequate. As to the first, the author cites Samuel Ramos on "Mexican character" (pp. 15–16), an author and a concept justifiably attacked by critics of the unfortunate confusion between political culture and national character. Likewise, the author seems convinced by the idea that a "revolutionary family" presides over public life in Mexico, another concept which increasingly is questioned as analysts of the official party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), begin to assign a less important role to party hierarchy in national decision making. Finally, the author asserts that "who you know" in the Mexican political system is important to political achievement (p. 95). It is difficult to disagree with this claim, but where does that claim take us intellectually, and how does the Mexican system differ from other purportedly less personalistic systems in this regard?

As to the author's categories of political influence, he states that "I believe that no one known to have political influence was omitted" (p. 2). In Mexico, where opposition does not have an adequate official forum for dissent, "unofficial" political leaders play an intensely important part in national political life. Since formal recruitment was the topic of Camp's book, informal leaders obviously were not candidates for the study, but that fact alone limits the usefulness of political recruitment alone as an avenue to understanding Mexican politics.

Despite these perceived shortcomings, Camp's book is a thorough one, of interest to the Mexican specialist. A larger dose of analytical imagination simply would have made it a better book.

STEVEN E. SANDERSON
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The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America *edited by Howard J. Wiarda. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 313 pp. $24.50.*

The United States has a long history of attempting to impose its version of democracy on its southern neighbors in Latin America. These attempts go back to Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to bring the benefits of democracy to "our little brown brothers," using a big stick or the marines when necessary, and show up in the modern period in John Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and President Carter's concern for human rights.

Despite these time-honored efforts, the concensus seems to be that Latin American de-

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mocracy is dead, dying, or, at the very least, under siege. In the late 1970s only three out of the twenty Latin American republics were governed by democratic regimes that lived up to North American standards, which include separate but coequal parliaments and courts, a tradition of party politics, a loyal opposition, and a full array of civil rights.

But are there other criteria and other definitions of democracy that reflect Latin America's own expectations and needs by which these countries should be judged?

This is the most interesting question examined in this book and one which is central to the vision of Howard J. Wiarda the editor. In his various essays Wiarda goes a long way toward producing a new definition of democracy and human rights in Latin America which is derived from the specific historical and developmental circumstances of this region. In particular, he stresses the prevalence of strong, personalistic leadership and the limitation of free speech and a free press for the sake of the "common good." Wiarda feels that both characteristics are legitimate parts of the Latin American democratic tradition.

The originality and vigor of Wiarda's approach is not, unfortunately, matched in many of the other essays. Some of the contributions are cast within the North American theoretical mold and judge Latin American democracy to have been a failure; others are frankly hostile to the democratic idea, seeing it as irrelevant to the Latin American experience. Only a minority of the authors join with Wiarda in seeking to discover an indigenous Latin American sense and meaning of democracy, different from but not inferior to the North American one. Some of the contributions, specifically Ieda Siqueira Wiarda's essay on "Women and Population Policy and Democracy in Latin America" and Anthony P. Maingot's essay on "Ideological Dependency and the Origins of Socialism in the Caribbean," seem inadequately linked to any of the major themes of the book.

If the book lacks a common theoretical thrust in the political sphere, it also fails to develop a systematic treatment of the economic development issue. Many of the contributions to this volume reiterate the conventional wisdom that the imperatives of growth in the twentieth century are important constraints on the democratic process in Latin America and that "a backbone issue of contemporary Latin American politics is how to achieve economic development and thereby close the gap in living standards with the industrialized nations" (p. 187). Given the already large scope of the book, it might have been better to leave this highly complex issue of the interaction between economic growth and political freedom in the hands of others. It is, after all, the subject of a vigorous and intense debate within the economics profession and involves such luminaries as Hollis Chenery, Irma Adelman, and Ian Little. Instead the issue is dealt with in a short essay by Paul H. Lewis, entitled "Development Strategies and the Decline of the Democratic Left in Latin America," who attempts to explain the entire problem by using the outdated (and discredited) model of W.W. Rostow. This essay neither stands on its own as a useful statement of the contemporary debate nor informs other contributions to the book.

In summary, while full of useful analysis and inspired by a powerful theoretical idea, *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America* falls prey to the common problems of edited collections of essays. It is not well-enough focused, it lacks integration, and too many of the essays seem artificially grafted onto the book.

SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT
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Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations *edited by Richard R. Fagen. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1979. 446 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $6.95.*

The diversity of papers presented in this book seems to underline the idea that the relations between the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean cannot be reduced to traditional problems of intergovernmental relations and diplomacy, and that these relations involve a gamut of complex and changing dimensions that no analytical framework has so far been able by itself to encompass.

The book is divided into two parts. The first is a collection of works, not all concerned with Latin American relations, that attempt to understand American foreign policy from different angles. Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt argue that the "low stateness" of the polity and "the low classness of social and political life" are two basic characteristics of American society that allow an understanding of American foreign policy and its oscillations between "hard" and "soft" stances concerning Latin America without changing the basic goal of maintaining geopolitical hegemony and hemispheric inequities.

Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders analyze the persistency of the cold war ideology in American foreign policy and give an illustration of it with the case of the Committee on the Present Danger, pointing out the failure of the Carter administration to formulate a new ideology that would avoid the reemergence of the cold war doctrines.

In his commentary of Wolfe and Sanders, Oscar Pino-Santos emphasizes the necessity of referring American foreign policy to structural factors rather than to a mere ideological debate, and he advances the theory of state monopoly capitalism as a fruitful analytical tool to do it. In another criticism on Wolfe and Sanders, Earl C. Ravenal develops his skepticism of the liberal vision of American foreign policy where he interprets liberals as sharing the basic premises of postwar policy, and he points out nonintervention as the only major premise that could introduce a real change.

Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson examine the support that the United States has given to authoritarian and repressive regimes in Latin America through military aid based on national security and counterinsurgency ideologies. The authors conclude that these trends persist despite the new rhetoric from American foreign policy. On a different level, Steven Volk points out the economic and technological changes in two industries, electronics and steel, that affect U.S. interests and its relations with other countries.

The second part of the book contains seven case studies on the relations between center and periphery countries. Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo O'Donnell analyze the deeply negative impact of stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund in countries with authoritarian and repressive regimes. Barbara Stallings shows in her illustration of the Peruvian example the increasing "privatization" of economic relations between the United States and Latin America. Peter Evans studies multinational corporations in Brazil and examines their impact upon internal contradictions between different sectors in the American economy. Describing carefully the dispute on exportation of Mexican natural gas to the United States, Richard R. Fagen and Henry R. Nau analyze the implications of the energy problems in the relations between these two countries. They show how a complex variety of factors and actors can go beyond the economic field. Concerning the ideological dimension, Anthony P. Maingot explains the preferences of the domi-

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nant elites of Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica for a kind of populist social democracy over the socialist option and how this eases the relations between these countries and the United States. Angela M. Delli Sante also concentrates on the ideological dimension in her study of the activities of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico which has endeavored to promote a favorable climate to capitalist relations in that nation.

It is obvious that by introducing a multidimensional vision to U.S.-Latin American relations, some aspects are privileged to the detriment of others. In this sense the reader will miss the dimension of cultural dependency in its different facets in this book. On the other hand, Fagen is aware of the variety of topics and approaches included, and in his remarkable introduction seeks its coherence and unity in two "problematics" that give the title of the book and related articles: the nature of contemporary capitalism and the nature of the contemporary state both in the United States and Latin America.

The author points out that we are far from having an adequate theoretical framework to encompass both problematics in analyzing the relations between the two regions. It seems, however, that a good improvement in this direction could have been reached in attributing more importance to the elaborations on the state, transnational problems, and Latin American-U.S. relations that have been developed in Latin America itself and which are not considered in some of the articles in this book.

In any case, the papers included in this volume—presented in a conference at The Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., March 1978—will constitute, with few exceptions, necessary reference pieces in the specific themes with which they deal. Even if some major problems such as a detailed evaluation of the human-rights policy are absent, the book gives a renewed vision of the complexity of relations between the United States and Latin America toward the end of the last decade and of some of the tendencies that will develop in the 1980s.

MANUEL ANTONIO GARRETÓN
*Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*

Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis *edited by John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1979. 449 pp. $19.75.*

Students of the American Congress have long been aware of the significance of the committee system to the way in which that institution functions, and, in recent years, sophisticated studies of particular committees have appeared that provide us with a good sense of how these bodies operate internally. Comparable information on committees in other legislatures, however, has been difficult to come by.

*Committees in Legislatures* is an attempt to fill this gap by providing assessments of the committee systems of the legislatures of eight countries: the United States, Italy, West Germany, the Philippines, Canada, Great Britain, India, and Japan. Each study is authored by an expert on the legislature in question, and even though the volume's editors refused to impose a common research framework upon their contributors, each country chapter, with some variations in both scope and quality, nonetheless covers roughly the

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same terrain: committee powers, jurisdictions, and procedures; the role of the chair and the individual members; committee relations with party and government leaders; and the functions and importance of the committee system for each legislature. A concluding chapter by Malcolm Shaw attempts to draw together the findings of these chapters and to arrive at some generalizations about committees and most particularly about the factors that contribute to their strength or weakness.

There is much to applaud in this book: its refusal to accept the parochial view that all committee systems that are weaker than the American system are necessarily inconsequential; the willingness of most of the contributors to look beyond the formal powers of committees to their less formal and frequently more important activities; the presence in some of the country studies of original data on attitudes of legislators toward the committee system; and finally, the scope of the book which includes work on the less studied legislatures of India, Japan, and pre-1972 Philippines, as well as the more traditional European and American cases. These strengths will make the volume a unique and welcome addition to the libraries of students of comparative politics and legislative behavior, among whom there, inevitably, will be some dissatisfied customers.

The country specialists can be depended upon to question whether a study of a particular legislature's committee system can stand on its own with only the most cursory reference to the legislative and political systems of which it is so clearly a part. Rigorous specialists of comparative politics will be annoyed by the decision of the editors to allow their contributors free reign in gathering, organizing, and presenting their data. While this may have been convenient at the outset of the project, the final product indicates that each country study could well have been arranged to cover the same topics in essentially the same order, thereby providing a much more clearly comparative analysis, albeit at increased editing costs. Those who have lamented the absence of theory in legislative studies will be unhappy with the highly descriptive, atheoretical country chapters which, while informative, do little to advance readers toward a theory of either legislative or committee behavior. On the other hand, Malcolm Shaw's strong concluding essay is helpful in this respect. By comparing the salient findings of the country chapters, he has developed some reasonable explanations for varying levels of committee strength, linking committee status quite correctly to both the nature of the legislature's position in the constitutional structure and the nature of the political party system. He also detects several important but less apparent characteristics of all committees regardless of their strength —informality, privacy, diminished partisanship—which taken together do much to add to our understanding of the complex relationship between legislatures and their committees.

MICHAEL L. MEZEY
*De Paul University*

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The Question of Palestine *by Edward W. Said. New York, Times Books, 1979. 265 pp. $12.50*

Edward Said makes no pretenses about writing as a detached observer. His book is a polemic, presenting the Palestinian case to the American public. The tone and mood of the book swing wildly back and forth between an anguished cry at the unfairness of history and a sober attempt to ask what is possible for Palestinians given the reality of a Jewish society and state that will not go away.

Zionism—its character and effects upon the Palestinians—is Said's consuming concern. In his most passionate moments, Zionism becomes a monster. Its history is characterized by "apartheid" policies of oppression and terror against the Palestinians (even against United Nations officials and the British), by state-sanctioned terror, and by international lawlessness. "All this makes Palestinian 'terror' a very pale and incompetent thing" (p. 172). But Zionism is even more than that. It is a representation of the poisonous, Orientalist view of the Arab. It is the darling of American liberalism. It is even responsible, in an odd way, for the consolidation of police states in the Arab Middle East as well as the absence of freedom of expression and a whole set of human-rights abuses in those states (p. 88).

At other times in the book, Said seems almost to be apologizing for his outbursts. He notes the horrors of European anti-Semitism, which bred Zionism, the achievements of Israel for Jews, and the support for it among its people and around the world (p. 214). And, after raising the pernicious analogy with South African apartheid policies, he recants by writing "that Israeli Zionism and Palestinian resistance do not have pristine, relatively uncomplicated characteristics of the black majority versus the white minority struggle in southern Africa" (p. 214). At one point, he even intimates that the real enemy may not be Israeli Zionism as such, for "the powerfully influential American Jewish community still imposes its money and its reductive view of things on the Israeli will" (p. 112).

At his best, Said attempts to come to grips with the stubborn fact that both the Jews of Israel and the Palestinians will not quietly disappear. He argues forcefully for the creation of a Palestinian ministate alongside Israel, not only as an expression of Palestinian national rights but also as an important step towards peace between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. He rails against the Camp David accords, thus missing, despite all their flaws and pitfalls, some of their tremendous achievements and opportunities. After all, in a book in which Said repeatedly cites Zionism's denial of the Palestinians' national rights, how can he so easily dismiss a document in which the Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin no less, affirms "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements"? Nevertheless, the attempt by as important a thinker as Said to deal forthrightly with the stubbornness of the reality we have inherited in the ceaseless Middle East conflict is in itself significant.

If only now that could be accomplished by others without the charges and countercharges of terrorism, barbarism, and worse. For every claim by Said that Zionism has totally denied the Palestinian presence and Palestinian national rights, there is someone else claiming, "No Palestinian spokesman can bring himself to say about the Jews what many Jews now say about the Palestinians: that they have a national identity, legitimate rights, a genuine movement of national liberation" (Leon Wieseltier in *The New*

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*Republic*). For every quotation by a Zionist that Said can find condemning Muslim Arabs for "the passion for murder deeply rooted in their blood," Yonah Alexander can find an Arab quotation, even in a paper for children, identifying "Allah's enemies, the Zionists who are bloodsuckers and killers of innocent children" (*The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict*, Praeger, 1973).

A number of Israeli and Palestinian thinkers and policymakers, among them Said, have come a long way during the last four years in recognizing the mutual compromises needed to produce answers to the question of Palestine. Some have even engaged in direct dialogue with those on the other side. Further progress, I think, will mean avoiding Said's route of mixing collective introspection and a hardheaded confrontation with reality, on the one hand, with invective and polemics, on the other.

JOEL S. MIGDAL
*University of Washington*

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

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
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
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

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
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

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